Post Election Violence In Nigeria
Experiences with the 2011 Elections

Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC)
THE 2011 POST ELECTION VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

BY

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FOREWORD

In this report, the authors document and analyze the violence that occurred in the aftermath of the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. As the authors note, election violence in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon, considering that even the 1959 independence elections organized by the departing colonial authorities were marked by various degrees of violence. What have changed over the years, however, are the frequency, ramifications and intensity of electoral violence, and these are the elements that must be carefully studied, understood and addressed in order to improve election security in Nigeria. As a background to its analysis, this report explores the various contexts within which electoral violence occurs in Nigeria, and presents socio-economic and structural explanations for the outbreak of the 2011 post-election violence. One point that was particularly highlighted in the report is the way in which tensions arising from lack of certainty in the practice of zoning/rotation of presidency by the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) may have contributed to the post election violence. However, it remains debatable how much weight we can attach to a single factor like that in explaining the violence.

Born of colonial origins, Nigeria is a mosaic of ethno linguistic groups and religious traditions. This diversity has historically posed a daunting challenge to governance and stability in Nigeria, considering that many groups feel politically and economically excluded by the extremely weak and corrupt Nigerian state. Indeed, regional, ethnic and religious divisions in Nigeria have for long provided a basis for competition among the elite, and this competition is usually most pronounced during elections. It is against this general backdrop that the report locates the specificities of the 2011 post-election violence. Still, it must be stressed that ethno-linguistic and religious differences in themselves do not explain conflicts, even if in the Nigerian situation they have become necessary factors in political conflicts. What political scientists must do is to understand the overarching explanatory variables that translate differences into politically pertinent conflicts.

Consequently, to properly anchor the explanations provided in this report for the outbreak of the 2011 post-election violence, it is important to note that the rising insecurity associated with Nigerian elections should not be treated sui generis. Election insecurity is organically linked to broader insecurity, which are usually exacerbated during elections. I argue that insecurity, including insecurity during elections, is rooted in the evolution of Nigeria’s political economy, which also shapes the character of the Nigerian state and its ruling class. At a general level, the making of the Nigerian state was marked by the rise to political pertinence of the petty bourgeoisie. The nature of petty bourgeois class rule focuses social contradictions directly on the state, making it difficult for the state to express a relative autonomy from specific class interests and, therefore, to appear and be accepted as representing the collective interests of the people-nation. Instead, the state is seen as the expression of private and sectional interests variously defined in partisan, ethnic, religious and regional terms. Since it is through elections that we determine those who control this enormous, yet privatized state; electoral contests become extremely charged and prone to violence. It is this character of the Nigerian state and its ruling class that explains the increasing insecurity in the country, as various factions of the ruling class have sought to control the state and use the state for private/sectional interests particularly during elections.
In addition to the above overarching explanation, a more specific explanation of the post-election violence in 2011, which needs to be highlighted, is what I call a crisis of expectation in the context of zero-sum political competition. Following the flawed 2007 elections and the widespread public demand for far reaching electoral reforms in its aftermath, there was a palpable rise in expectations that the 2011 election would be more credible, especially in the wake of the appointment of a new Commission widely praised for quality of its leadership. But then, the zero-sum nature of political competition by the petty bourgeoisie persisted. This led to negative mobilization of party supporters into believing that once the elections were free and fair, then their party must win. The converse was then that if ‘our party’ loses, then the elections were not free and fair. Expectedly, these rising expectations turned to a sense of injustice once their parties failed to win, and since party support also mirrored wider ethnic and religious differences, this sense of injustice rapidly deteriorated into ethno-religious violence. It was this type of negative mobilization that accounted for much of the violence that followed the announcement of the result of the 2011 presidential election.

To address the challenges posed by electoral insecurity in Nigeria, this report advocates more action by the federal and state governments to deter future outbreak of violence. The actions required include publishing reports of commissions of inquiry into the 2011 post-election violence, and implementation as appropriate of their recommendations, as well as the recommendations contained in government white papers; identification and punishment of individuals responsible for organizing or encouraging the post-election violence as well as those involved in the killings, assault and destruction; review of deployment plans and coordination arrangements among different security agencies to ensure that security agents are deployed promptly in the event of any future outbreak of violence; provision of adequate funding to security and law enforcement agencies to enable them deter, arrest, and prosecute offenders; as well as improvement of intelligence, investigation and prosecution capacity of security agencies, especially the Nigeria Police.

I commend the authors of this report and the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) for this publication. Based on strong field research, the recommendations of the report will no doubt contribute immensely to improving election security in Nigeria. I therefore recommend it as a vital resource to students of Nigerian politics, policy makers and the general reader, who may be interested in understanding election (in)security in Nigeria and the possible means of addressing it, particularly as the country prepares for the 2015 general elections.

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INTRODUCTION

Results in Nigerian elections come in two separate columns. One records the votes cast at polling stations; the other the number of people killed around the time of the election. Elections involve a set of activities leading to the selection of one or more persons out of many to serve in positions of authority in a society. Political scientists and development theorists link free, fair and credible elections to democratic governance, peace and development. In brief, they argue that free, fair and credible elections provide the basis for the emergence of democratic, accountable and legitimate governments with the capacity to initiate and implement clearly articulated development programmes. Again, they claim that free, fair and credible elections empower the electorate to hold the government accountable and to demand strong credentials and feasible development agenda from prospective government officials. In other words, free, fair and credible elections bestow on governments the legitimate authority to, on one hand, initiate and implement policies; while on the other hand, they empower the citizens to hold governments accountable for their actions and/or inactions. Credible elections are, therefore, sine qua non for democratic governance, political stability and national development.

Since 1999, elections have become more regular in Nigeria. Between 1999 and 2011, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) conducted four consecutive general elections. Nigeria’s attempt to practice parliamentary democracy at independence in 1960 was interrupted by a military coup in 1966 (Dudley 1982). In 1979, Nigeria made a transition from military rule to presidential democracy. Again, the democratic government was removed via a military coup in 1983 (Diamond 1988, Joseph 1991). The third democratic experiment in Nigeria began in 1989 but was aborted in 1993 following the annulment of the presidential election, which would have marked the highpoint of the transition. Following intense domestic and international pressures on the military government, as well as the sudden demise of the then military Head of State General Sani Abacha, the military government finally relinquished power to an elected civilian government in May 1999 (Ihonvbere and Shaw 1998, Osaghae 1998). The period since 1999 has been marked by an extra-ordinary progress towards the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria, considering that the country is able to conduct four consecutive general elections for the first time in its political history (Oyovbaire 2008).

Although elections are now more regular in Nigeria, the quality of these elections is a matter of grave concern to both the actors and observers. The 2003 and 2007 elections were particularly marked by dissatisfaction by candidates, voters and observers (Ibrahim and Ibeanu 2009). Dissatisfaction with the 2007 general elections reflected in the barrage of litigations brought before the election tribunals and courts as well as the number of election results that were nullified (INEC 2007, Ugochukwu 2009). Unlike the 2007 elections, the April 2011 general elections in Nigeria were adjudged by observers and analysts as the most credible election in the series of elections organized since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999. The success of the 2011 elections can be attributed to the remedial measures taken by both the government and the Independent National

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Electoral Commission (INEC) in the aftermath of the 2007 general elections to restore the credibility of the electoral process. Just to illustrate, in June 2010, President Goodluck Jonathan appointed Professor Attahiru Jega, a respected academic and activist as the chairman of INEC. The appointment of Professor Jega boosted public confidence in INEC. The government also ensured adequate and timely funding of the Commission. The federal government reportedly released over 87 billion naira (about US $580 million) to INEC to support the Commission’s preparations for the 2011 elections (Gberie 2011: 9). In addition, the Nigerian National Assembly undertook a major revision of the legal framework for elections in Nigeria, including the 1999 Constitution and the Electoral Act. To complement government’s efforts, INEC adopted far-reaching measures to ensure the success of the 2011 elections. For instance, INEC made a critical decision to discard the existing voters register which was highly discredited and to compile a new one just four months to the April 2011 elections. Also, the Commission strengthened its election personnel by recruiting members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) and staff of federal universities to serve as ad hoc registration and polling staff. The efforts of both INEC and the government to restore the credibility of Nigeria’s electoral process paid off with the success of the 2011 general elections.

The 2011 general elections were adjudged by many observers as the most credible election organized by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) since 1999. For example, Terence McCulley, U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, praised the National Assembly election as the first-ever ‘credible, transparent, free and fair general election’ in Nigeria, and declared that it provided ‘a historic opportunity for Nigeria to consolidate its democracy and further expand its voice on the world stage’ (Agbambu and Ajayi 2011). The ECOWAS observation mission described the presidential poll as ‘fair and transparent’ (ICG 2011: 4), while the EU Election Observation Mission to Nigeria, said ‘the 2011 general elections marked an important step towards strengthening democratic elections in Nigeria, but challenges remain’ (EU EOM 2011: 1). Clement Nwankwo, head of the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) in Abuja and who is working with more than 20 civil society groups in the Nigerian Civil Society Election Situation Room to monitor elections said: ‘we have not seen large-scale reports of malpractice, nor of collusion between electoral officials and politicians’ (Omokri 2011). The credibility of the 2011 general elections further reflects in the fewer number of litigations it attracted compared to the barrage of cases brought before the election tribunals and courts as well as the number of election results nullified by the tribunals and courts in the aftermath of the 2007 elections (INEC 2007, Ugochukwu 2009, EU EOM 2011).

The widely acclaimed success of the 2011 elections was dented by post-election violence that broke out following the announcement of the results of the presidential elections. The 2011 post-election violence is seen by many as the bloodiest incident of electoral violence in Nigeria’s history (Bekoe 2011, Ajayi 2011, HRW 2011, ICG 2011, Shuaibu and Iroegbu 2011). In fourteen Northern States, including Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna, and Bauchi States, where the post-election violence was most prevalent, violent protesters killed several people, including an unspecified number of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members²; torched, looted or destroyed businesses, churches and

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² NYSC programme is a one year mandatory national service by Nigerian graduates who are below the age of 30 years. The programme was decreed by the military government in 1972, just after the end of the Nigerian civil war, to encourage social mobility and promote national integration. INEC recruited mostly NYSC members as Ad Hoc Presiding Officers during the 2011 general elections.
private houses (Shuaibu and Iroegbu 2011, HRW 2011). In the aftermath of the violence, thousands of people were displaced from their homes and places of business.

Although the Nigeria Police and other security agencies appeared startled by the outbreak of post-election violence, the violence did not come to many observers as a surprise, considering that analysts had warned that a contest which pitched two popular candidates from Northern and Southern Nigeria against each other as a result of the stepping-down of the power-sharing arrangement would inevitably culminate in violence (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart 2010: 8). In March 2011, Amnesty International issued a report in which it noted that hundreds of people had already been killed in 'politically motivated, communal and sectarian violence across Nigeria ahead of presidential and parliamentary polls', and advised the authorities to take immediate action to prevent further violence (Amnesty International 2011: 5). This advice was ignored to the peril of several Nigerians who died in the post-election bloodbath. Several media houses and other independent observers produced reports that offered clues of what was to come (Campbell 2010). In the weeks preceding the 2011 presidential election, Nigeria had experienced a wave of violent incidents ranging from communal unrest to bombings. On the eve of the National Assembly elections held on 9 April 2011, a bomb attack at the INEC office in Suleja, Niger State, killed at least 10 people and injured several others (Ploch 2012: 7). There were also bomb explosions in the Northern city of Maiduguri, Borno State, where the Boko Haram Islamic militant group is most active (Bekoe 2011). A few months before the 2011 general elections, over 200 persons had lost their lives in communal unrests in Plateau State (Amnesty International 2011: 6). Furthermore, there were reports of election-related assassinations of political candidates and their supporters, and clashes between party supporters. Despite predictions of violence, the government did not seem to have done much to prevent its outbreak. According to Amnesty International (2011: 5), there were no general countrywide anti-electoral violence campaigns, no public awareness programmes, and no adequate investigations, prosecution and conviction of culprits from pre-election violent incidents. Thus, one can conclude that the authorities saw the 2011 post-election violence coming, but did not do much to prevent it.

While the 2011 post-election violence may be outstanding in terms of its magnitude, severity and consequences, it is pertinent to note that elections are synonymous with violence in Nigeria. All the eight general elections conducted in Nigeria since independence in 1960 (including 1964, 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections) have been marred by various degrees of violence (Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research 2002). The announcement of the results of the Western Region elections in 1965 was followed by violence and breakdown of law and order in the region. It was the Western Region crisis that gave rise to the infamous 'Operation Wetie' - an atrocious practice of dousing political opponents in petrol and setting them ablaze (Anifowose 1982, Soeze 2011). In 1983, allegations of rigging by the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) led to bloody post-election crisis in Ondo State (Babarinsa 2003). In 1993, the results of the presidential elections won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola was annulled by then military ruler, Ibrahim Babangida, leading to the ‘June 12’ crisis that took the lives of many Nigerians. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has not been devoid of electoral violence. Between 1999 and 2011, thousands of people have died in election related violence (ICG 2011: 3). Many of those that lost their lives in post-election
violence in Nigeria were allegedly killed by members of the notoriously violent ‘Mobile Police’ (MOPOL) and other security agencies.  

Unlike previous incidents of post-election violence in Nigeria that attracted considerable documentation and analysis, only a few studies have attempted to document and analyze the 2011 post-election violence (Bekoe 2011, NAPEN 2011, Ploch 2012). Although existing literature on the 2011 post-election violence provide useful data and insights into the unrest, a more rigorous and systematic analysis of the problem is required. The aim of this study is, therefore, to document and analyze the 2011 post-election violence, and to identify and recommend reforms required in preventing the recurrence of post-election violence in Nigeria. In specific terms, this study provides analyses of the triggers and manifestation of the April 2011 post-election violence, documents and reports the experiences survivors, and identifies reforms and measures required to address the problem of post-election violence in Nigeria. The outcome of this study will serve as a basis for dealing with post-election violence. Data used in this study were derived mainly from documents, including published literature, official documents, and media reports. Primary data were also obtained from eye witness accounts and testimonies of individuals that experienced post-election violence.

This study is made up of six sections. Following this introduction is the second section which examines the conceptual background of post-election violence, focusing on the meaning, triggers, and manifestation of post-election violence. The third section explores the history of post-election violence in Nigeria, beginning from the late colonial period till date. The section compares incidents of post-election violence across different periods of Nigeria’s history. The fourth section presents the results of the empirical analyses of the April 2011 post-election violence. Here, the triggers, patterns and manifestations of post-election violence during the 2011 general elections were highlighted. The fifth section identifies and analyzes the reforms and measures adopted by the government to prevent and/or manage post-election violence in Nigeria. These measures were interrogated in the light of the experiences of other African countries including Kenya, Ethiopia and Congo. Finally, the sixth section discusses the lessons learned from historical, empirical, and comparative analysis of post-election violence in Nigeria, and recommends strategies for preventing post-election during the 2015 general elections.

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CHAPTER ONE
Conceptualizing Post-Election Violence

Post-election violence is a specific form of electoral violence. Electoral violence is “any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced ‘protection’, blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination’ (Fischer 2002: 8). The target of electoral violence can be people, places, data, or things. In an attempt to influence the electoral process, perpetrators of electoral violence may attempt to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll and determine the winners of competitive races for political office (UNDP 2009: 4).

Three key elements in the above definition of electoral violence are worthy to note. The first is that like any other form of violence, electoral violence manifests in physical forms (kidnapping, killing, and destruction of property) and non-physical forms (threats, intimidation and blackmail) (Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance 2011: 15). Secondly, the main goal of electoral violence is to influence the electoral process, either by changing the outcome of elections or by disrupting the electoral process. Thirdly, electoral violence can occur at different periods in the election cycle; that is, before, during, or after election. Therefore, what distinguishes post-election violence from other forms of electoral violence is the fact that it occurs just after polling, usually during or after collation and announcement of election results.

In interrogating post-election violence, analysts focus on the election cycle, tracking the differences between election violence at the various stages of the election cycle. An election cycle is typically made up of three stages: the pre-election phase, the election period, and the post-election phase. Experts place a lot of emphasis on studying and observing violent activities around the election cycle. They see the electoral cycle approach as useful in developing conflict prevention and management strategies as well as providing assistance to countries struggling with the problem of electoral violence (Kammerud 2011: 2). Underlying the electoral cycle approach is the assumption that while violence can occur at any time in the election cycle and exhibit similar manifestations, there are markers that differentiate the nature of violence that occur at different periods in an election cycle (UNDP 2009: 20, Balogun 2003).

To get a good grasp of how electoral violence plays out at the different phases of the electoral cycle, it is important to first gain a detailed understanding of the three stages of the election cycle, namely pre-election, election, and post-election phases. The pre-election phase includes the long run-up to elections – specifically, the party nomination and campaign processes (Sisk 2008: 14, UNDP 2009, Adoke 2011). Election violence at this stage usually manifests in intra-party and inter-party clashes arising from struggles over party nomination and access to the electorate (Ladan 2007). Violence at the pre-election stage would usually take the form of inflammatory rhetoric, attacks on politicians, and party supporters (Sisk 2008). Most of the precipitating factors for post-election violence begin at this stage. Statements and comments made by politicians could become potentially volatile, and could be construed by followers or supporters as a call to violence before, during and after elections (Ofili 2011: 14).

The election phase includes activities around the polling such as distribution of election materials, accreditation of voters, and actual voting. These activities normally take place
on the polling day. Acts of violence at the election phase often involve voter intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes or ballot papers, ballot stuffing, and attack on election officials and observers. Violence at the election phase would normally begin from the polling centers and may tend to spread thereafter.

The post-election phase usually starts from the collation and announcement of election results to litigation and settlement of election disputes. Violence at this phase is usually triggered by issues emanating from the pre-election and election phases. Post-election violence manifests in several ways including attacks on rival candidates, party officials and supporters; as well as violent street protests (UNDP 2009: 22). They could also include shooting, killings, arson, wanton destruction of property, usually perpetrated by officials and/or supporters of different political parties (Adoke 2011).

While all forms of electoral violence may have similar remote causes and manifest in comparable ways, they are not always triggered by the same factors. Election experts argue that there is a need to identify the causes, types, and manifestations of election violence to enable stakeholders develop a ‘strategic design of prevention and management programmes that can forestall recurrence’ (Matlosa et al. 2010: 7).

**Remote causes of electoral violence**

At the roots of electoral violence in Nigeria are several issues some of which do not have any direct relationship with the country’s electoral process. These issues define the ways electoral violence can play out. The remote causes of electoral violence in Nigeria include saliency of communal identities in politics and communal tensions, decline in trust and social capital among communities, culture of impunity, economic vulnerabilities, institutional and behavioural issues such as erosion of trust in the electoral justice system, and lack of internal democracy in political parties.

*Cleavage structure, saliency of ethnicity in Nigerian politics and communal tensions*

Since the colonial era, ethnic, regional and religious divisions constitute the main form of expression of social cleavage in Nigeria. In Nigeria, political parties and candidates are seen as representatives of a particular ethnic, regional or religious group and voters do most times support parties and candidates in these terms. As a result, the voting pattern in Nigerian elections has mostly followed the configuration of ethnic, regional and religious cleavages. At local and national levels, tensions arising from communal identity conflicts have had a major influence on electoral contest and the political process. Beginning from the early independence period, sectarian conflicts have mixed with political differences, resulting to electoral violence. In Nigeria’s political landscape, it is difficult to draw a line indicating where communal tensions end and where political conflicts begin. Part of the reason why it is difficult to separate communal tension and political conflict is because of the nature of Nigerian politics, which Richard Joseph (1991) describes as ‘prebendal politics’. The concentration of resources in the state makes the possession of state powers a means to the end of controlling state resources. The system of prebendal politics spurs individuals, groups, communities and constituencies to seek to capture state power in order to control state resources. Those who are already in control of state power often hold strongly onto it by suppressing their opponents. Under this circumstance, the democratic tradition of alternation of power among individuals and political parties is difficult to achieve. Once in control of state power, the incumbents try to retain it by all means, including use of violence. At the same time, those aspiring to take over power sometimes pursue their goal by employing extreme
measures such as violence. In the context of stiff competition for power, individuals employ ethnic, communal and religious symbols and sentiments in order to outwit their rivals. This eventually drags an entire ethnic, regional or religious community into political competition which is supposed to be squarely between political parties. Once candidates and political parties are identified with a particular ethnic, regional or religious group, victory or defeat in the electoral contest is defined in communal terms. Thus, electoral violence is typically triggered by attempts by individuals and political groups to use ‘all available means’, including the use of violence, to defend their ‘communal honour’.

Decline in trust and social capital among communities
Since the colonial era, ethnic, regional and religious communities in Nigeria have engaged each other in violent confrontations. In their studies of ethnic relations in Nigeria, Leonard Plotnicov (1971), Okwudiba Nnoli (1978), and Olawale Albert (1995) presented lucid accounts of these inter-group clashes. Years of violent confrontations by various communal groups in Nigeria have eroded trust and social capital existing in the communities, making the communities vulnerable to political manipulation. Communal tensions not related to elections can degenerate into bloodshed during elections. In Nigeria, people who live outside their state of origin are most times excluded from participating in governance and political life of their place of residence because they are perceived as ‘non-indigenes’ (Bach 1997, Ostein 2009). In the past, attempts by ‘non-indigenes’ to resist their exclusion from politics and governance have resulted in highly contested elections and violence (Best 2007, Orji 2011). The violence in Nigeria’s northern city of Jos illustrates the tendency by politicians to exploit mistrust among communities to bolster their support bases. The governor of Plateau State, (Jos is the capital city of Plateau State), reportedly not only favours members of his own ethnic community but also manipulates their perceived grievances against the other group (Ostein 2009, Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart 2010). In the context of intense inter-group political struggles such as the one between ‘indigene’ and ‘non-indigene’ communities, the politicians are inclined to appeal to communal animosities and negative stereotypes, making it difficult for local conflicts to be resolved, and for free, fair and transparent electoral competition to take place.

Culture of impunity
There is a culture of impunity in Nigeria. The Nigerian legal system and law enforcement agencies are not able to arrest, prosecute, and convict offenders; as such, victims of violence normally receive little or no redress. Members of the security forces implicated in violations of civil and political rights, including electoral violence, are also not usually held accountable. The awareness of the possibilities of getting away with acts of violence has fostered unabated continuation of those acts. Reports indicate that more than 11,000 people were killed in hundreds of separate outbreaks of politically motivated communal violence in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007 (Aniekwe and Kushie 2011: 18). During the same period, the country recorded several high profile cases of politically motivated assassinations (Ladan and Kiru 2005). In all these, no one was convicted (ICG 2011: 1). The tendency of political actors to use violence in the electoral process is defined by the state’s capacity to enforce law and order. Sadly, the capacity of Nigerian State to enforce law and order is undermined by the erosion of the states’ monopoly of the use of violence. The state’s monopoly of use of violence in Nigeria is gravely challenged by the activities of ‘cult gangs’, ‘area boys’, ethnic militias, unlicensed vigilante groups, and armed bandits that operate in rural and urban areas (Adewale
2005, Pratten 2006, Higazi 2008, and Fourchard 2008). The armed operations of these groups are aided by the illicit and unrestrained flow of small arms (Hazen and Horner 2007). As Nigeria’s experience demonstrates, political actors can sometimes take control of these armed groups and use them to perpetrate electoral violence (HRW 2005 and 2007). In all, the political elite and state officials, who support and use armed groups to achieve political ends, are the greatest beneficiaries of the erosion of the state’s monopoly of use of violence, and the culture of impunity that promotes electoral violence.

Economic vulnerabilities
High rate of illiteracy, unemployment and poverty is a vital sign of underdevelopment. In Nigeria, a large section of the population lack access to opportunities and resources to actualize their potentials. This situation breeds a class of economically marginalized people (mostly youths) who can be used to perpetrate electoral violence. This group of people is pliant and easily enticed by the wealthy violent entrepreneurs who sponsor most of the violent political encounters. Electoral violence in Nigeria is mostly carried out by gangs whose members are openly recruited, financed, and sometimes, armed by politicians, state officials, and party officials or their representatives. Members of these gangs are mostly illiterate, unemployed and poor young men, who are mobilized to attack their sponsors’ rivals, intimidate members of the public, rig elections, and protect their patrons from similar attacks (Aniekwe and Kushie 2011: 20).

Erosion of trust in the electoral justice system
The electoral justice system involves the prosecution of offences and the resolution of petitions against election results. The belief by political actors that they cannot secure justice in election tribunal/courts reduces their inclination to seek legal redress to allegations of election fraud. The situation in Nigeria relates to Kenya’s experience during 2007 election, where Raila Odinga out-rightly rejected the advice by the US that ‘those alleging vote tampering may pursue legal remedies’, maintaining that the election dispute was not a legal matter but a political conflict that required a political solution (East African Standard [Nairobi], 30 December 2007). Odinga’s party, the ODM, also declared that it would not go to court over the contested election results because it had no confidence in Kenya’s judicial system, an institution that has failed to resolve past political disputes and is controlled by President Kibaki’s loyalists (Harneit-Sievers and Peters 2008: 137, Mutua 2001). During Nigeria’s 2011 elections, the leading opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, was reported by the national television as saying that he will not lodge petition regarding the outcome of the election since his previous attempts at legally challenging election outcomes did not yield any meaningful result. In Nigeria, the judiciary, which is central to electoral dispute resolution, enjoys a considerable degree of credibility at the federal level due to some landmark judgments it has given in the past. However, the credibility of Nigeria’s judiciary was badly dented by revelations emerging from a dispute between the two most senior judicial officers in the country – the Chief Justice of the Federation and the President of the Court of Appeal (Ajaero 2011, Abimboye 2011). The disclosure by the President of the Court of Appeal that the Chief Justice of the Federation tried to influence the Sokoto State governorship election appeal indicates that the judiciary is prone to corruption and vulnerable to

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4 In response to attempts by the Chief Justice of the Federation to remove him as the President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Ayo Isa Salami accused the Chief Justice of trying to influence the decision on Sokoto State governorship election appeal. The allegation made many people to suspect that some other judgments given by the judiciary may have been influenced.
interference. This is, perhaps, why many politicians find it more rewarding to seek redress through violence rather than the judicial process.

Low level of internal party democracy
Political parties are a major building block of democracy. However, the inability of many political parties in Nigeria to operate in a democratic manner introduces tension and violence in the electoral process. In Nigeria, political godfathers control the parties at local and national levels (HRW 2007, Omobowale and Olanrewaju 2007). These godfathers select the delegates who elect party leaders and candidates. Through their control of the delegates, the godfathers decide who gets the party’s nomination and leadership positions. The activities of political godfathers create so much dissatisfaction in the political process because of their disregard of the formal procedures for party elections and nomination of candidates. Ibrahim (2007: 5) identifies five tactics used by Nigerian political godfathers to eliminate popular candidates from party primaries. These include: 1) declaration of one candidate as the ‘consensus’ candidate and the insistence by the godfathers that those entitled to vote must support the candidate and that other aspirants must withdraw, 2) use of zoning and other procedures to exclude unwanted candidates by moving the party zone for a particular seat or position to an area where the excluded candidate is not local, 3) use of violence by thugs or security personnel to harass and intimidate candidates (and the supporters of candidates) who oppose the godfathers’ protégés, 4) use of money to bribe officials and induce voters to support particular candidates, and 5) application of what Nigerians call ‘results by declaration’: an aspirant wins a nomination or election, but polling officials disregard the results and declare the loser the winner. In some instances, results of primary elections are simply overturned by the party godfathers. To illustrate with the 2011 general elections, Olu Agunloye was replaced as candidate for one of the Ondo State senatorial seats by the party leadership. This forced him to defect from Labour Party to the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). In another case, Mohammed Abacha’s victory in the CPC gubernatorial primary for Kano State was rejected by the party leadership. He was replaced by Lawal Ja’afaru Isa despite the case he filed in court (ICG 2011: 14-15). Party members who dare to express their dissatisfaction with the mafia-style political process in the parties are normally charged with engaging in ‘anti-party’ activities and suspended or expelled from the party. Depending on the capacity of the disgruntled party members to fight back, serious intra-party crisis and violence often follow each episode of party convention in Nigeria.

Immediate causes of electoral violence
There are a number of issues that could immediately trigger electoral violence. These include issues relating to the integrity of elections, use of inflammatory rhetoric, and changes in political institution.

Integrity of elections
Questions about the transparency and fairness of the electoral process, credibility of election authority, neutrality or partisanship of election management authority, lack of faith in the Electoral Commission, lack of independence of the Electoral Commission, and the perception that an election was rigged may play a major role in instigating electoral violence. Doubts over the integrity of elections can create frustration among stakeholders in the electoral process, which can transform into violence. As Ethiopia’s experience illustrates, delays by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) in announcing the 2005 election results triggered public protest which culminated in several
days of violence (Barnes 2006). The issue of election integrity is even more problematic in countries where ethnicity is salient in politics. In such societies, the victory or defeat of a particular candidate or party is perceived as victory/defeat of an entire community. As such, any form of irregularities that would prevent a candidate or his/her community from clinching electoral victory is often opposed, sometimes violently, by the entire community (Orji 2010).

**Inflammatory rhetoric**

Spread of rumor and inflammatory messages about an election or its outcome could be an immediate trigger of electoral violence. The electoral violence in Kenya’s 2007 election and Nigeria’s 2011 elections were attributed mainly to the inflammatory messages sent by supporters of different candidates (Harwood and Campbell 2010, Ofili 2011: 3). In the Nigerian case, several unguarded utterances were attributed to the candidates while some politicians were accused of using innuendoes to incite the public to violence (William 2011). Inflammatory rhetoric sent via the social media worsened the tensions created by religious and ethnic campaigning by supporters of President Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari. There were also SMS that attempted to stir up Muslims against President Jonathan and Northern Muslim governors perceived to be supporting him. The anti-Jonathan rhetoric in the North hardened the stance of many Southerners against Buhari, setting up an inevitable clash between followers of Buhari and Jonathan. Both local and foreign media have also been accused of fanning the already inflamed discourse by reporting partisan stories with sensational headlines. An example of such sensational headlines is the one by *The Nation*, a major daily newspaper in Nigeria which carried the header: ‘The North is against Jonathan’ (Omondi, 2011). Publishing provocative stories during election periods when tempers are charged may incite supporters of different parties to violence.

**Institutional changes**

Sudden shifts in institutional arrangements that guide election can result in opposition and violence. This is illustrated by Nigeria’s experience where the relegation of the power-sharing arrangement which guided the previous election resulted in vigorous opposition and violence. For many analysts, the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria reflects the regional and religious divisions and simmering tensions created by debates over power sharing modalities in the aftermath of the demise of President Umaru Yar’Adua. Many in the North believe that President Jonathan, a Christian and Southerner, should have conceded his presidential bid to a Northerner and Muslim in honor of the unwritten rotation of power between the North and South. Umaru Yar’Adua, a Northerner and Muslim, succeeded President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Southerner and Christian, who ruled Nigeria for eight years beginning from 1999. Unfortunately, Yar’Adua died untimely in 2010, midway through his term, paving the way for then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to emerge as president. The proponents of power sharing insist that Jonathan should not have contested the presidency because the North had not completed its ‘turn’. The 2011 post-election violence can therefore be seen as an expression of the frustration caused by the failure of Muhammadu Buhari, a Northerner and Muslim, to reclaim the North’s control of the presidency from President Jonathan.

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CHAPTER TWO
Post-Election Violence in Historical Context

Nigeria has a long, discontinuous history of elections, spanning more than eighty years, beginning from 1923 when the first election in the country was held. The 1923 election did not allow for popular participation. The 1922 Constitution that provided the legal framework for the election in Nigeria laid down highly restrictive electoral law for the country. As a result, the initial elections in Nigeria were not based on universal adult suffrage; instead, they were guided by an income-based male suffrage. The restrictive nature of the colonial electoral system is exemplified by the regulation which stipulated that only adult males with a gross national income, from all sources, of not less than one hundred pounds (£100.00) were allowed to vote. Under this circumstance, just a small fraction of adult males were considered eligible to vote. According to Okafor (1981: 197), only 3,000 and 1,000 out of an estimated 40,000 and 10,000 adult African males in Lagos and Calabar, respectively were eligible to vote. Other aspects of the restrictive electoral system include the limiting of political activities in Nigeria to only Lagos and Calabar, the requirement that every candidate for nomination to a position shall deposit a sum of ten pounds (£10.00) towards the cost of the election, and the rule that requires all prospective voters to register in their municipal areas. This particular regulation raised so much anxiety as some prospective voters were concerned that the colonial state would use such registration exercise as basis to impose further taxes and rates.

The elections held between 1923 and 1954 were based on the restrictive electoral laws imposed by the colonial state. However, following the enactment of the Lytton Constitution of 1954, Nigeria’s electoral landscape became more liberalized. The Constitution provided the legal framework for the first general election in Nigeria based on an adult suffrage that is broader than what hitherto exists. In the first place, the Constitution diversified the scope of elections, making provision for separate elections into the regional and central legislatures. To this end, different electoral laws were put in place for the three regions of Nigeria. Thus, in the Eastern Region, only persons above 21 years were allowed to vote; in the Western Region, only adult males who paid taxes could vote; while in the Northern Region, voting was by the indirect college system limited only to adult male tax payers. Additionally, a prospective election candidate was required to: (1) be a British subject or a British protected person of the age of 21 or more; (2) be born in the region in which he was seeking election or his father was born in that region; and (3) be resident in that region for a continuous period immediately before the date of election of at least three years in the case of the Northern Region, or at least one year in the case of the Eastern and Western regions (Nnadozie 2007: 52-53).

This historical analysis of post-election violence in Nigeria would focus on elections conducted since 1954. Nigeria has organized ten general elections and numerous regional/state/local elections between 1954 and 2011. Of these elections, the 1965, 1983 and 2011 witnessed significant incidents of post-election violence. All the general elections organized in Nigeria since 1954 can be broadly categorized into two: consolidation and transition elections. Transition elections are the general elections organized by a departing political authority, which include those organized by the departing colonial authorities in 1954 and 1959, and those organized by military regimes in 1979, 1993 and 1999. On the other hand, consolidation elections are general elections

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**Transition elections**

Based on available records, transition elections are relatively more peaceful than consolidation elections. For instance, the 1954 and 1959 elections were devoid of large scale violence. Only isolated incidents involving pre-election clashes between supporters and thugs working for rival political parties in specific regions as well as reports of acts of intimidation (including unlawful arrest, detention, and assault) of opposition politicians were reported (Mackenzie and Robinson 1960, The Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research 2002). In his assessment of the 1959 election, Kenneth Post (1964: 292, 345) wrote:

> …polling in the 311 constituencies at issue went off with remarkable smoothness. One particularly praise worthy feature was the almost complete absence of outbreaks of violence on polling day. Despite the recurrent violence of the campaign, the gloomy prophecies of rioting on December 12th were not fulfilled. The innate decency and good sense of the Nigerian elector was once more displayed.

The 1979, 1993 and 1999 elections also took place without significant incidents of election-related violence. Although the registration process and all four rounds of the 1999 elections were marred, to varying degrees, by irregularities, and in some cases, outright fraud, observers note that the elections were conducted generally without violence. According to NDI (1999: 32) ‘to all of their credit, the [1999 Presidential] elections proceeded on time, with limited disruption or incidences of violence, and achieved their primary goal of transferring power’. The Commonwealth Observer Group (1999: 24, 27) corroborates this view, noting that ‘there were no significant reports of violence that were election-related…As with the National Assembly campaign, we saw no evidence of violence that was election-related’.

The main explanation for relative absence of violence in transition elections is the role that departing political authority usually play as a strong umpire, relatively independent of the political forces contending to capture power. This posture bestows on the departing political authority the legitimacy and credibility needed to mid-wife relatively peaceful elections with largely acceptable outcome. Again, most transition elections occur at historical junctures where there is consensus in favour of regime change. At this point, it is usually easier for contestants in transition elections to restrain their actions and ensure that they do not jeopardize the transition programme. To this end, candidates

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6 Because the Western Regional Election of 1965 is quite pertinent to our study of post-election violence in Nigeria, we have included it as part of the consolidation elections, regardless of the fact that it was a regional election.
tend to approach the elections with strong sense of restraint and willingness to accept the outcome of the elections irrespective of any blemish that may be associated with it. To sum up the above contention, Amadu Kurfi’s (1983: 243) argues that:

The calm atmosphere prevalent during the 1979 elections was not brought about by the existence of [a] fine political culture in the Nigerian people but was due to the veiled threat of immediate military retribution should law and order breakdown – and worse, the possibility of postponement of the date of hand-over of power to the civilians.

Indeed, the military government intervened in all the transition elections attempting to arbitrate inter-party conflicts and to caution politicians on the need to adhere to the established rules of conduct. During the 1979 elections, for example, the military played open and strong oversight roles on two specific occasions (Koehn 1981: 28). On 28 December 1978, the then Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Shehu Yar'adua, convened a meeting with the five presidential candidates. At the meeting, he warned against the bitter personal attacks which had already surfaced in the campaign and extracted a pledge from each of the candidates that they would endeavour to be fair, would refrain from personal abuse, and would abide by the verdict of the electorate. Again, on 31 March 1979, the then Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo invited all the presidential candidates to another meeting where he repeated criticisms of their personal attacks on one another and specifically instructed each of the candidates to stop making statements that would provoke violence. The implicit message delivered at both meetings was that the military was closely monitoring the electoral process and would not tolerate excesses that could disrupt the elections or threaten peace and national unity.

Consolidation elections
Unlike transition elections, consolidation elections are more prone to violence. This is probably because the political forces with stakes in the elections have more diverse interests and some of these forces are actually in control of state resources and election machinery. Therefore, in most consolidation elections, contending forces in the political process are less able to compromise because their common interest in removing the incumbent political authority have been achieved and there are no much strings that bind them together. The willingness to exhibit political restraint and make compromise declines quickly in the consolidation phase because the common ‘enemy’ has been eliminated, and former opposition now confront each other in a new form of political struggle.

The new form of political struggle involves the former political opposition engaging themselves in fierce political battles. This was the case in the 1960s when the ‘nationalists’ who were formerly opposed to the colonial authorities and demanded their exit, turned around to confront themselves in deadly political encounters after the colonial authorities had departed. Again, the ‘pro-democracy’ forces that fought the military leaders have at different times engaged themselves in lethal political battles after the exit of the military governments. Considering that there is the absence of an independent arbiter (in the form of colonial or military authority) in the consolidation phase, consolidation elections often witness an unmediated collision of the different political forces. In this circumstance, the electoral landscape turns into political battlefield, with electoral contests becoming akin to ‘warfare’. The result of this is keenly
contested elections in which the rule of law is openly violated, all sorts of malpractices are employed to outwit opponents, and election results are bitterly contested by the losers, to the point of taking up arms.

Consolidation elections exhibit some distinctive tendencies including a deliberate attempt by the ruling party (or ‘actual dominant forces’) to contrive and monopolize the electoral space, engineer grand electoral fraud, as well as hatch a deliberate plot to move the process towards a one party dominance in favour of the ruling party. This pattern reflected in the ‘simulated landslide’ victories recorded by the ruling parties in the 1964/65, 1983, 2003, and 2007 elections. In the 1964 Federal election and the 1965 Western Regional election, the NPC’s desperate manipulation of the electoral process in Western Nigeria, using the NNDP as its proxy, resulted in the political chaos that eventually led to the collapse of the First Republic (Post and Vickers 1973). The 1964 Federal election was contested by the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) - a coalition of NCNC and AG with predominantly Southern appeal, and the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) - an alliance between the NPC and the NNDP, with support mostly in Northern Nigeria. The NPC and its allies in the NNA took advantage of their control of the federal government to manipulate and gain victory in the 1964 Federal election.

The 1965 Western Regional election which came soon after the 1964 Federal election presented an opportunity for UPGA (and indeed the AG) to demonstrate its popularity and to curtail attempts by the NNA (through the NNDP) to control the Western Region. Although the 1965 election was a regional election, it had far reaching implications for federal politics. Notably, a victory for UPGA would have ensured that the NNA is kept out of Southern Nigeria, as UPGA already controls Eastern and Mid-West Regional governments. But a victory for NNDP would mean that the NNA controls a majority of national vote sufficient for the alliance to exclusively rule Nigeria. Considering the high stakes in the 1965 elections, both the NNDP and the AG desperately wanted to win the election by all means, however unscrupulous and unlawful.

The 1965 election was made even more prone to violence by the fact that the AG was presumably the ‘dominant force’ in Western Region politics as at that time, did not possess real political power at local and national levels. Following conflicts arising from the split of NNDP from AG in 1962, the NPC controlled federal government declared a state of emergency in Western Region, removed the AG government in the region and replaced it with an Emergency Government which had sympathy for the NNDP, and which later returned control of Western Regional government to NNDP. Many people in Western Nigeria at the time of the 1965 election see the AG as the genuine Yoruba party, while NNDP was seen as a mirror image of the NPC and epitome of Northern control of Yoruba politics. The 1965 election was therefore a good opportunity for the AG to triumph over the NNDP and regain control of Western Nigeria. It was in the context of this contest between AG (the ‘presumed dominant force’ in Yoruba politics) and NNDP (the ‘actual dominant force’) that the electoral violence of 1965 occurred.

On the polling day, two electoral officers and two polling agents were killed at Mushin I Constituency in Lagos following allegations of attempts to manipulate voting. This action sparked off violent demonstration which spread to virtually all the sixteen administrative Divisions of the Western Region, especially after official election results announced indicated that NNDP had won 71 seats compared with UPGA’s 17 seats. 19
Official report said the 1965 electoral violence led to the death of 153 persons, including 64 persons killed by the police; but observers put the number of casualty at over 2,000 deaths with many more seriously injured (Anifowose 1982: 220-221). Those that lost their lives and properties were mostly NNDP members, election officials (believed to be instrumental to NNDP’s victory), local government officials, traditional rulers (believed to be loyal to NNDP), and other persons associated with the NNDP government (Anifowose 1982: 240).

The violence that occurred during the 1983 general elections was similar in magnitude to the 1965 electoral violence. The NPN which won the presidency and gubernatorial elections in seven out of the nineteen states in 1979 wanted to extend its political power throughout the federation. However, the party was concerned that the UPN would get a sufficient amount of votes to deprive its candidate, President Shehu Shagari, of a simple majority on the first ballot over UPN’s candidate Chief Obafemi Awolowo. There was no risk that Chief Awolowo would actually win in the first round, because he could not hope to win the required 25 per cent in two-thirds of the states, the required ‘spread’. But as the 1979 election had shown, President Shagari’s strength was in ‘spread’ while Chief Awolowo’s power lies in votes. Chief Awolowo’s supporters could assert their weight through a national vote even if they could not do so through the constituency allocation. As Hart (1993: 404) notes:

It might then be that Shagari could still survive a second round with Awolowo but his prospects would have been much poorer if he had had to go into a third and deciding election. For then his reputation would have been dented and Awolowo could have dispensed with any need for ‘spread’ and just won on national votes alone. It was therefore imperative that he should knock his opponents out in the first round, as he had done, with a little help from the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the twelve and two-thirds decision, in 1979. Thus the NPN leaders had the task in each state of gathering in as many votes as possible and finding enough to reach 25 per cent.

The quest for votes pushed the NPN to rig the 1983 elections in a grand scale. The elections were so badly rigged that one analyst described it thus:

It is very clear that the Nigerian Election of 1983 is a sham election. It was massively rigged and nobody can honestly, truthfully and scientifically state that Shagari and his lieutenants in the state capitals were democratically voted into office. A massive collusion involving the NPN, the FEDECO, the police and some sections of the judiciary had produced governments that could not claim legitimacy by dint of even the most rudimentary requirement of bourgeois democracy (Tijani 1986: 15).

The brazen manipulation of the 1983 elections triggered violent protests in some parts of Nigeria. For instance, on 16 August 1983, several towns in Ondo State erupted into violence, following popular reaction against perceived rigging of the gubernatorial election in favour of NPN candidate, Akin Omoboriowo (Babarinsa 2003, Kurfi 2005). According to reports, a crowd of mostly old and middle-aged women carrying sticks, cudgels, and yam-pounding pestles, mobilized first (Apter 1987). They were quickly joined by young girls and boys, and later men and women, who are assumed to be supporters of the UPN candidate, Governor Michael Ajasin. The first act of protest was
to overturn and set fire to a Peugeot station-wagon owned by an NPN supporter. As the crowd turned into a mob it broke into sections, burning and gutting NPN beer-parlours, compounds, cars, and motor-cycles, drinking plundered beer and smashing bottles. The destruction in Ondo State followed a path of increasing social status and stature; first the ‘ordinary people’ were victimized, tenant farmers who had no influence in the town; widows whose children had left for the cities who were marginals in the community and had responded to the ‘generosity’ of the NPN. Subsequently, the pillage climbed the social hierarchy. Several ‘important personalities’ in Ondo State, particularly NPN officials and key allies of Chief Omoboriowo, were killed. Among the dead were the then Majority Leader of Ondo State House of Assembly, Hon. Tunde Agunbiade, his wife, two children, a driver and five other people as well as Hon. Olaiya Fagbamigbe, a member of the National Assembly and Secretary of NPN in Ondo State, who was burnt along with ten members of his household (Guardian 22 August 1983: 2, 16). When the protests had calmed down, over 300 houses, including the office of FEDECO in Akure, were destroyed.

The 2003 and 2007 general elections witnessed a more sophisticated brand of electoral fraud than 1964/65 and 1983 elections. However, no significant incident of post-election violence was recorded7 (Human Rights Watch 2004, LeVan 2003: 36-38). The main reason why the widespread rigging of the 2003 and 2007 elections did not translate to violence is because the opposition could not sufficiently mobilize the people to protest the outcome of the elections. One thing that helped weaken opposition mobilization against the outcome of the 2003 and 2007 elections was the remarkable tendency of the ruling party to contain sectionalism by pushing for a broad national consensus behind the incumbent president in 2003, and the election of a northern Muslim in 2007 to succeed to the presidency after eight years of leadership by a southern Christian president. The elite consensus engineered by the PDP in favour of the re-election of President Obasanjo in 2003 was so deep that most people tended to accept the election even with its many blemishes. As noted by one analyst, the 2003 election was ‘hardly credible, but acceptable’ (Kew 2004). In a repeat of the inter-elite concession of the 1999 election, when the two major parties presented Christian Yoruba candidates from the Southwest for the presidency, the three major parties in the 2007 election nominated Muslim Hausa-Fulani candidates from the North. This innovative ethnic accommodation strategy tempered the tendency of the losers to mobilize sectarian violence.

Although the 2003 and 2007 elections did not produce remarkable incidents of post-election violence as the 1964/65 and 1983 elections, it is imperative to give an account of the unprecedented acts of electoral fraud that occurred during the elections. Observers of elections in Nigeria note that during the 2003 elections, a major shift occurred in the pattern of electoral fraud in the country. They argue that the former pattern of electoral fraud - competitive rigging, gave way in 2003 for a more sophisticated mould known as ‘primitive accumulation of votes’ (Ibeanu 2003). Primitive accumulation of votes involves attempts by political forces to win votes by the use of both objective and structural violence, and disregard of the rule of law. Ibeanu (2007: 6) argues that primitive accumulation of votes is often justified in the name of communal interests such

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7 Much of the violence associated with the 2003 elections occurred in the pre-election period and manifested in the form of intra-party violence. Expectedly, the PDP had more intra-party violence than other political parties, while the opposition parties lost a number of leading members via assassinations.
as clan, ethnic, and religious groups, ‘though in fact it is self-seeking, and electoral regulatory regimes are captured by sectional and special interests.

During the 2003 elections, primitive accumulation of votes reached its apogee particularly in the South-West zone where the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) moved into states hitherto controlled by the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and dislodged the AD in five out of the six states it controlled in 1999. The political encounters between the PDP and AD in the South-West zone require a brief exposition. The Yoruba of the South-West zone had early access to western education; this helped them to produce many of the educated elite that championed Nigerian nationalism. The Yoruba elite felt that their progress in education and social advancement would pave the way for them to lead Nigeria (Ukeje and Adebanwi 2008: 570). However, attempts by two Yoruba sons – Obafemi Awolowo and M. K. O. Abiola at winning presidential elections during the First, Second, and Third Republics failed. The Yoruba blame Igbo and Northern elites for frustrating the ambitions of their sons8 (Ibrahim 1999:14, Sklar 1991). The annulment of the June 12, 1993 election which a Yoruba, M. K. O. Abiola, was the presumed winner, by a Northern military ruler, Ibrahim Babangida, particularly provoked the Yoruba elite9 (Abegunrin 2006).

In order to protect the Yoruba from further ‘political oppression’, a group led by former Ondo State Governor, Michael Adekunle Ajasin formed the Egbe Afenifere10. A militant group, the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) was also formed by a former presidential aspirant, Fredrick Fasehun. These two groups engaged in aggressive agitation for the restoration of Abiola’s mandate. The tempo of Yoruba agitation was however toned down following the sudden death of General Sani Abacha and Chief M.K.O. Abiola, and the resolve by Nigerian political elite to concede power to the Yoruba – a concession that produced Olusegun Obasanjo as president in 199911. For a substantial part of Obasanjo’s first four-year term, the Afenifere resented his leadership. The opposition against Obasanjo stems from the belief that as a military ruler in 1979, Obasanjo failed to stand up in favour of his kinsman Obafemi Awolowo whose victory in a presidential election was robbed by the Northern elite. Obasanjo was also accused of not sufficiently supporting the struggle to uphold Abiola’s presidential election victory annulled by a Northern military ruler. These allegations portrayed Obasanjo as pliant and conservative figure, who works at cross-purposes with Yoruba interests, which Afenifere stands for. Obasanjo’s response to the opposition by Afenifere was to paralyze the organization using

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8 They point to the alliance between the Igbo and Northern elites after the 1959 election, which kept the Yoruba elite out of power and eventually capitalized on a split in the AG to destroy the party and to imprison Awolowo and his supporters in 1963.
9 To appease the Yoruba elite, Babangida appointed Ernest Shonekan, a respected Yoruba businessman as the head of an interim national government while departing on 27 August 1993. Many Yoruba elite opposed Shonekan’s government pressing for the upholding of the June 12 election. But on 17 November 1993 another Northern general, Sani Abacha toppled the Shonekan government. Abacha appointed prominent Yoruba elites into his government to pacify the Yoruba. But this could not halt the opposition. Then Abacha adopted repressive tactics - assassination, imprisonment, and harassment of Yoruba elites opposed to his regime.
10 Ex-Senator Abraham Adesanya became the leader of Afenifere following the death of Adekunle Ajasin. For an assessment of the Afenifere, see Aduwo 2004.
11 The concession allowed for only Yoruba candidates in the 1999 presidential election. Obasanjo contested under the platform of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) while Olu Falae vied under the Alliance for Democracy (AD). The Afenifere and the OPC opposed the candidature of Obasanjo, ensuring that he lost in the entire Yoruba area to the AD, a party associated with the Afenifere.
three malevolent measures (Adindu 2003). First, he co-opted a key member of Afenifere – Bola Ige into the inner core of his government. Through Ige, a rival group – the Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE) that opposed Afenifere’s Yoruba nationalist ideology was established to supplant Afenifere. Finally, the political arm of Afenifere – the Alliance for Democracy (AD) was rooted out of the South-west. This was achieved by sponsoring a splinter group within the AD; the intra-party crisis in the AD weakened the party and made it incapable of responding to PDP’s primitive accumulation of votes. As a result, AD lost all but one of the six Yoruba states it had previously controlled.

Although all the major political parties that contested the 2003 elections were actively involved in rigging, as Hoffmann’s (2010) study of elections in Anambra State demonstrates, the PDP simply surpassed all the other parties in electoral fraud. This enabled the party to take control of more states – increasing the number of states under its control from 21 in 1999 to 28 in 2003. Among those that criticized the 2003 elections, Festus Iyayi (2003: 16) particularly decried the crude manner the irregularities were orchestrated:

The mandate of the people was stolen in a manner reminiscent [sic] one-stone-age politics where the size of the foot of the master determined the length of a foot. In 2003, the political class did not even have any respect for sensibilities of the Nigerian people to rig intelligently. In awarding votes to victors and the vanquished, the numbers swelled up so much that they exceeded by wide margins the number of voters registered to vote in the elections.

Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of over 90 civil society groups, in its report on the 2003 general elections, joined in condemning the elections. The group declared:

While the voters waited and persevered in the polling stations to cast their votes, the political class and the political parties had different ideas. The voters wanted their votes to determine the winner of elections while the political class wanted to corrupt the process and rig their way into elective office. On the whole, the results can be said to marginally reflect the choice and will of the Nigerian people (cited in Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006: 39).

For those who thought that Nigeria had reached its highest stage of electoral fraud in 2003, the 2007 elections proved that the ‘worst is yet to come’. The stage for the electoral impunity that characterized the 2007 election was set by President Olusegun Obasanjo when he declared that the election would be a ‘do-or-die affair’ for the ruling PDP (Suberu 2007: 98). On one hand, Obasanjo’s comment eroded the optimism of some who felt that the 2007 election would kick start a breakaway from the history of electoral fraud in Nigeria. But on the other hand, Obasanjo’s comments reflected the thinking within the PDP, especially as a top party official had earlier been reported as saying that the party would dominate Nigerian politics for at least sixty years. President Obasanjo and, by extension, the PDP did not stop at words. Their threat to approach the 2007 election with all sense of guts was actually applied. The result was a blatantly rigged election in which the people’s mandate was overtly stolen. Analysts observed that the electoral fraud in 2007 reached a new height in the history of Nigerian elections. Beyond the stages of competitive rigging and primitive accumulation of votes, electoral fraud in the 2007 election was dubbed ‘direct capture’ of the people’s mandate (Ibrahim and
Ibeanu 2009). In conceptualizing the specificities of ‘direct capture’ in the 2007 elections, Ibeanu (2009: 10) asserts:

It does appear that government agencies and the ruling party pulled off one of the most brazen stealing of votes ever recorded in Nigerian history. While in the past, rigging was regarded as an illegal act to be carried out subtly and covertly, in 2007 it was direct, brazen and daring. Indeed, it was an unprecedented direct seizure of votes and mandates. The people’s mandate could not have been more directly captured.

The flaws that characterize the conduct of the 2007 elections severely dented Nigeria’s image and electoral integrity. This gravity of electoral offences committed during the 2007 elections led to soul-searching among the Nigerian leadership. This reflected in the public acknowledgement by President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua that the election that brought him to office was fundamentally flawed. This posture allowed for a deep reflection on Nigeria’s electoral process. Part of this reflection took place among members of the Electoral Reform Committee, a body inaugurated by the federal government to suggest measures that would improve the conduct of elections, restore electoral integrity, and strengthen the quality of democracy in Nigeria. Some of the recommendations of the Electoral Reform Committee were reviewed and included in the amended Electoral Act. Another major intervention by the federal government to restore electoral integrity in Nigeria was the appointment of a more credible leadership for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). On its part, INEC embarked on internal reforms to address the challenges of electoral integrity. The most significant step taken by INEC was the compilation of a credible voters register. These and more interventions adopted by the government and the electoral management body (INEC) culminated in the relative success that was achieve during the 2011 general elections.

Four main assumptions can be derived from our historical analysis of post-election violence in Nigeria:
1. The core issue underlying post-election violence in Nigeria is not necessarily the question of electoral integrity, but the frustration arising from the inability of the ‘presumed dominant forces’ to win political power.
2. Post-election violence tends to occur in elections that emerge as a contest between two powerful political forces with relatively equal strength - the ‘actual dominant forces’ and the ‘presumed dominant forces’.
3. Post-election violence manifests in attacks on individuals/institutions assumed to have worked, or to be working, against the victory of the ‘presumed dominant forces’.
4. Consolidation elections appear more prone to post-election violence in particular; and violence in general, than transition elections.

In analyzing the 2011 post-election violence, this study will be guided by these assumptions.
CHAPTER THREE
Analyzing the 2011 Post-Election Violence

The Nigerian presidential election of 16 April 2011 was the fourth in the series of presidential elections conducted since the country’s return to civil rule in 1999. Unlike the previous elections which were characterized by fraud and flaws, the 2011 election is regarded by many observers as largely credible and well organized (EU EOM 2011). However, post-election violence, in which many people were killed, many more displaced and valuable properties was destroyed, robbed the shine off the electoral success. Although violence has been part and parcel of electoral contest in Nigeria since 1999, the 2011 post-election violence stands out in terms of its magnitude, severity and consequences. The 2011 post-election violence started in Bauchi and Gombe states, and quickly spread to other parts of Northern Nigeria such as Kano, Adamawa, Niger, and Kaduna states. What were the underlying causes of the violence, who participated in the violence, who/what were the targets of the attacks, what was the degree of intensity of the violence, and how did state and non-state actors respond to the violence? These are some of the issues we will deal with in this section as we try to analyze the 2011 post-election violence.

The underlying causes of the violence
To provide a systematic explanation of why violence occurred after the 2011 presidential election, this study would draw from three major analytical perspectives (the grievance, opportunity structure, and structural perspectives).

Grievance perspective
The grievance perspective is by far the most popular way of looking at violence by social scientists. While there are internal differences in definitions, interpretations, and conceptualization, most grievance theories focus on how individual and group grievances could provide incentives for violent protests. The most influential account in this perspective is the frustration-aggression theory, which states that aggression is always the result of frustration; aggressive behaviours such as violent protests result from frustration individuals feel when they are restrained from achieving valued goals (Yates 1962, Berkowitz 1962). Scholars have observed that an individual whose basic desires are frustrated is likely to react to his condition by directing aggressive behaviour at what is perceived to be responsible for thwarting those desires, or at a substitute (Anifowose 1982: 6). With regards to electoral competition, politicians who fail to clinch electoral victory or their supporters may direct violence at their opponents, electoral institutions/officials, members of the community of origin of their rivals, or any other person/group perceived to have contributed to their failure.

Part of the individuals’ or groups’ frustration may flow from a condition Ted Gurr (1970: 24) refers to as relative deprivation – the perceived disparity between an individual’s expectations and fulfilment. The greater this disparity, the greater is the individual’s anger and propensity towards violence. Thus, electoral violence is expected to occur when many people in the society become angry, especially if existing social and political conditions provide encouragement for aggression against political targets (Skocpol 1979:

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12 Observers reported hundreds of incidents of election-related violence, including at least 105 deaths in 2003 and more than 300 deaths in 2007, see Unom and Ojo (2010), HRW (2004), The Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research (2002), Ladan and Kiru (2005).
9). In this sense, frustration is engendered by the gap between what is sought and what is realistically attainable in a particular social context. Thus, deprivation breeds frustration, frustration produces grievance, and grievance begets violent behaviour. As instances of post-election violence in Nigeria demonstrate, the failure of candidates or parties presumed to be ‘dominant’ in a community to win an election could produce deep frustration, which may likely translate to violence. This is particularly so, where the credibility of the election is in doubt. In the context of the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, there are two main indicators of grievances: 1) the feeling by the losers that the winners robbed them of their legitimate electoral victory, and 2) the fear of exclusion from patronage and positions of power by the losers.

Flaws in election administration and doubts about the integrity of the elections
Although the 2011 elections are acclaimed as credible, there were flaws in election administration that raised doubts about the credibility of the elections. These flaws prompted the losers to assume that the winners stole the victory. In the first place, the pace with which INEC registered over 70 million voters created doubts. From the time the timetable for the 2011 was announced, analysts expressed concerns that the Electoral Commission may not be able to conduct a credible election within the allotted timeframe. According to one analyst:

I don’t know though how 70 million people will be registered in 2 weeks, 14 days, 336 hours, 20,150 minutes, 1,209,600 seconds – or 650 per second. That is lightening registration! I figure that we will require four to five times that length of time per registrant, which means that we won’t be able to register more than 10-15 million people in two weeks, outside chance of 20 million (cited in Akhaine 2011).

At the end of the two-week voter registration exercise with an additional one week extension of time, INEC, to the amazement of many, announced that it had registered 73.5 million voters, more than the 60 million it expected to register. The bewilderment that followed the close of the voter registration exercise transformed to doubts. Femi Falana, Chairman of the National Conscience Party (NCP) expressed this doubt:

We expected that after the AFIS screening and the display/verification exercise conducted by the INEC, the figure of 63 million voters would have been pruned down. But to our utter dismay, the final figure has jumped to 73.5 million. As no explanation has been adduced for the increase of eligible voters from 63.9 million to 73.5 million, we call on the INEC leadership to review the register by subjecting it to AFIS screening without any further delay (cited in Awowole-Browne 2011: 8).

It was obvious that INEC did not have time to de-duplicate the voters register, as such, the Commission went ahead to organize the 2011 elections disregarding public misgivings with the voters register.

INEC’s capacity to conduct the 2011 elections became even more suspicious after the Commission cancelled the parliamentary election scheduled for 2 April 2011 as a result of organizational and logistical challenges. In a televised broadcast made hours after the election commenced in several states, INEC Chairman Attahiru Jega announced to the discomfiture of many Nigerians that sheets for the recording of accreditation and election results arrived late and could not be distributed to all the polling stations. According to him, the decision to postpone the election was necessary to ‘maintain the
integrity of the elections and retain effective overall control of the process’ (BBC News Africa, 2 April 2011). The postponement of the April 2 election triggered calls for the removal of INEC Chairman, especially by those who interpreted the move as either ‘an elaborate attempt to rig the election’ or ‘sheer incompetence’ on the part of INEC (BBC News Africa, 4 April 2011).

The false start by INEC did not end up as ‘a comprehensive failure’ as the Commission managed to put its acts together and convinced the political parties and other election stakeholders to accept 9 April as the new date for the elections (ICG 2011: 4). The re-scheduled parliamentary elections of 9 April proceeded peacefully and orderly. But the presidential election of 16 April was marred by violence triggered by allegations of poll rigging in favour of the ruling PDP. Officials of the opposition CPC as well as some poll analysts pointed out that the pattern of voting in the South-South and South-East zones (where support for the PDP candidate was greatest) did not follow the track observed in previous elections, and raised fears of foul-play\(^\text{13}\) (Akhaine 2012: 653).

The CPC alleged vote buying, ballot-box stuffing, and inflation of results by the PDP in the South-South and South-East states, particularly in states such as Abia, Anambra, Bayelsa, and Delta, which recorded an abnormally high voter turnout of up to 98 and 99 percent. The ‘astonishingly high voter turnout’ in South-South and South-East States fit the pattern of the discredited 2003 and 2007 elections, and considering that these zones have a history of results being declared without regards to actual vote tally, some observers suspect that much of the election result in the zones was massaged. One analyst argued that: ‘the official results of the balloting are certainly somewhat suspect…they indicate perhaps some sophisticated tampering by the PDP, which has a notorious record of rigging elections’ (Gberie 2011: 1).

Much of the alleged electoral malfeasances during the 2011 elections were associated with the vote collation and computation process. The CPC specifically alleged that the Microsoft Excel software used by INEC to compute election results across the country was deliberately designed to favour the PDP and shortchange the party. It asked for manual re-computation of the election results. The CPC also called for a forensic examination of ballot papers. The CPC’s National Secretary, Buba Galadima said the party would not go to court as it did in the past, and that the party will equally not accept any candidate declared as the winner of the presidential election, unless the results of South-East and South-South states were cancelled (Olumide and Akinfenwa 2011; Alli and Babalola 2011). The complaints by the CPC leadership appeared to have prompted youths suspected to be CPC supporters to embark on violent protests in some Northern states. The outbreak of post-election violence in the North can be seen as an expression of disappointment and frustration at electoral defeat by some CPC supporters. These supporters who see the CPC as the ‘dominant political force’ in their communities were apparently frustrated that the party could not win the presidency. They were particularly aggrieved that the allegedly inflated vote figures recorded in South-South and South-East states prevented their candidate/party from clinching victory.

\(^{13}\) For instance, renowned professor of constitutional law Itse Sagay argued that elections in South-south and South-east geopolitical zones were flawed, as evidenced by: a) huge disparities in the scores of the PDP and the other parties; b) President Jonathan receiving millions of votes, but the governors who campaigned for him receiving only thousands; and c) crooked elections in Delta and Akwa Ibom states, which INEC should have cancelled as it did in Imo state (see ICG 2011: 4, note 16).
The grievance over the outcome of the presidential election is accompanied by a second grievance which relates to the fact that the ‘winner takes all’ politics in Nigeria has ensured that losers have limited access to state resources. The practice of a presidential system of government in which Nigeria’s president controls overwhelming powers has promoted personalization of state powers. In Nigeria, the president controls vast patronage including powers to appoint officials into vital positions as well as powers to award huge contracts. In many occasions, the presidents tend to use these powers to dictate state and party politics. Because the presidents use much of their powers in purely discretionary ways, individuals that share ethnic, religious and other social affiliations with the president tend to have more access to state resources. Under this circumstance, access to the state is defined by the extent an individual feels affiliated to the presidency. Thus, for many candidates and their supporters, losing an election implies loss of access to state resources; an since state resources is an important asset in the struggle for power, losing an election carries with it the risk of being continuously kept out of power. Many institutionalist analyses acknowledge that grievances stemming from political exclusion are a major source of conflicts, particularly in multi-ethnic societies (Lijphart 1977, Horowitz 1985).

**Opportunity structure perspective**

The second perspective to the analysis of the causes of post-election links the likelihood of violence to the presence or absence of opportunity structure for violence. The opportunity structure argument contends that no matter how discontented a group of people may become, they cannot engage in violent political action unless they organize themselves and utilize some essential resources. An important component of the opportunity structure perspective is the elite manipulation thesis, which asserts that the elite often exploit individual and group grievances of the masses to incite violent mass protests. It is assumed that the elite possess the capacity to exploit widespread individual or group grievances due to their acquisition of relevant resources for mobilization of collective violence. Many opportunity structure theories explore the factors that facilitate resource mobilization by aggrieved individuals or groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978). They examine the kinds of existing material or political resources that the elite can draw on in an attempt to mobilize collective action. These resources include group interests, social networks, organizational abilities, presence of willing protesters, rhetorical powers, and availability of arms and low-cost weapons. Weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement is also a major opportunity for would-be violent entrepreneurs to mobilize mass violence (Wilkinson 2004, 11; 17).

The outbreak of the 2011 post-election violence owes much to the ripe opportunity for violence in Nigeria. In the context of the 2011 president election, four main issues provide opportunity for mobilization of violent protests: 1) the presence of willing protesters, 2) weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement, 3) use of inflammatory rhetoric, and 4) existence of simmering communal tensions.

**Presence of willing protesters**

Although Nigeria is richly endowed with land, oil, and human resources, a substantial part of its population remains uneducated, unemployed and poor due to the failure of governance (International Crisis Group 2006). Recent figures put the percentage of Nigerians living in absolute poverty (that is, those who can afford only the bare essentials of food, shelter and clothing) in 2010 at 60.9 per cent (NBS 2010). Nigeria’s absolute poverty rate in 2004 was 54.7 per cent. The rate of unemployment is also very high,
rising from 11.9 percent in 2005 to 23.9 percent in 2011, with states like Yobe, Zamfara, and Niger, recording as high as 60.6, 42.6, and 39.4 per cent unemployment rate, respectively (NBS 2009, 2011). Poverty, illiteracy and unemployment play major roles in producing willing violent protesters (Sambanis 2004). Nigerian politicians often invest on these willing violent protesters (also known as thugs) in order to enhance their position in political contests. Thugs are mainly young men who can be easily and reliably mobilized on short notice to engage in a variety of activities, including spearheading violence, on behalf of a politician before, during and after elections (Ichino 2004: 16).

**Weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement**

The opportunity to engage in violence in Nigeria is also enhanced by the weak capacity of the Nigerian State to provide security and enforce laws. Decades of corruption, maladministration, and economic decline have weakened the capacity of Nigerian government to prevent or punish mass violence. Participants in mass violence in Nigeria operate against the backdrop of impunity or, at best, a reduced risk of being punished. Nigeria’s weak security and law enforcement capacity reflect on the country’s inability to regulate the flow of small arms, curtail banditry and check the activities of thugs and militia groups (Ndubuaku 2001, Human Rights Watch 2003, Human Rights Watch 2005, Adewale 2005). It also reflects on the citizens’ perception of the country’s poorly trained and poorly equipped security agents, as demonstrated by a recent survey. In the survey, conducted in Kano and Rivers States, a majority of the respondents reported that they feared ex-military officers and local armed groups more than the police (Hazen and Horner 2007: 65). This means that ex-military officers and local armed groups have greater capacity to restrain the people from violence than the police. In many communities, vigilante groups have been established to fill security gaps left by the state and to protect the local population (Pratten 2006, Higazi 2008, Fourchard 2008, Orji 2012).

**Use of inflammatory rhetoric**

In addition to the presence of willing protesters and weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement, inflammatory remarks/messages emanating from political leaders and shared by community members provide basis for eruption of violence. In a bid to mobilize voters, politicians embarked on ethnic and religious campaigning. For instance, three days after the parliamentary elections, the spokesman of Nigeria’s Vice President alleged that ‘some people have been going around in the North warning that any Muslim that votes for PDP or any other party outside CPC (Congress for Progressive Change) is not a genuine Muslim and will be punished for that’ (Omokri 2011).

The issue of zoning triggered some of the most inflammatory comments by Nigerian politicians in the run up to the 2011 elections. Under the platform of Concerned Members of the Peoples Democratic Party, some Northern politicians including Adamu Ciroma, Iyorcha Ayu, Lawal Kaita, Bello Kirfi, Yahaya Kwande, and Bashir Yusuf Ibrahim wrote a letter to the PDP National Chairman on 17 September 2010 requesting

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14 Although unemployment is a major problem for most countries around the world, Nigeria’s case is particularly disturbing. Compared with countries such as US (with 9% in 2011), UK (8.1% in 2011), Italy (8.3% in 2011), Egypt (11.8% in 2011), and Kenya (11.7% in 2011), Nigeria’s 23.9% national unemployment rate is staggering. Only a few countries like South Africa (25%), Angola (25%), and Namibia (51%) are comparable to Nigeria.
the party leadership to restrain President Goodluck Jonathan from contesting the 2011 elections under the party’s platform. The group argued that an eight-year, two-term presidency ceded to the north in line with the PDP constitution, which began with former President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2007, must continue through another Northerner following Yar’Adua’s death. The group warned that the failure of the ruling PDP to apply the principle of zoning would threaten the stability of Nigeria, saying: ‘we are extremely worried that our party’s failure to deliver justice in this matter [power-shift to the North] may ignite a series of events, the scope and magnitude of which we can neither proximate nor contain’ (Abdallah 2010, Obia 2010).

Nigeria’s ex-military president, Ibrahim Babangida, reportedly said that jettisoning zoning ‘endangers not only the prospects of orderly transition in the country, but also its progress towards evolving into a single individual nation’ (Alechenu 2011). By tying zoning to national integration and development, the statement underlines the views that failure to ‘zone’ the presidency to the North portends grave dangers for peace and stability in Nigeria. If the statement by Babangida is suggestive, the one by Lawal Kaita, former governor of Kaduna State, is brazenly direct. Kaita was quoted as saying that the ‘North’ would force Jonathan out of office. In his words:

Anything short of a Northern president is tantamount to stealing our presidency. Jonathan has to go and he will go. Even if he uses the incumbency power to get his nomination on the platform of the PDP, he would be frustrated out. (If Jonathan emerges as President next year). The North is determined, if that happens, to make the country ungovernable for President Jonathan or any other Southerner who finds his way to the seat of power on the platform of the PDP against the principle of the party’s zoning policy’ (Jason 2011, Nigerian Tribune 2010).

There were reports that some CPC supporters threatened that ‘all hell would be let loose’ if their preferred candidate was not declared winner of the elections (Ibrahim 2011: 19). In fact, the CPC candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, was reported as telling his supporters that the 2011 election, like the previous ones, would be rigged. He advised them to cast their vote and ensure that they protect their votes: ‘You should never leave polling centres until votes are counted and the winner declared and you should lynch anybody that tries to tinker with the votes’ (Aminu 2011). Earlier he threatened that ‘the fate of this country will be decided by the people in April…Anybody who stands in the way of the people will be crushed by the people’ (Shiklam 2011). Later, he advised the political class: ‘with what is happening in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Gulf states I think the message is getting across to politicians, especially the ruling party that they either behave themselves or the ordinary people will take over… Elections must be free and fair, that is the bottom line. If people choose bad legislators, let them freely change them. But if they can’t, what is happening in some parts of Africa and the Middle East is bound to happen’ (Tattersall 2011). These comments by the CPC candidate were considered inflammatory and were condemned by many people. The Panel of Inquiry set up by the government to investigate the causes of the 2011 post-election violence

specifically attributed the 2011 violence partly to inflammatory remarks including the ones made by Buhari (Ndujihe and Idonor 2011).

Inflammatory messages sent through the social media worsened the tensions created by religious and ethnic campaigning by supporters of President Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari (Harwood and Campbell 2010). The rumor mill was agog with several unsubstantiated stories. For instance, there were allegations that people were paid with as little as two hundred naira (₦200) or packets of noodles to vote against Buhari (Ibrahim 2011). There were also rumors that some political leaders with close ties with the ruling PDP were stuffing the ballot box with fake ballot papers. All these unsubstantiated allegations helped solidify the fears in the North that the PDP would try to rig the presidential election.

There were also SMS that attempted to stir up Muslims against President Jonathan and Northern Muslim governors perceived to be supporting him. The text messages were circulated in the North saying that a vote for Jonathan is a vote against Islam. Some people also circulated videos showing people who were chanting slogans and engaging in provocative behavior during voting. The day after the presidential elections, people opposed to PDP vented their disappointment at the elections on the Facebook and Twitter, some of them alleging that the PDP had rigged the elections (Omokri 2011). The anti-Jonathan rhetoric in the North hardened the stance of many Southerners against Buhari, setting up an inevitable clash between followers of Buhari and Jonathan.

Existence of communal tensions
The existence of social tensions and communal violence in many parts of Nigeria provides a strong basis for outbreak of post-election violence. Since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, at least 18,000 people have been killed in more than 600 violent incidents – ranging from the low-intensity conflict in the Niger Delta which have resulted in occasional fatalities, to large urban conflicts as in Jos and Kaduna which have claimed thousands of lives (Lewis 2011: 9, Orji 2011). Regular communal violence in Nigeria stirs animosities which in turn stimulate social tensions. In many communities where post-election violence occurred, there were existing social tensions, making it persuasive to argue that the violence was an expression of the simmering tensions. In Kaduna State, for example, tense relations exist among the large population of Christians and Muslims that inhabit Southern and Northern parts of the State, respectively. Religious tensions in Kaduna State predate the 2011 elections. In fact, Kaduna State has witnessed some of the most disturbing sectarian violence in Nigeria’s history (Akinteye, Wuye and Ashafa 1999, HRW 2003, Angerbrandt 2011). In this regard, Kaduna State was tagged as an ‘election violence hotspot’ by experts following a remarkable political dynamic that played out in the run up to the 2011 general elections (Unom and Ojo 2010, Aniekwe and Kushie 2011).

Following the demise of President Umaru Yar’ Adua and the emergence of Vice President Goodluck Jonathan as president, the office of the Vice President became vacant. In line with the tradition of having the offices of President and Vice President shared between Northern and Southern Nigeria, the Governor of Kaduna State, Namadi Sambo was selected as the Vice President. This decision significantly distorted the power structure in Kaduna State. Kaduna State politics is dominated by Hausa-Fulani Muslims from the Northern part of the state, and it is this group that has repeatedly controlled the office of the Governor of the state. The position of Deputy Governor is usually reserved
for Christians from the minority communities of Southern Kaduna. Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa, a Christian from Fadan Kagoma, Jema’a Local Government Area in the southern part of the State was serving as the Deputy Governor before Sambo was appointed as Vice President. The exit of Governor Sambo led to the emergence of Yakowa as Governor of Kaduna State, to the displeasure of many non-Christians in the State. Like President Jonathan who is seen by many Northern Muslims as one who usurped the presidency from the North, Governor Yakowa’s decision to stand for election in 2011 was seen by some Kaduna Muslims as a clear attempt by the Christians to take political control of the state. The candidacy of Patrick Yakowa in Kaduna gubernatorial elections, along with that of Goodluck Jonathan in the presidential election, polarized Kaduna State along sectarian lines, setting up the most combustible electoral contest in the state since its formation in 1967.

The tense situation in Kaduna State reflects the state of affairs in many other parts of Northern Nigeria where tensions between Christian and Muslim communities are ripe. In Borno State, for example, attacks by the militant Islamic fundamentalist group, Boko Haram, intensified just before the 2011 elections placing the State among the ‘election violence hotspot’ in Nigeria (Unom and Ojo 2010, Aniekwe and Kushie 2011). Boko Haram is opposed to Western education and seeks to impose Islamic law all over Nigeria. Since staging its major violent uprising in July 2009, the group has consistently targeted state institutions and Christian communities in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has also attacked prominent figures associated with PDP and ANPP. For instance, on 28 January 2011, gunmen suspected to be members of Boko Haram shot dead Fannami Gubio, the gubernatorial candidate of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) in Borno State, Godi Modu Sheriff, a brother of the former governor of Borno State, and six other supporters of the ANPP. Suspected Boko Haram gunmen also killed the chairman of the All Nigeria Peoples’ Party in Jere Local Government Area of Borno State at his home in Maiduguri, just a few hours before the commencement of the parliamentary elections (Idris and Ibrahim 2011: 20). In the same period, suspected Boko Haram members shot dead four people including an official of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Borno State (Brock 2011). These attacks on officials of PDP and ANPP signify a rejection of the two parties which have been dominant at federal and state levels, respectively, and seen as symbols of Southern political control of Nigeria and embodiment of corruption and misrule. Reports indicate that the 2011 post-election violence was clearly organized in some areas, suggesting the influence and involvement of antiestablishment organizations or sects like Boko Haram, Taleban, and Kala Kato16 (Lewis 2011). Acts of violence, including bomb attacks on INEC and other government institutions in Niger and Bornu States by suspected Boko Haram insurgents, set the tone for the 2011 post-election violence17 (Amnesty International 2011).

16 The Taleban is based in Maiduguri and draws inspiration from Islamists in South Asia, while Kala Kato is a descendent of the Maitatsine movement of the early 1980s and operates mainly in Bauchi.
17 The Boko Haram (‘Western Education is Forbidden’) movement is a militant Islamist sect founded by a radical young preacher Mohammed Yusuf. The official name of the group is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal Jihad (‘Association of Sunnis for the Propagation of Islam and for Holy War’). The group draws its core support from unemployed youths in Maiduguri, Bornu State and seeks the imposition of strict Sharia law in Nigeria’s 12 northern states. In July 2011, the Boko Haram carried out a deadly suicide bomb attack on the building housing UN Mission in Nigeria, killing dozens and injuring many more, apparently in bid to put pressure on the government.
Although there is ample evidence of deep-seated grievances and ripe opportunity for violence in Nigeria, these conditions alone cannot explain the eruption of post-election violence in the country. After all, these conditions have been in existence since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, and significant incidents of post-election violence never erupted. To fully account for the outbreak of the 2011 post-election violence, it is pertinent to consider in addition to the factors mentioned above, some structural conditions that played defining roles in the eruption of the 2011 post-election violence. In adopting a structural perspective to explaining the outbreak of the 2011 post-election violence, we would focus on two critical variables: salience of ethnicity and winner-loser power parity.

Structural perspective
The structural perspective to violence examines how socio-political and economic structure of a society shapes the escalation or control of violent protests. It assumes that the presence of grievance and opportunity structures are necessary but not sufficient in inducing violent protests. Although strong grievances and ripe opportunity structures for violence may exist, there are other structural/intervening factors that may facilitate or hinder the escalation of violent protests. The work of Theda Skocpol (1979) that demonstrates how state structures, international forces, and class relations combine to explain the origins and achievements of social revolutions in France, Russia, and China is a leading study in this perspective. Structural explanations consider how societal structures and processes influence inclination towards violent or peaceful behaviours (Ibeanu and Orji 2004). With regards to the 2011 post-election violence, two structure-related factors provided the basis for violence. These include the political salience of ethnicity and winner-loser power relations.

Salience of ethnicity
The degree of importance of ethnicity in multi-ethnic political systems affects the tendency of losers to mobilize violent protests after elections. If political actors attach an ethnic interpretation to their differences, political competition and conflict will tend to be more comprehensive in terms of issues and populations involved. Again, the groups involved in political contest will feel more vulnerable collectively and less able to isolate themselves from political conflicts and their consequences on an individual basis. In the words of Azarya (2003, 7), once political competition and conflict is portrayed in ethnic terms, there can be no “sitting on the fence”. In the context of ‘ethnicized’ political competition, the consequences of defeat or victory are collective and comprehensive because they affect all aspects of life of a group. This is especially so in ‘winner-take-all’ situations where the losing side in the contest would think everything (including wealth, status, freedom, identity, and self-respect) is lost or threatened.

The high salience of ethnicity in Nigerian politics has often been used to explain the difficulties faced by the country in the process of national development (Nnoli 1995, 1998). One school of thought blames colonial administrative style for the prominence of ethnicity in Nigerian politics (Blanton, Mason and Athow 2001). During the colonial period, Nigerians as well as other African communities were allowed only a limited political space, which existed mainly at the local and informal levels. As such, local leaders were forced to carve out political space at the communal level, to form ethnic parties, to develop one-party districts, and to woo ethnically homogenous supporters (Cheeseman 2006: 13). Thus, colonial policies nurtured ethnic politics while hindering the development of national politics. Although there have been substantial progress
towards reducing the significance of ethnicity in politics, the outcome of the 2011 general elections indicates that is still a core factor in Nigerian politics.

Another school of thought argues that blaming colonialism for the political prominence of ethnicity is an easy way out in explaining contemporary challenges in African politics in general, and Nigerian politics in particular. Rather, it suggests that the elites in Africa are responsible for increasing the prominence of ethnicity in public consciousness. According to this school, the greatest development of ethnicity as a political tool occurred during the decolonialization period, a time when the African elite were struggling to replace colonial regimes with independent states and to take over positions occupied by the colonial officials (Azarya 2003). In the post-colonial period, ethnicity has become a major element in political contest in many African countries. Politicians invoke and use ethnicity in political mobilization, especially in countries like Nigeria where electoral constituencies coincide with ethnic boundaries.

Once the polarizing effect of zero-sum electoral competition (division of winners and losers) manifests, it divides the ethnic groups between the government and opposition. The desire to avoid being excluded from the government would push ethnic leaders to adopt extreme measures, including vote buying and other forms of election fraud. In the face of electoral defeat, this desire may spur ethnic leaders to engage in violent electoral protests in an attempt to alter their position. Over the years, scholars have suggested the application of consociational measures to reduce the salience of ethnicity in elections in multi-ethnic societies. This seems to have worked well in Nigeria, insulating the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections from the combustible political competition that is a prominent feature of Nigerian politics. But in 2011 election, the political salience of ethnicity was heightened by the truncation of the power-sharing arrangement, which has been rigorously implemented since 1999.

The underlying issue behind the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria is the frustration arising from the failure of the CPC candidate to win the Presidency during the April 2011 elections. The 2011 post-election violence is an expression of the regional and religious divisions and tensions created by debates over power-sharing modalities in the aftermath of the demise of President Umaru Yar’Adua. Many in the North believed that President Jonathan, a Christian and Southerner, should have conceded his presidential bid to a Northerner and Muslim in honor of the unwritten rotation of power between the North and South. Umaru Yar’Adua, a Northerner and Muslim, succeeded President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Southerner and Christian, who ruled Nigeria for eight years beginning from 1999. The untimely demise of Yar’Adua in 2010, midway through his term, paved the way for then-Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to emerge as president.

Fear of ethnic/regional domination has been the bane of Nigerian politics since the colonial times. At the core of this phenomenon is the fear in Northern Nigeria that the more educated South would dominate state institutions as well as the concerns in Southern Nigeria that the more populous North would have upper hand in majoritarian electoral contest. To prevent ‘Southern domination’ of federal institutions, Northern elites pushed for the constitutionalization and application of the principle of federal character in recruitment and promotion of public servants at the federal level. This principle ensures equitable distribution of federal positions among the states. Southern elites have tried to counter-act possibilities of ‘Northern political primacy’ by advocating the constitutionalization and application of the practice of zoning in distribution of top
political positions, particularly the presidency (Orji 2008). While federal character principle was constitutionalized in 1979, attempts to enshrine the practice of zoning in the constitution failed repeatedly (Ekeh and Osaghae 1989, Akinola 1988, Orji 2008). The failure to constitutionalize zoning gives the political elite the leverage to informally decide the modus operandi of the arrangement. Following intense pressures for power-shift from North to South in 1999, all the three registered political parties zoned their presidential ticket to the South. That decision led to the emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo as president. After Obasanjo served out his first four year term and decided to stand for re-election, his party – the PDP, engineered a national consensus in favour of his re-election (Kew 2004). Part of the argument then was that the Southern candidate should complete the mandatory two terms of four years each before ‘power-shift’ to the North. In 2007, there was a unanimous agreement that it is the ‘turn’ of the North to produce the president (Suberu 2007). The major parties that contested the 2007 elections presented Northern candidates, out of which Umaru Yar’Adua emerged as the president.

The emergence of Umaru Yar’Adua as president was however questioned by many people, especially among the Northern elites. In the first place, many Northern elites saw Yar’Adua as a candidate hand-picked and imposed on the North by President Obasanjo (Adeyemo 2006: 58). To make matters worse, there were serious concerns about the state of health of Umaru Yar’Adua, leading many Northerners to speculate that President Obasanjo wanted to pair a weak and ill Northern candidate with a vibrant Southern in a presidential ticket to enable the South to indirectly control the presidency, or eventually take over the presidency at the demise of the ailing president (Zounmenou 2010). Thirdly, Yar’Adua was seen by many as ill-prepared to serve as Nigeria’s president (Aluko 2008). Although he served eight years as Governor of Katsina State, critics perceived Yar’Adua as reclusive and without the required political clout and administrative credentials that can make a president succeed. More importantly, critics pointed to lack of a political programme and his adoption, hook, line, and sinker, of President Obasanjo’s dubious ‘Vision 2020’ programme. Considering all these as well as the tenacity with which the PDP rigged the 2007 election in his favour, there were fears that there was more to Yar’Adua’s candidacy than met the eye (Suberu 2007, Adeyemo 2006, Onyekwere 2006). When President Yar’Adua eventually died in May 2010, some in the Northern saw his death as an opportunity for a more focused Northern candidate to take over power. Even while Yar’ Adua was sick, some key officials of Northern origin in his government tried to prevent Vice President Goodluck Jonathan from replacing Yar’Adua for fear that Jonathan may utilize his incumbency to usurp the presidency and obstruct power-shift (Amuta 2010). But after attempts to prevent Vice President Jonathan from serving as acting president failed, Jonathan went ahead to become the acting president, and later substantive president following the demise of President Yar’Adua.

The fears in the North that President Goodluck Jonathan would use his power of incumbency to usurp the presidency manifested when President Jonathan announced that he would vie for presidency in 2011. To counteract President Jonathan, the Northern Political Leaders’ Forum (NPLF) endorsed former Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, as the North’s ‘consensus candidate’ to confront Jonathan in the PDP primaries, but President Jonathan roundly defeated Atiku Abubakar in the PDP presidential primaries. Based on the belief that some Northern PDP governors were instrumental to President Jonathan’s victory at the party primaries, irate youths protested violently in Kaduna and Bauchi States (Mudashir et al. 2011). In Kaduna State, youths
numbering about a hundred set ablaze the flag of the PDP, chanting ‘Ba muson PDP’ (we don’t want PDP). Similar occurrence was witnessed in Bauchi State where protesters burnt several PDP flags and umbrella (which is the symbol of PDP). With the benefit of hindsight, the protests after the PDP primaries were the precursor of what was to come in the aftermath of the presidential election. After President Jonathan defeated Atiku Abubakar in the PDP primaries, the major opposition parties in Nigeria - Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), and All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) - also nominated Northern candidates (Muhammadu Buhari, Nuhu Ribadu, and Ibrahim Shekarau, respectively) to contend with Jonathan. Perhaps due to the opposition’s failure to rally behind a single candidate, President Jonathan won the presidential polls. Jonathan’s victory in the 2011 election truncated the practice of zoning in Nigeria, unleashing the tensions that the arrangement has helped to contain since 1999.

Shifts in power relations among political parties
Besides the high salience of ethnicity in the 2011 election, the outbreak of the 2011 post-election violence was informed by shifts in the power relations between the ruling party (the winner) and the opposition parties (the losers). Drawing from war studies, we argue that violent post-election protests are more likely to occur when there is relative power parity between the winners and losers in an election. War studies suggest that international violence emerges when competitors control equivalent amounts of resources (Benson and Kugler 1998). Losers in domestic politics who attain positions of power parity with the winners may choose violence as a means of altering their political status or expressing their frustration with the election outcome. Under such conditions, they may use violence to press for some form of redress, including the setting up of a power-sharing arrangement as was the case in Kenya. On the other hand, under position of power disparity, the winners may adopt violence as a tool to suppress or even eliminate the opposition as the Zimbabwean case illustrates.

The reason Nigeria did not experience remarkable post-election violence between 1999 and 2007, even when brazen rigging of the elections produced serious grievances, may be connected to the wide disparity in strength and capacity of the opposition parties vis-à-vis the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Between 1999 and 2007, the PDP positioned itself as a durable multi-ethnic coalition, which holds together Nigerians of different communal backgrounds and shades of opinion (Kendhammer 2010). At that time, the party represented the ‘dream party’ of the Nigerian elite (Sklar 1967), a party which has the capacity to bring together elites from different regional blocs and which derive support from all regions and groups in Nigeria. The PDP elite mobilization capacity owes much to the party’s amorphous power structure, which makes it difficult for a particular group to control the party, and for many people to find coverage under the party’s ‘umbrella’. As a result, the president, state governors, and local government chairpersons assumed paramount positions in the party’s structures at the federal, state and local government areas. This decentralized power structure of the party provided accommodation and some political space for the elite from different parts of the country. It also gave the party an image of a truly national party that contrasts with the ANPP posture of a Northern party supported mainly by Muslims, and the ACN picture of a gathering of disgruntled PDP members from South West Nigeria.

Unlike the opposition parties, the PDP was able to set up an outstanding intra-party dispute resolution mechanism that helped the party to win back many of its estranged
members, including notables like Alex Ekwueme and late Abubakar Rimi. The PDP also successfully co-opted notable members of the opposition parties like ex-ANPP Governors such as Saminu Turaki of Jigawa State, Adamu Aliero of Kebbi State, and Aliyu Shinkafi of Zamfara State. In all, the PDP's broad-based elite recruitment and commitment to equitable distribution of economic and political patronage among the elite from all parts of Nigeria placed the party ahead of the opposition parties during the 1999, 2003, and 2007. As Suberu (2007: 102-103) notes, the PDP’s ‘enormous patronage and incumbency powers, the divided opposition, and the negative personal qualities of major opponents’ (Muhammadu Buhari and Atiku Abubakar were known for ethno-religious chauvinism and corruption, respectively), paved the way for the party to dominate Nigeria’s political landscape between 1999 and 2007.

Although it is hard to argue that the elections won by the PDP between 1999 and 2007 were credible, there is evidence that the party had more support than any other party in Nigeria during that period. Several surveys, including one by Afrobarometer, point to the power disparity between the PDP and the opposition parties. A majority of the respondents who reported affiliation to a political party in the survey said that they feel closer to the PDP than the other parties (Afrobarometer 2005: 42). The PDP's political primacy in Nigeria reflects in the 2007 election results where the party won 70% of the votes in the presidential race. The PDP also clinched 28 of the 36 gubernatorial positions and more than two-thirds of the seats in both houses of the National Assembly. The PDP’s landslide victory in the 2007 general election – an indication of its superior capacity to mobilize violence in many parts of Nigeria - probably sent clear signals to the opposition parties that it may be an uphill task to organize violent post-election protests, and that such protests may not sufficiently alter the outcome of the elections.

The greatest challenge to the PDP's political dominance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic came during the 2011 general elections. PDP’s pre-dominance was defied by the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) which draws its support mainly from the Yoruba of Southwest and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) which appeals mostly to the Muslim North. In the 2011 presidential election, the PDP lost the entire Muslim North (12 states) to the CPC and one state (Osun State) in the Southwest to the ACN. PDP's control of 70 per cent of the presidential election vote in the 2007 election was reduced to 58 per cent in the 2011 election, with the party getting as low as 32 per cent and 35 per cent of presidential votes in North West and North East zones, respectively (See Figure 1 below). The PDP also lost all the gubernatorial positions in the Southwest, with the party retaining a majority in only one of the state assemblies. The 2011 losses were the greatest electoral defeat suffered by the PDP in the party’s history. The 2011 election results significantly shifted power relations between the PDP and the opposition party in ways that favoured the latter. The gains made by the opposition parties, particularly the CPC, prompted the party’s supporters to violently confront individuals and institutions that seemingly played a role in subverting the ultimate victory of the party.

Figure 1: Distribution of votes in the 2011 presidential elections according to states

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18 ACN controls gubernatorial positions in six Southwest states, while the Labour Party (LP) produced the Governor for the seventh state (Ondo State).
The extent of support received by the CPC during the 2011 presidential election stunned many observers. Regardless of the fact that the CPC was a relatively new party (founded in 2009), the party attracted huge followership particularly among the masses of Northern Nigeria. Three factors account for the high degree of support that the CPC received in the North. Firstly, CPC’s mass appeal in the North can be attributed to the party’s agenda, which leans towards the left wing of the political spectrum, supporting individual liberty, rights and social welfare of the less privileged. The party’s manifesto calls for the amendment of the Nigerian constitution to ensure devolution of powers, duties and responsibilities to states and local governments in order to deepen the practice of federalism\textsuperscript{19}. The CPC’s agenda appeals to the Northern masses (‘\textit{Talakawa}’) who appear dissatisfied with the elitist leaning of the PDP and ANPP - the two dominant parties in Northern Nigeria.

Secondly, the CPC presents alternative platform particularly for some individuals in the North that are disillusioned with the performance of the PDP. The close association of Muhammadu Buhari with CPC provides the basis for the party’s support outside the North. Over the years, Buhari has casted an image of himself as ‘can-do, courageous man of integrity and action’. This image has grown in reverse proportion to the image of the key elements in the PDP, who are widely seen as corrupt and incapable of leading Nigeria out of its several governance challenges. In other words, the CPC captured many

\textsuperscript{19} CPC Manifesto: Our Commitment to Change, \url{http://buhari4change.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/CPC-OurCommitmentToNigeria.pdf}. 

\vspace{1cm}
of its followers with its promise of change – basically a shift from PDP’s maladministration.

Thirdly, the truncation of zoning in the PDP paved the way for Buhari to run as the leading Northern candidate and for CPC to emerge as the main power contender with the PDP. Although CPC’s constitution is silent on the issue of zoning and its candidate Muhammadu Buhari repeatedly denounced the practice, much of the party’s support in the North is based on the fact that PDP failed to allocate its presidential ticket to the North. In the 2011 election, the CPC provided a platform for Northerners who support the retention of presidency by Northern Muslims, and represents a channel through which power-shift to the North can be actualized. Because CPC positioned itself as an alternative to the PDP, but more importantly, as the platform for the North’s campaign for a power-shift, it attracted a lot of passionate followers, some of whom were the core of those that protested in the aftermath of the 2011 presidential election.

Together, grievances over election outcome, existence of ripe opportunity for violence, increased salience of ethnicity in Nigerian politics, as well as the relative power parity between the PDP and the main opposition parties provide the underlying causes for the outbreak of the 2011 post-election violence. Figure 2 below illustrates the nexus between grievance, opportunity structure, and structural conditions as factors that explain the outbreak of the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria.

**Figure 2: Relationship between the key variables**

- **Grievance**
  - Electoral defeat
  - Political exclusion

- **Opportunity structure**
  - Presence of willing protesters
  - Weak security/law enforcement capacity
  - Inflammatory rhetoric/messages
  - Existing communal tensions

- **Violent Post-election Protests**

- **Structural/ intervening conditions**
  - Salience of ethnicity
  - Winner-loser power relations

**Participants in the violence**

It is difficult to track the profile of those that participated in the 2011 post-election violence especially because the security agencies were unwilling to provide the profile of the protesters that were arrested. On the other hand, individuals who took part in the protests were not inclined to giving out personal information. However, a group of people commonly referred to as ‘thugs’ are often identified the key participants in election related violence in Nigeria (Anifowose 1982, Babarinsa 2003, and HRW 2007). Statements released by Nigeria Police also indicated that the 2011 post-election violence was carried out by thugs. For instance, the Commissioner of Police in the Katsina State Command, Ibrahim Mohammed, blamed post-election violence in the State on ‘people, who I will call miscreants, arsonists, criminals and murderers’ (Lartey 2011: 7). Furthermore, it was reported that thugs were behind the post-election violence that occurred in Kaduna, Adamawa, Bauchi and Niger States (Liman 2011: 2, Njoku 2011: 4, Adekanmbi and Akintunde 2011: 3, Tsenzughul, Orintunsin and Asishana 2011: 6).
The role of thugs in the 2011 post-election violence requires further interrogation since it is not really clear who these thugs are, who mobilizes them, and how they operate.

Illicit armed groups, including extremist groups, are known to be key perpetrators of election violence (UNDP 2011). Northern Nigeria, like other parts of the country, hosts a number of these groups. In many Northern cities, unemployed youths who have little opportunity for legitimate employment form loosely organized violent groups and serve as willing protesters during civil unrests. It is members of these organized violent groups that are often identified as thugs. One organized violent group that is quite notorious, especially in Kano State, is the Yandaba. The Yandaba are gangs of unemployed youth who reject the poor conditions to which their social background has relegated them and have taken refuge in group criminal and violent activities (Ya’u 2000: 162). A variant group of the Yandaba is the Yanbanga, made up of political party thugs. The rise of the Yanbanga in Kano can be traced to the colonial period. During colonial rule, the feudal class in Kano had become too exploitative and repressive towards the Talakawa (peasant). This forced the Talakawa to offer strong support to the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) after the party began its anti-colonial and anti-feudal struggle in Kano. The message of NEPU threatened both the colonial authorities and the traditional aristocracy forcing them to launch a campaign of repression against NEPU. NEPU leaders and members were regularly harassed and when it appeared that the party was unstoppable, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was established to supplant the party (Ibid: 169). Part of the strategy adopted by the NPC to deal with NEPU was to use the Yanbanga to intimidate NEPU leaders and members. In response, NEPU engaged its own Yanbanga to act as body guards and to protect its leaders especially during campaign tours (Umar 2003: 332). Since then, the use of Yanbanga by politicians to harass and intimidate their opponents has become a standard political strategy and a source of frequent violent clashes. During the Second Republic, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) raised their own Yanbanga to continue the power struggle along the same lines as the NPC/NEPU contest of the First Republic (Ya’u 2000: 170). Although the role of Yanbanga in the 2011 post-election violence is not quite clear, reports indicate that the Yantauri (thugs believed to have spiritual protection from knife cuts) actively participated in the attacks (Oyelere et. al 2011: 2). Considering that the Yandaba have an extraordinary capacity to hijack a protest started by others and to turn it into their own, it is not surprising that the group is identified as participants in the 2011 post-election violence.

Another group that has been identified as participants in the 2011 post-election violence is the Almajirai. Almajirai are people who migrate in search of knowledge. Almajiri is a Hausa word for a pupil in a Koranic school (the plural is Almajirai). The Arabic origin of Almajiri is Al-muhajir, meaning a travelling student. The Almajiri system has four important features (Awofeso et.al 2003: 314). First, it involves children relocating from their family and friends in villages to the guardianship of Mallams in towns. Second, it is restricted almost exclusively to boys—the girls who attend these schools are normally limited to schools nearby their homes in the villages for relatively short periods. Third, the curriculum of the schools is concerned primarily with learning the Koran. Finally,

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20 The NPC began as a cultural organization dominated by the local aristocracy before transforming into a political party in 1951.
21 Mallam is the term for a Koranic instructor. The term is derived from Arabic word Mu’allim (or Mullah) meaning teacher/clergy.
each school, consisting of between 25 and 500 pupils, is largely autonomous, thus making it difficult to regulate the practice.

The difficult condition in which many Almajirai find themselves after leaving their home is perhaps the most critical factor that predisposes them to becoming involved in violence. The Almajiri system breeds some of the individuals that end up as Yandaba. In his study of the Yandaba in Kano, Ya’u (2000: 167) maintain that the Yandaba are ‘recruited mainly from primary and high school drop-outs’, and that ‘a large percentage of these drop-outs are ex-pupil of traditional Qur’anic schools’. The involvement of the Almajirai in incidents of violence has been documented (Awofeso et al. 2003). The most significant violent incidents involving the Almajirai were the Maitatsine riots (1980) and the Zango-Kataf riots (1993). During the 2011 post-election violence, there were reports that the Almajirai were involved in the protests. In one incident, it was reported that the house of Pastor Yussuf Ishaya of First ECWA Church in Minna was burnt by suspected Almajirai (Laleye 2011: 31). However, like in the past, there are some who have launched eloquent defense of the Almajirai, insisting that although some under-privileged Almajirai may be forced by economic difficulties to do menial jobs between school times, the Almajirai are under strict supervision of the Mallams (Dantiye 2011, Kurawa 2003). They, therefore, argue that many of the allegations of misconduct against the group are based on stereotype, ignorance and prejudice.

Targets of attacks
The riots, looting, arson and assaults associated with the 2011 post-election violence were focused mainly on PDP leaders and supporters, state institutions, government officials, traditional rulers, and individuals suspected to be non-Muslims. Homes, businesses and properties of notable PDP members such as Vice President Namadi Sambo, former speaker of the House of Representatives, Ghali Umar Na’Abba, and President Goodluck Jonathan’s campaign coordinator, Salisu Buhari, were either torched or vandalized. The offices of the PDP in Niger and Gombe States were burned. Some PDP members escaped being lynched. In Gombe State, vehicles and house belonging to the chairman of the PDP in the state, Jack Gumpy, were set on fire; at least nine people trapped in the house were killed. In addition to these attacks on political parties and private individuals, state institutions and government-owned properties such as the Kaduna State Independent Electoral Commission (KADSEIC), the popular Minna Centenary round-about at Kpakungu area in Niger state, as well as the INEC office in Gombe were all destroyed.

Some revered traditional rulers were not spared in the violence. Traditional rulers suspected to have supported the PDP were selected for attack. Specifically, the palaces of some of the most renowned and revered traditional rulers in Nigeria including the Sultan of Sokoto, Sa’ad Abubakar, Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero, and the Emir of Zazzau, Shehu Idris, were targeted and destroyed. In Bida, Niger state, two irate youths who were so brazen to march to the palace of the Etsu of Nupe, Yahaya Abubakar, with intentions to attack the palace were shot and killed by security agents (Ebijie 2011: 2).

The attacks on traditional rulers indicate a breakdown of the moral authority of these traditional rulers and a decline in the social and political linkage between the traditional elite and the masses of Northern Nigeria. For some analysts, the decline in the moral authority of traditional rulers in the North can be attributed to the involvement of the traditional rulers in partisan politics. According to one analyst:
The involvement of traditional rulers in partisan politics has desecrated their sacred positions. They are supposed to be custodians of values, beliefs, and cultural heritage, but rather, they veered off into politics. Their involvement is seen as a means to amass wealth and to protect their thrones, to the detriment of their people. Before then they were held in very high esteem because they advanced the interest of their subjects (Ibrahim et al. 2011).

CPC presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari supports the above argument contending that the violence against traditional rulers in the North was spontaneous and reflects similar occurrences in the First and Second Republics when traditional rulers that collaborated with the political elite to subvert the wishes of the people were attacked (Abbah and Alao 2011: 14). It is pertinent to note that traditional rulers in Northern Nigeria have historically been involved in politics. The point therefore is not about the involvement of Northern traditional rulers in partisan politics, but whether or not the traditional rulers were on the side of the people.

Another group that was specifically targeted during the 2011 post-election violence was members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). The National Youth Service Corps programme was introduced in 1972, shortly after the end of the Nigerian civil war, to promote national integration through encouraging social mobility and community service. Over the years, members of NYSC were seen as de-tribalized Nigerians representing the country’s future – a future built on unity and common destiny. To enhance the integrity of elections in Nigeria, INEC recruited NYSC members to serve as ad-hoc election staff in communities where they were deployed. The logic behind deployment of Corps members as election officials is that since most of the Corps members are non-natives, they are likely to be non-partisan. This call to duty portrayed the Corps members as part of the election officials; in other words, as part of the corrupt system that manipulated the results of the 2011 presidential election. This unfortunate perception of the Corps members as well as the fact that many NYSC members deployed to Northern states were non-natives and non-Muslims set them up as prime targets.

In Bauchi State, for example, about eleven NYSC members were killed in Giade, Itas Gadau, Katagum, and Alkaleri Local Government Areas. According to reports, seven of these Corps members were brutally killed by rioters who set them ablaze in a police station at Giade where they had sought safety (Michael 2011). Two female Corps Members were raped before being killed. An unspecified number of other female Corps Members were raped and assaulted by protesters in Gadau village. In Minna, Niger state, protesters stormed a lodge occupied by members of the Nigerian Christian Corpers Fellowship (NCCF), forcibly locked in 50 Corps Members in the building and set it on fire. They were able to escape after one of them forced the door open. An 18-Seater bus and motorcycle belonging to the fellowship was also burnt by the protesters. The rape and sexual assault of female Corps members highlights the gender dimension of the 2011 post-election violence. The case of the female NYSC members reflects the assault experienced by several other women during the protests.

One distinctive feature of the 2011 post-election violence is that it took a religious dimension. Attacks during the 2011 post-election protests took a distinctive pattern when the protesters attacked individuals suspected to be non-Muslims or Southerners. These individuals were portrayed as PDP supporters and were singled out for attacks. Armed
youths mounted roadblocks and asked motorists to identify their faiths before being allowed to continue their journey (Ebije and Muhammad 2011: 9). The attacks on non-Muslims and Southerners triggered reprisal attacks in some Northern states and fear of reprisal attacks in many Southern states. The main targets of the reprisal attacks were Muslims and Northerners. In Kaduna, for example, reprisal attacks were mobilized through text messages urging non-Muslims and Southerners who reside mainly at Sabo area in Kaduna to be ‘on the lookout and prepare for any emergency’ since they had become the main targets of the protests (Ebije and Muhammad 2011: 9). What can be categorized as perhaps the worst incident of reprisal attacks occurred in Zonkwa, Kaduna State - where men from the predominantly Christian Bajju tribe attacked Muslim residents of the area, killing several hundreds of people (Human Rights Watch 2011).

Finally, serious incidents of attacks by security agents against civilians were also reported. Rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and Civil Rights Congress, alleged that the police and other security agencies were involved in abuses, including extra-judicial killings, as they sought to quell the post-election violence (Agence France-Presse 2011). The chairman of the CPC in Borno State, Zana Shettima, also claims that supporters of the party were targeted and shot by security operatives in Maiduguri. Over 100 civilians, mostly women and children who were fleeing protests in Kaduna were reportedly stopped and arrested by soldiers and detained at an Army Depot in Zaria. They were detained for days in an area that lacked adequate ventilation and deprived of food and water for a long time before being released. Members of the special joint task force were accused of routinely rounding up suspects and even shooting at unarmed residents of violence-prone areas (Liman 2011: 3). Officials have repeatedly denied these allegations. For instance, spokesperson of Kaduna State governor, Reuben Buhari, dismissed the accusations as baseless and ‘a deliberate attempt to smear the image of the security personnel who have done an excellent job of restoring and maintaining peace in the state’. He maintained that ‘the government has not received any complaints of abuse or extra-judicial killings from any residents, and if such alleged abuses have taken place there was no way they could have escaped the knowledge of the government’ (Agence France-Presse 2011).

**Intensity of the violence**

In assessing the gravity of violence and extent of destruction that occurred following the 2011 post-election violence, we would focus on number and distribution of casualties, extent of damage to property, and other evidence of human suffering. Analysis of the intensity of the 2011 post-election violence is difficult since there are no collated data indicating the total number of casualties, or disaggregated profiles documenting the ethnic group, religion, gender or age of the victims. To worsen the situation, the reliability of the available data is in doubt, considering allegations of inaccuracy and/or distortion of information by parties in the conflict. The report of the Commission of Inquiry set up by the federal government ‘to investigate the immediate and remote cause(s) of…the tide of unrest in some states of the federation following the presidential election…’ which would have provided a rich and credible source of data, especially since the Commission was specifically mandated to ‘ascertain the number of persons who lost their lives or sustained injuries during the violence and identify the spread and extent of loss and damage to means of livelihood’, is yet to be released by the
government nearly one year after it was submitted\(^\text{22}\). However, the data presented by state officials, the media, and humanitarian agencies can provide us with an idea of the magnitude of death and destruction caused by the 2011 post-election protests.

**Deaths**

The 2011 post-election violence seems to be most intense in Kaduna where the highest number of deaths and destruction were recorded. Figures released by the Nigeria Police indicate that 401 people were killed during the post-election violence in Kaduna State (Kaduna State Government 2011). Figures by Non-Governmental Organizations like the Human Rights Watch point to higher number of deaths. The Human Rights Watch for example notes that over 180 people were killed in the cities of Kaduna and Zaria, while attacks in predominantly Christian communities of Southern Kaduna State, including Zonkwa, Matsirga, Kafanchan, and Marabar Rido led to the deaths of more than 500 people (Human Rights Watch 2011: 1, 4). Reports indicated that men from the Bajju tribe encircled their victims, raided and hacked them to death, before burning their homes (Ibid 4). The nature of the killings in Kaduna State shows that violence in the area is based on past animosity. Kaduna State has experienced series of violence including the Zango Kataf crisis in 1993, sectarian clashes sparked by Christian protests linked to the hosting Miss World beauty pageant in Nigeria. Ever since the Zango Kataf crisis in 1993, relationship between Christians and Muslims in Kaduna State has been tense. Years of repeated sectarian bloodshed have produced deep-seated animosity among the two religious communities. Like other animosity conflicts, memories of past conflict have acquired a relative autonomy, and become significant in renewing and intensifying the violence that occurred in many parts of Kaduna State (Ibeanu 2003). Younger members of communities in the State are simply born into sectarian conflicts, and these young ones have tended to drive the violence to new heights. One district head in predominantly Christian community of Zonkwa, Kaduna State told the Human Rights Watch that attacks by Christians against the Muslims in the area reached new heights: ‘the boys here made it total. They would not relent’ (HRW 2011: 4). At the end of the attacks, nearly all the Hausa-Fulani residents of the town were reportedly either killed or displaced.

**Sexual abuse and other forms of physical assault**

The intensity of the 2011 post-election violence also reflects in the sexual abuse and other forms of physical assault. Sexual violence is usually part and parcel of violent conflicts around the world (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007). During the 2011 post-election violence, sexual abuse was reported, although the gravity of the sexual violence associated with the protests may have been under-reported. In one instance, Bauchi State Police Command announced that ‘unspecified number of female Corps members were raped, molested and assaulted by irate youths in Gadau village’ (Orude 2011: 5, Mohammed 2011: 10). In another incident, a group of protesters reportedly invaded a female hostel at the Federal College of Education, Kano but there was no report of sexual assault (Mgboh and Ebije 2011: 7). Several issues make it possible to under-report sexual abuse during conflicts in Nigeria. These include the culture of silence around sexual abuse, insufficient reporting mechanism for available to victims of sexual

violence, attitude of security agents towards victims of sexual abuse, and difficulty in identifying perpetrators of sexual abuse in the context of violence (Amnesty International 2006).

Physical assault was a common and well reported aspect of the 2011 post-election violence. The media were replete with stories of individuals who were maimed, injured, and beaten by protesters. A large number of people suffered bodily harm inflicted with dangerous weapons such as machetes, cutlasses, and arrows. In one incident, a police officer was bathed in hot oil (Asemota 2011: 8). Gunshot injuries were widespread according to reports from various hospitals (Binniyat 2011: 7). While there is no official figure on the number of victims that suffered assault and physical injury, figures from various sources suggest that physical assault was the most common form of violence experienced during the protests.

Destruction of houses and other properties
In addition to killing and physical assault, the 2011 post-election violence was marked by destruction of houses and other properties. In Kaduna State alone, the Nigeria Police reported that 1,435 private houses, 987 shops, 157 Churches, 46 Mosques, 45 police properties, 16 government properties, 437 vehicles, and 219 motorcycles were burnt or destroyed (Ogbaudu 2011). These figures indicate the gravity of destruction during the 2011 post-election violence. They also point to the targets of attacks of the protesters. The religious dimension of the violence explains why numerous Churches and Mosques were targeted. The religious dimension of the violence equally explains why destruction was comprehensive – affecting several houses and shops. The introduction of religion as a factor in an ordinarily non-religious conflict widens the scope of the conflict in such a way that most members of the community whether political or apolitical are defined as parties in the conflict. Thus, many of the people that lost houses, shops and other properties are not necessarily members of rival political parties, but individuals who the protesters defined as adherents of rival religions.

The widespread destruction of government properties, including properties belonging to the Nigeria Police, can be attributed to grievances against the ruling party/government and frustration caused by the outcome of the election. In some communities, protesters specifically targeted the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). For instance in Bauchi State, protesters destroyed INEC offices in Itas-Gadau, Jama’are, Bauchi, Dambam, and Misau Local Government Areas. The protesters either looted or destroyed properties including about 500 laptop computers, 13 power generating sets, file cabinets and other properties from the offices (Ojeme 2011: 7, Mohammed 2011: 2). An interesting dimension to the destruction of government properties was the attacks on prisons. In Kaduna and Katsina States, protesters attacked Zaria Central Prison and Katsina Federal Prison in Malumfashi and released 164 and 45 inmates, respectively (Lartey 2011: 7). According to Hussaini Lema, Comptroller of Prisons in Kaduna State, administrative block, vehicles and money, and vital documents belonging to Zaria Central Prison were destroyed (Liman 2011: 11). One explanation for the attack on the prisons is that it is an expression of the protesters rejection of the state and its institutions. According to reports, the reasons given by the protesters for breaking the prison was that ‘it houses no son or daughter of any influential person in Nigeria despite their alleged atrocities…, inmates are all common people who are from ordinary backgrounds’(Ibid: 11). A striking aspect the 2011 post-election violence was the use of bombs and explosive devices in the destruction of houses and properties, especially in
Kaduna and Borno States (Idris 2011: 9, Muhammad 2011: 12, Olugbode 2011). The use of bombs and explosive devices in sectarian violence has become widespread following uprising by the Islamist group, Boko Haram.

Internal displacement and other forms of human suffering
The 2011 post-election violence resulted serious internal displacement in Nigeria. Internal displacement is a common consequence of the recurring sectarian violence in Nigeria. But due to the absence of a functioning monitoring mechanism, it is difficult to get accurate figures of persons displaced by conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies. While ad hoc local registration exercises may provide hints at the scale of displacement, persons who seek shelter and support from family and friends (these people actually make up the majority of internally displaced persons in Nigeria) tend not to be counted (IDMC 2012: 1). According to the Human Rights Watch (2011: 1), the 2011 post-election violence forced more than 65,000 people to flee their homes. The Nigerian Red Cross Society released a slightly lower figure indicating that the violence displaced 48,000 persons in 12 states (Omenazu and Paschal 2011: 6). The Society said the displaced persons were camped at various locations in Nigeria, including 7,000 persons at Army Barracks, Zango and Railway area in Bauchi State; 700 persons at Army and Police Barracks in Gombe State; 7,000 persons at Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna State; 4,000 persons at Bompai Police Barracks, Army Barracks, Mobile Police Barracks, and Air Force Base in Kano State; 800 persons at Central Police Station, Sabon Gari Police Station in Daura and Makera Police Station in Funtua, Katsina State; 500 persons at the Army and Mobile Police Barracks in Niger State; and 2000 persons at Army and Police Barracks in Sokoto State. The Nigerian Red Cross Society also noted that about 8,400 persons from Northern Nigeria are taking refuge at a Military Barracks in Onitsha, Anambra State for fear of being attacked.

Although the post-election violence did not produce as many cases of internally displaced persons as conflicts such as the Jos conflict, which displaced over 250,000 persons between February and May 2004 alone (International Crisis Group 2006: 15), the conditions faced by those displaced by the post-election violence are typical of the challenges facing internally displaced persons in Nigeria. These challenges include the inadequacy of IDP camps leading to the separation of many families, since members of the same family may secure refuge in different overflowing IDP camps scattered across towns and villages (Orji 2011). Furthermore, many IDP camps in Nigeria lack basic sanitation and health facilities; as such, inhabitants are left to contend with communicable diseases and other major health challenges as well as the broader crisis confronting Nigeria’s health sector including short supply of health workers, lack of basic equipment and consumables, poor disease surveillance and management (Adirieje 2010, WHO 2010). The conditions in many IDP camps probably forced some displaced persons to seek alternative places of abode - some reportedly squatted with prostitutes for a fee (Mgboh and Ebije 2011: 7). Finally, the conditions of internally displaced persons were worsened by shortage of food and other basic necessities like water. Following days of civil unrest and the curfew imposed by the government in areas where violence occurred, prices of food items soared, making life difficult, particularly, for internally displaced persons who could not receive sufficient amounts of food in the camps, but also for other residents of the areas. In Tudun Wada area of Kaduna, for example, the prices of food items increased to as much as 100 per cent, forcing many residents to go hungry for days (Musa and Mudashir 2011). The human suffering that resulted from the
2011 post-election violence, as indicated by the experience of the internally displaced persons, constitutes a key element that defines the intensity of the violence.
Like Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya have recorded remarkable cases of post-election violence. In order to gain deeper insights on the phenomenon of post-election violence, it is pertinent to look at it from a comparative point of view. This section presents the case studies of post-election violence in Ethiopia and Kenya, highlights lessons that can be drawn from the experiences of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Kenya, and offers comparative perspective on the problem.

**Ethiopia’s 2005 election**

Ethiopia’s May 2005 election was the third multi-party parliamentary elections since the establishment of the country’s federal democracy in 1994. The election was described by the European Union Election Observation Mission as ‘the most genuinely competitive election the country has experienced’ following a record of boycott of the previous elections by the opposition parties (Teshome 2009: 466). Ethiopia’s 2005 election was remarkable in many ways. First, the election was keenly contested between the ruling party and the opposition, the first time the country witnessed such competitive election in its contemporary history (Barnes 2006). Secondly, the elections were preceded by more widespread campaigning in the countryside than the previous elections and a relatively free and open public debate between the ruling party and the opposition parties. For the first time, ‘public debates between high-profile candidates of the main political party coalitions provided a forum for discussion of some of the most controversial and important political issues, including land ownership, economic development, language and education policy, and ethnic self-determination’ (Smith 2007: 4). Thirdly, the elections saw the largest vote for parties in opposition to an incumbent government in recent times. The opposition parties ‘conquered the seats in virtually all towns and urban areas, most notably in Addis Ababa’ (Abbink 2006: 183). Fourthly, the election witnessed the most concerted international engagement with Ethiopia’s domestic politics since the end of the cold war. Finally, despite hopes of success, the election ended in sharply disagreement, controversy, bloody electoral protest, and massive repression of popular protests (HRW 2010). In fact, some analysts fear that the aftermath of the election has marked a major democratic reversal in the country, with the return to authoritarianism and non-competitive elections in 2008 and 2010 (Lyons 2011, Aalen and Tronvoll 2008).

Although the pre-election and election-day activities were relatively peaceful, the post-election phase of the election was marred by electoral violence that led to the death of more than 193 people and the detention of over 40,000 others (Teshome 2009: 466). Three major issues set the stage for the outbreak of the violence. The first is the announcement by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of a ban on public demonstrations and protests in Addis Ababa for one month beginning after the voting day. This action set a combative tone for the election and sends a warning signal to the opposition that any form of protest would not be tolerated. The second action was the untimely announcement by the ruling party – EPRDF, claiming ‘overwhelming victory’. The ruling party declared that it won elections in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regions. This declaration of victory came too early after voting when only a little vote counting had been done. The EPRDF declaration was immediately followed by counter claims and declaration of victory by the opposition parties. The third action that provided basis for eruption of post-election violence in Ethiopia was the delayed release...
of the election results by the NEBE. The counting, collation and release of results were quite complicated and delayed by many weeks. This exasperated many, forcing the EU Observation Mission to express its worry about the process in a statement on 24 May 2005:

The European Union Observation Mission regrets the way in which the counting of the votes at the constituency level is being conducted as well as the way in which the release of results is being handled by the electoral authorities, the government and the political parties, especially the EPRDF.

Finally, the stage for electoral violence was set by accusations and counter accusations of electoral fraud brought against each other by the opposition and the ruling parties. The leader of the CUD, Hailu Shawel, called on his party to reject the election results due to massive irregularities. In a similar vein, Bereket Simon, an official of the EPRDF alleged: ‘the conventional wisdom is that the state or ruling party cheats. Now we have found that it is otherwise. We have ample evidence that the opposition party has rigged the election’ (Teshome 2009: 467).

Amidst accusations and counter accusations of electoral misconduct, the NEBE began to release provisional election results at the constituency level. The delays in the release of the election results and the fact that the preliminary results showed an early lead of the ruling party led to frustration among some elements of the population. Consequently, in early June, students of Addis Ababa University defied the ban on demonstrations and staged a spontaneous sit-in-strike to protest ‘the stealing of the elections’ by the ruling party. Within the next two days, taxi drivers began a strike and students in Bahir Dar, Awasa, and Ambo regional universities also joined the protest. On 8 June 2005, street demonstrations by students, street youths, and other urban supporters of opposition parties began in Addis Ababa. The government ordered the suppression of the protests, and special armed units popularly called the *ag’azi* were used to aggressively repress the protesters (Abbink 2006).

The opposition parties, especially the largest one – CUD, released press statements in the subsequent weeks, accusing the ruling party of election fraud, mandate theft, and indiscriminate repression. They also called for further peaceful public protests. However, a state media campaign was initiated to counter the opposition’s rhetoric or rigging. The state media campaign accused the opposition of disloyalty and ‘plotting to overthrow the government’. In what appears like a systematic repression, ruling party politicians, cadres and police harassed perceived opposition activists, leading to the arrest of thousands and the killing of one elected candidate in unclear circumstances. In October 2005, the annual *Maskal* celebrations – a religious occasion tinged with nationalistic sentiment – also descended into violence. The crowd greeted government and civil dignitaries with shouts of protest as they enter the venue of the event. Speeches by government officials were interrupted, while other elements in the crowd confronted the police and began throwing stones (Barnes 2006). Continuing claims of electoral fraud by sections of the CUD coalition instigated a programme of strikes and boycotts beginning on 31 October 2005, following which large numbers of suspected CUD members were arrested. Police also arrested most of CUD leadership, critical journalists, students’ activists, and some prominent individuals from the civil society.
Since June 2005, the government has continued to carry out a crackdown on the opposition and the civil society. This has resulted in the constriction of Ethiopian political space. The ruling EPRDF has effectively limited the ability of independent voices to peacefully express their views, particularly in the rural areas where the local administration maintains a strong grip on communities (Lefort 2010). This ways, the ruling party has successfully restricted opposition activity where it exists, and prevented it from arising elsewhere (HRW 2010: 22). The ruling party has also used its stronghold on Ethiopian politics to gain victory in the 2008 local elections and the 2010 national elections (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008, Lyons 2011).

Kenya’s 2007 election
Kenya’s December 2007 general election was the fourth since the country’s transition from one-party authoritarianism to multi-party democracy in December 1991. The outcome of the election represents a dashed hope for the opposition; there were high expectations among opposition supporters that the election would go their way. Few months before the election, a number of polls indicated that the incumbent president trailed opposition candidate Raila Odinga (Daily Nation [Nairobi], 29 September 2007; Daily Nation [Nairobi], 21 November 2007; Standard [Nairobi], 18 December 2007). Many observers, including key advisors of President Kibaki, also acknowledged that the President and his party may lose the December election (Dagne 2008: 2). However, as events turned out, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced that President Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) beat Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) to clinch victory. The results announced by the ECK indicated both a rapid disintegration of Odinga’s large lead and a 2.5 percent margin between Kibaki and Odinga. This raised suspicions of vote tampering, especially because the opposition had won 99 seats at the parliamentary election to PNU’s 43 seats. Most international observers noted that there had been irregularities in the collation of the presidential vote, even though the conduct of the ECK during the before and during the election day had been largely acceptable (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009: 2).

Raila Odinga’s immediate reaction to the outcome of the election was to reject the election results. He accused the ruling party of fraud and called for a vote recount. Odinga also rejected the advice by the incumbent and countries like the US that ‘those alleging vote tampering may pursue legal remedies’ (East African Standard [Nairobi], 30 December 2007). He maintained that the election dispute was not a legal matter but a political conflict that required a political solution. Odinga’s ODM declared that it would not go to court over the results because it had no confidence in Kenya’s judicial system, an institution that has failed to resolve past political disputes and is controlled by Kibaki loyalists (Harneit-Sievers and Peters 2008, 137; Mutua 2001). After Mwai Kibaki was hurriedly sworn in, the ODM called on its supporters to hold protest rallies as a way of forcing Kibaki to concede defeat and accept that the election was rigged in his favour. While the rallies were meant to be peaceful, some ODM supporters took to violence. HRW (2008: 35) reported that in some ODM strongholds like the Rift Valley, violent attacks against the Kikuyu (Kibaki’s ethnic group) were planned before results of the December polls were released. The calls for demonstrations provided opportunity for some ODM supporters to carry out premeditated violence.

The outbreak of violence in Kenya was not necessarily the result of a flawed election. Rather, the disputed election served as a catalyst of violent expression of deep-seated frustrations. The frustrations felt by the Kenyan opposition stemmed from feelings in the
Luo community (Raila Odinga’s ethnic group), that there were deliberate efforts to prevent the Luo from ascending to the position of President. In the first place, these feelings were underlined by the assumption that President Kibaki (a Kikuyu) robbed Odinga of his well deserved victory during the 2007 election. Again, the Luo were offended by personal attacks launched against Odinga by the PNU during the electioneering campaigns (ICG 2008: 4-5). The personal attacks were based on deep-rooted ethnic prejudice. For instance, PNU leaders declared publicly that an ‘uncircumcised boy’ could not lead Kenya; referring to Odinga whose Luo community does not traditionally circumcise men, even though males in most other Kenyan communities are circumcised to mark entry into adulthood. This propaganda was well received especially by members of the Bantu communities, for whom circumcision is a key social value, associated with cleanliness and respectability. It also appealed to the Kikuyu in the Nairobi slums and the migrant communities in the Rift Valley (ICG 2008: 5). Finally, the feeling of anti-Luo conspiracy gathered support from the challenges faced by patriarchs of Luo politics such as Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya, and Robert Ouko in their struggles to find a place in the mainstream of Kenyan politics (Gimode 1996; Ajulu 1999; Badejo 2006). The deep sense of marginalization among the Luo is an important factor in Kenya’s post-election violence.

Besides Luo grievances, there was the land grievance. Land seized by British colonists is a major source of conflict in Kenya’s modern-day provinces of Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, and Central. The colonial government acquired more than 7 million acres of land (about 20% of Kenya’s land) and earmarked it for cultivation by Europeans. The ethnic communities that occupied the areas were transferred to marginal reserves, overcrowding the reserves and forcing many Luo, Kisii, Luhya, and Kikuyu to migrate to the Rift Valley province as squatters. At independence in 1963, some portions of the seized land were returned, not to the people from whom it had been taken, but to the new government and without regard to the collective land rights of communities (Kanyinga 2000). The government sold the land it acquired from British settlers under the principle of ‘willing seller’, ‘willing buyer’. But much of the land ended up in the hands of members of Kenyatta’s Kikuyu ethnic group rather than with the communities from which it had been taken because Kenyatta had used the land for patronage and to build alliances (Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2005).

The land reallocation upset the traditional arrangements of many indigenous groups and incensed the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (KAMATUSA) group of the Rift Valley who regard the settler farms as their ancestral home. The KAMATUSA group favoured federalism in order to obtain guarantees against land grabbing by squatters and migrants. The group also resented settlers and used violence in an attempt to expel them from those areas (Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2005: 127). This led to the displacement of people who had settled in parts of the country other than their ancestral home. The settler communities on their part have been keen to protect their territorial gains outside their ancestral land; as such, they adopted various strategies including strong opposition to the idea of federalism. Thus, for most of the post-colonial era, conflict over land has been at the centre of ethnic conflict in Kenya. During the presidency of Daniel arap Moi, the main settler communities (Kikuyu, Luo, parts of Luhya, and parts of Kamba) joined the opposition while the Moi regime tried to hold together the KAMATUSA group. When opposition pressure on Moi became overwhelming, top Kalenjin politicians incited ‘ethnic cleansing’ against the settlers (Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, and Kissi) in parts of the Rift Valley (Harneit-Sievers and Peters 2008: 134). Between 1992 and 1997, more
than 1,500 people were killed and up to 500,000 were displaced mainly in the Rift Valley. Thus, an inter-ethnic tension generated by land-related conflicts had simmered since the 1990s.

The potentials of Luo and Kalenjin grievances to induce violent protests were reinforced by the opportunity structures for initiation of violence in Kenya. It is common knowledge that poverty and a weak security and law enforcement capacity provide great opportunities for initiation of violent protests (Elbadawi et al. 2001). Although Kenya has encouraging economic growth statistics (6.4 percent for 2007), the country’s development records are tarnished by depressing figures of severe poverty (see IMF 2007). Recent figures show that 58% of the Kenyan population live on less than two US$ per day (UNDP 2007). The high rate of poverty in Kenya is a reflection of the fact that the country is not immune to widespread corruption and failure of governance that have infected most African countries. Poverty produces criminals and violent gangs in most of Kenya’s slum areas, and these individuals constitute a pool of willing violent protesters (HRW 2008: 27-29, Evans Jr. 1977). Contemporary Kenya has garnered a reputation for violent crimes and insecurity, a clear indication of the country’s weak security capacity (Gimode 2001). In all, the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya was underpinned by deep-seated ethnic grievances and ripe opportunity structures for violence.

**Comparing notes: lessons from Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia**

There are key lessons to be learned from the post-election violence in Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria. The first is that the experiences of the three countries show that electoral violence is deeply-rooted in the countries’ historical, political, and socio-economic configurations, and were only triggered by election outcomes, including allegations of electoral fraud. Electoral violence in Ethiopia was shaped by the domination of the country’s politics and governance by Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), under the control of Tigray and Amhara elite. In Kenya, the 2007/08 electoral violence was underpinned by the exclusion of the Luo in governance, while the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria was underlined by the supplanting of the Muslim/Hausa-Fulani community in national politics. This shows the continued saliency of ethnicity despite efforts towards moderating the influence of communal identities in African politics. Identity politics remains a major challenge to peace, security and stability in Africa.

Secondly, the violence that took place in the three countries was directed at the incumbents/ruling parties and their supporters, indicating an expression of dissatisfaction with the ruling parties’ domination of the political process. In all the three cases, the incumbents/ruling parties maintain primacy on national politics for a number of years. Specifically, the EPRDF has had a stronghold on Ethiopian politics since 1991; the PDP maintains hegemony in Nigerian politics since 1999, while Kibaki (under NARC and PNU) has dominated Kenyan politics in much of post-Moi period.

Thirdly, all the three cases of electoral violence occurred in the post-election period, suggesting that the bone of contention is more about the people’s perception and response to the election outcome than their interpretation and reaction to the credibility of the electoral process. This shows that had the outcome of the elections been different, the violence may not have erupted, or may have taken a different form, the level of credibility of the electoral process, notwithstanding.
Fourthly, the Nigeria case, in particular, demonstrates that, sometimes, the triggers of electoral violence run deeper than dissatisfaction with the conduct of elections. In other words, flawed election is not always the explanation for outbreak of electoral violence. The high stakes attached to the 2011 elections in the North and Niger Delta suggests that no matter the degree of credibility of the conduct of the election, its outcome would be contentious, divisive and prone to violence.

Finally, the case studies reveal the importance of the power relations between the winners and losers in defining the success or otherwise of electoral protest as well as the magnitude and severity of electoral violence. By all accounts, the electoral violence in Kenya had a greater magnitude and severity than that of Ethiopia and Nigeria. This can be explained by the relative power parity that exists between winners and losers in the Kenyan election (Orji 2010). War studies suggest that violence emerges when competitors control equivalent amounts of resources (Benson and Kugler 1998). Unlike losers in Ethiopian and Nigerian elections, losers in the Kenyan election carried out a more successful electoral protest because they were more organized and able to mobilize their local activists, the civil society and the international community (Brown 2009, Orji 2010). The ODM employed a double-edged strategy of using protests and international attention to give weight to its cause. This gave the party a strong position when it entered into negotiation with the ruling party. ODM’s experience was contrary to those of the opposition in Ethiopia and Nigeria, which were divided and often poorly led. The Ethiopian and Nigerian opposition found it hard to obtain the widespread popular support and to attract the attention of the international community (Abbink 2006, HRW 2010). Thus, unlike the Kenyan opposition that forced the ruling party to cut a power-sharing deal, Ethiopian and Nigerian opposition were simply suppressed and contained by the government.
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusions and Recommendations

This study documents and analyzes the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria. It situates the violence within conceptual, historical, empirical and comparative perspective. In conceptualizing the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria, the study defined post-election violence as a specific form of electoral violence that occurs at a particular time focused in the electoral cycle - the post-election period (that is, between the Election Day and the announcement of results and in the aftermath). The study traces the roots of post-election violence in Nigeria to remote and immediate causes such as saliency of communal identities in politics and communal tensions, decline in trust and social capital among communities, culture of impunity, economic vulnerabilities, institutional and behavioural issues such as erosion of trust in the electoral justice system, lack of internal democracy in political parties, integrity of elections, use of inflammatory rhetoric, and changes in political institutions.

In providing a historical perspective to this study, we examined all the general elections organized in Nigeria since 1954, focusing on the elections of 1964/5 and 1983 both of which witnessed significant incidents of post-election violence. In all, we derived three main assumptions from our historical analysis of post-election violence in Nigeria – assumptions which guided our analysis of the 2011 post-election violence. The main assumptions we identified include: 1) the core issue underlying post-election violence in Nigeria is the frustration arising from the inability of the ‘presumed dominant forces’ to win political power, 2) post-election violence tends to occur in elections that emerge as a contest between two powerful political forces with relatively equal strength, 3) post-election violence manifests in attacks on individuals/institutions assumed to have worked, or to be working, against the victory of the ‘presumed dominant forces’.

Based on data collected mainly from documents, this study examined the underlying causes, participants, targets and intensity of the 2011 post-election violence. To provide a systematic explanation of why violence occurred after the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, this study adopted three major analytical perspectives: grievance, opportunity structure, and structural perspectives. Based on these perspectives, the study observed that seven key issues combined to provide the basis for the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria. These include: 1) flaws in election administration and doubts about the credibility of the elections by opposition candidates/parties, 2) presence of willing protesters in various Nigerian communities, 3) weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement, 4) unrestrained use of inflammatory remarks, 5) existence of communal tensions, 6) saliency of ethnicity in 2011 elections, and 7) shifts in power relations among political parties. Further studies could attempt to identify the most important cause of the 2011 post-election violence bearing in mind these various factors.

In interrogating the perpetrators and targets of the 2011 post-election violence, this study notes that violent groups such as Yantauri were reportedly active participants in the protests. However, the study maintains that more information is required to conclusively identify the role of various individuals and groups in the violence. While the participants in the 2011 post-election violence may not be clear, the targets of the attacks are well-known. These include leaders and supporters of the ruling PDP, state institutions, government officials, traditional rulers, and individuals believed to be non-Muslims. Finally, in assessing the gravity of the 2011 post-election violence, this study highlights the number and distribution of casualties. Based on available data, Kaduna State
recorded the highest number of deaths and destruction. The intensity of the 2011 post-election violence also reflects in sexual abuse and other forms of physical assault as well as internal displacement.

To situate our analysis of the 2011 post-election violence in a comparative perspective, we examined the violence that took place in the aftermath of the 2005 and 2007 elections in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively. Based on the analysis, two key lessons were discerned from the experiences of the three countries. Firstly, we learn from the experiences of Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia that electoral violence is deeply-rooted in the historical, political, and socio-economic configurations of the countries, and that it is only triggered by election outcomes, including claims of electoral fraud. This suggests that the bone of contention is not necessarily about the people’s perception of the integrity of elections, but their interpretation and reaction to the wider implication of the outcome of the electoral process. Secondly, we observe that post-election violence is usually directed at the incumbents/ruling parties and their supporters, indicating an expression of frustration and dissatisfaction with the ruling parties’ domination of the political process.

To address some of the issues we have raised in this study, we suggest as follows:
1. Federal and state governments should publish reports of commissions of inquiry into the 2011 post-election violence and implement as appropriate their recommendations as well as the recommendations contained in government white papers.
2. Federal and state governments should identify and bring to justice those responsible for organizing or encouraging the post-election violence as well as those involved in the killings, assault and destruction.
3. The federal government should review deployment plans and coordination arrangements among different security agencies to ensure that security agents are deployed promptly in the event of any future outbreak of violence.
4. Federal and state governments should provide adequate funding to security and law enforcement agencies to enable them deter, arrest, and prosecute offenders.
5. Judicial and law enforcement agencies, particularly the Nigeria Police and the Directorate of Public Prosecution, should improve their intelligence, investigation and prosecution capacity.
6. Nigeria Police and the Directorate of Public Prosecution should review coordination arrangements among them to facilitate prompt prosecution of suspected perpetrators of violence.
7. Security agencies should develop joint security forecast and response strategy at local and national levels as a basis for dealing with any outbreak of post-election violence.
8. Political parties should work with other stakeholders to review the issue of zoning/rotation of presidency and come up with a clear position on whether or not it should be applied in Nigeria’s electoral process as well as a clear definition of its modalities.
9. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should ensure that political parties and their members abide by the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, the Electoral Act, and the political parties’ Code of Conduct, particularly those provisions that relate to campaigns, political rallies and processions as well as involvement of party supporters in election violence.
10. Development partners and donor agencies should support appropriate local and national conflict prevention and resolution initiatives aimed at dealing with election violence.

11. Civil society groups should initiate and encourage civic and voter education programmes that would promote peaceful democratic culture and mitigate electoral violence.

12. Civil society groups should closely monitor and support measures put in place to prosecute suspected perpetrators of post-election violence.
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COMPILATION OF INCIDENTS DURING THE 2011 POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE
GUIDE

DS – Daily Sun
SS – Saturday Sun/ Sunday Sun
DT – Daily Trust
ST – Sunday Trust
WT- Weekly Trust
TG – The Guardian
TV – The Vanguard
SV – Saturday Vanguard
TN – The Nation
TP – The Punch
TD – This Day
DI – Daily Independent
NT – Nigerian Tribune
HRW – Human Rights Watch
CPC – Congress for Progressive Change
PDP – People’s Democratic Party
NAPEN – National Association for Peaceful Elections in Nigeria
NEVR – Nigeria Election Violence Report
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<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Description of Incident</th>
<th>Victims: Name/Type/Number</th>
<th>Suspected Perpetrator(s)</th>
<th>Sources of Information</th>
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|      | Kabala West, Kaduna North | Saturday, April 16, 2011 | On the night of the Presidential Election, two bomb blast incidents were reported; one at the *Happy Night Hotel* in Kabala West, Kaduna South LGA, a suburb of Kaduna and another in *Magajin Gari Sharia Court 1*, a court attached to the Kaduna North LGA. The second bomb went off at about 10.30pm | • 2 people reportedly killed in Kabala  
• According to the State CP, 8 persons at the *Magajin Gari Sharia Court* bombing sustained serious injuries. Casualties could have been more in number if the bomb had gone off during busy hours as the area is known to attract large gatherings of people.  
• Two of the blast victims, Ben Manson and Ekaette Patience were taken to St. Gerald's Hospital, Kaduna for treatment. (DS)  
• Journalists reportedly beaten up by youths protesting in the Kabala area (ST) | The Police paraded 4 Nigeriens and 2 Nigerians as suspects of the Kabala West bombings. The Nigeriens are: Abubakar Abdulazeez, Ja’afaru Abu, Alhaji Samaila Alhassan, and Abdullahi Sulaiman (Nigeriens). The Nigerians are, Shuaibu Abdullahi from Igabi LGA of Kaduna State and Mohammed Hari, a 16 year old student of Kufena Science Secondary School and indigene of Kaduna State. (DS) | • Daily Sun, April 18, 2011, p.12  
• Sunday Trust, April 17, 2011, p.1  
• The Nation, April 18, 2011, p.10 |
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<th>Location</th>
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<td>Nasarawa</td>
<td>Sunday, April 17, 2011</td>
<td>Zakaria Elisha (25), a Christian and trader of Nasarawa, a Christian dominated suburb of Kaduna, along with two of his brothers were jolted from sleep by noise and cries around 2am. He woke up and saw “scores of Hausa boys with knives, sticks, guns, bows and arrows” attacking and killing people. Some were shooting, and some were pursuing people and stabbing them. The rioters attacked him and his brothers by cutting them with machetes. (SV)</td>
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<td>Zakaria Elisha and his two brothers, macheted by a group of boys; his two brothers died from injuries sustained during the attacks. (SV)</td>
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<td>Group of “Hausa” boys</td>
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<td>Saturday Vanguard, April 23, 2011, p.7</td>
<td>Eyewitness account by Zakaria Elisha</td>
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<td>The Public Relations Officer of St. Gerard Hospital, Kaduna, Mr. Sunday John Ali, said that the hospital had about 30 corpses on Saturday, April 16, and that by Sunday, over 300 victims, mostly with bullet wounds fired by high caliber weapons were being treated in the hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Sunday, April 17, 2011</td>
<td>Violent attack on students and lecturers of Nuhu Bamali Polytechnic, Zaria. They were cornered and beaten to death with sticks, clubs, and machetes.</td>
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<td>4 Christian Students and a Christian lecturer at the college were killed</td>
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<td>Mob/youths</td>
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<td>• The Punch, April 20, 2011, p. 7</td>
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<td>• Human Rights Watch, May 17, 2011 available</td>
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<td>NAPEN reported that this incident occurred on April 18,</td>
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<td>Location</td>
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</table>
| Kaduna town, Zaria, Tudun Wada, Zazzau | Monday, April 18, 2011 | Riots erupted when irate youths took to the streets to protest the defeat of CPC Presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari. Properties belonging to some prominent individuals were destroyed due to their perceived or alleged support of PDP candidate, and President elect, Goodluck Jonathan. | - Hundreds of civilians injured  
- 7 persons killed in Zaria (DT)  
- Vice President elect (then) Namadi Sambo's house in Tudun Wada burnt  
- Ikara Local Government Chairman, Gambo Lawal's house burnt  
- Emir of Zazzau, Alhaji Shehu Idris's residence in Ungwan Sarki, torched  
- Home of Hajia Halima Labbo, Commissioner for Special Duties, burnt  
- Home of Alhaji Ibrahim Ali, Special Adviser to the Governor Patrick Yakowa, burned  
- House belonging to Alhaji Shehu Ahmad Giant, two-time chairman of Kaduna North LGA and PDP House of Representatives candidate house burnt  
- House and cars of former Legislator and PDP chieftain Alhaji Sabo Babayaro burnt  
- The State Independent Electoral Commission office burnt | - Daily Trust, Tuesday April 19, p.2  
- The Nation, April 19, p.6  
- Guardian Tuesday April 19, p.6  
- Daily Sun, April 19, p.9  
- Nigerian Tribune, April 19, p.2  
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<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>At about 10.00am, a group of rioters made up of hundreds of youths stormed the Zaria Central prisons. They overpowered the prison security, forced their way in and released 164 inmates. According to Alhaji Hussaini Lema, the Kaduna State Comptroller of Prisons, the prison’s Black Maria, administrative block, two vehicles and a motorcycle were burnt. Apart from a prison warden who sustained minor injuries, there were no other reported casualties.</td>
<td>The Nation, April 19, 2011, p.6, Nigerian Tribune, April 19, 2011, p.2, Weekly Trust, Saturday April 23, 2011, p. 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angwar Romi, Sabon Gari, Kabala West</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>The violence spread to several areas in the State forcing the governor to impose a dusk-to-dawn curfew. In Angwar Romi and Sabo, armed youths mounted roadblocks and asked motorists to identify their faiths before being allowed to continue on their journey. Non-natives known to be PDP supporters allegedly singled out for attacks in Kabala West. Irate youths on the Nnamdi Azikiwe by-pass, close to the Kabala West junction smashed windscreens of vehicles on sight prompting circulation of text messages among residents of Sabo area to be “on the lookout and prepare for any emergency.”</td>
<td>Groups of angry youths</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Incident Description</td>
<td>Responsible Parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Dauda Hafis, 27, a Muslim Truck Driver was travelling from Suleja to Zaria when he ran into a heavy road block mounted by a group of angry Christian youths. Dauda Hafis beaten and his truck set on fire. According to him “I was stopped and forced out. They rushed at me with sticks and knives.” “I was beaten with clubs; while others used Machetes on me.”</td>
<td>Angry Christian Youths</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ungwan Maigero, Trikania</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Riots in Ungwan Maigero: Mrs. Laitu Elisha said her husband, Elisha Mandung, 52, a teacher at Government Day Secondary School, Kakuri, and part time lecturer at Kaduna State University was killed by rampaging youths in Ungwan Maigero. She also stated that she lost her nephew in the Trikania area, and that her brother-in-law’s house was burned.</td>
<td>Rampaging Youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Attempt by a group of Almajiris to burn ECWA church. Associate Pastor of the church, Yussuf Ishaya’s house burned by Almajirai he was feeding and housing</td>
<td>Almajirs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Not indicated</td>
<td>Reported attacks and killings of Zaria residents by soldiers: There was an unconfirmed report of a soldier named Sergeant Mailer who admitted killing anyone he came across in Zaria. This information was passed on to the Commandant of the Army Depot Zaria, Brigadier General Hussaini Abayomi Salihu who said he had ordered an investigation of the report. (Reports on the result of the investigation were not found.)</td>
<td>Soldiers and Police</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) Teaching Hospital.

- Naomi Amos had her arm broken by a soldier that attacked her. Recounting her experience from the ECWA health center in Narayi, Kaduna, she said a soldier broke into a compound she shared with some other persons, ordered all the occupants into a room, and beat her violently. (SV)

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<th>Additional Information</th>
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<td>Maigero, Narayi</td>
<td>“Fake soldiers” allegedly invaded Maigero, near Narayi, a suburb of Kaduna metropolis and attacked residents; 2 persons were allegedly arrested with explosives at Narayi on Monday, 4/18 (NEVR)</td>
<td>The Guardian, April 19, 2011, p.6 NAPENs live report, available at <a href="http://nevr.org/reports/view/628">http://nevr.org/reports/view/628</a></td>
<td>&quot;Fake Soldiers&quot;</td>
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<td>Kaduna-Zaria Road</td>
<td>Buhari's convoy attacked by a Mob along Kaduna-Zaria road and inside Kaduna town. Buhari himself was not travelling in any of the vehicles</td>
<td>Angry mob</td>
<td>Sunday Trust, April 24, 2011, p.2</td>
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HRW documented eight cases of alleged unlawful killing of unarmed residents by the police and soldiers in the cities of Zaria and Kaduna, and received credible reports of more than a dozen other incidents.

Destruction of Mosques, homes and property belonging to Muslim residents. |
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<td>• Houses and property of mostly Hausa/Fulani community members burned</td>
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<td>• Initial reports said over 150 members of the Hausa/Fulani communities were killed</td>
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<td>• A survivor named Kabiru said 117 corpses were burned beyond recognition, and another 74 men killed but not burned and being removed by community members for mass burials.</td>
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<td>• Resident of Zonkwa, Salisu Mu’azu said close to 50 people, mostly women and children killed, 300 cars set ablaze and their settlement razed</td>
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<td>• Hausa/Fulani Community later said they lost over 400 persons in the violence. (DT 4/25)</td>
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<td>• Residents of Zonkwa told the BBC Hausa Service that over 400 persons were buried in mass graves between Friday, April 22 and Saturday April 23.</td>
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<td>• HRW reported that over 311 Muslims, mostly men were buried. 10 Christians killed, but that no churches were destroyed</td>
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<td>• According to Jaamatu Nasril Islam (JNI), the Muslim umbrella body in the North, the Chief Imam of Zonkwa was brought out to the road and slaughtered like a ram (SV)</td>
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<td>• Shehu Sani, president of Civil Rights</td>
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<td>• One Alhaji Yahaya Abdullahi of Marabar Rido alleged that most of Zonkwa residents were killed by “fake soldiers”, police and hired thugs from Plateau State. (DT 4/25)</td>
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<td>• Daily Trust, Thursday April 22, p.4 &amp; April 25, p.2</td>
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<td>• Saturday Vanguard, April 23, p. 7</td>
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<td>• Saturday Vanguard, April 23, 2011, p.7</td>
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<td>There is no official figure on the number of the dead and wounded. Reported figures are rough estimates, and therefore differ.</td>
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<td>Police Public Relations Officer (PRO) of Kaduna, DSP (Deputy Superintendent of Police) Aminu Lawal disputed the number of deaths put forward by members of the Hausa/Fulani Communities. He said the number</td>
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</table>
Congress (CRC), a Kaduna-based civic group, revealed that his organization confirmed that up to 316 persons were killed in Zonkwa alone.

- Six of the Zonkwa's mosques burnt including the main mosque; anti-Islamic graffiti and the inscription "Jesus is Lord" inscribed on the burned-out walls of the mosque (HRW).
  - Multi Million Naira Samarun Kataf Central Mosque built by Hajia Maryam Gidado Idris, an indigenous Kataf Muslim woman torched in Zangon Kataf Local Government.
- All of the town's Hausa-Fulani residents nearly displaced. One of the district heads told HRW “The boys here made it total. They would not relent.”
- Another report said all the mosques in Zangon Kataf LGA and Christian dominated areas of Southern Kaduna were all razed (SV)
- Islamic School attached to Samarun Kataf Central Mosque torched.

Of deceased persons was not up to 400, but didn't give the polices’ own official death toll—DT, Monday 4/25

On the issue of “fake soldiers” being perpetrator s, Kaduna State Commissio n of Police, Mr. John Haruna responded that his command had effectively dealt with the issue. Daily Trust, Monday 4/25
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<th>Location</th>
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<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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*Military High Command Issued shoot-on-sight order to soldiers deployed to Kaduna. (TG 4/20)*
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<tr>
<td>Kaduna Town</td>
<td>Tuesday, April 19, 2011</td>
<td>Fresh riots broke out in Kaduna. Six charred bodies with machete wounds lay on the roads. The Red Cross said some victims were children with gunshot and machete wounds.</td>
<td>The Guardian UK, April 19, 2011, available at <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/19/nigeria-riots-dead-injured?INTCMP=SRCH">link</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Tuesday, April 19, 2011</td>
<td>Killings by soldiers in Samaru Hayin Dogo area of Zaria near Basawa Army Barracks</td>
<td>Soldiers Punch, April 20 2011, p.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna Town</td>
<td>Tuesday, April 19, 2011</td>
<td>Soldier kills two students at Ungawar Dosa area of Kaduna metropolis. The incident that led to the shooting was not reported.</td>
<td>Unnamed soldier attached to an army colonel called “Ibrahim” who was allegedly in charge of “Operation Yaki”, the State’s Security outfit Saturday Tribune, April 23, 2011, p.3</td>
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</table>
| Rafin Guza    | Friday, April 22, 2011 | Bomb exploded at about 7.00pm in Rafin Guza near the State Legislators’ residential quarters. About 3 or 4 persons feared dead and many injured. | Unknown. Police PRO, DSP, Aminu Lawal said 2 people were arrested in connection with the bombing. (ST; WT)  
- Saturday Sun, April 23, 2011, p.10  
- Saturday Vanguard, April 23, 2011, p.6  
- Saturday Tribune, April 23, 2011, p.4  
- Daily Independent, April 23, 2011, p.2  
- Weekly Trust, Saturday April... |
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<tr>
<td>Sabon Gari</td>
<td>Friday, April 22, 2011</td>
<td>Soldiers at the Bus-Stop junction in Sabon Gari LGA, forced a commercial bus driver and resident of Danmadami in Zaria to do frog jumps on a burning tyre.</td>
<td>Commercial bus driver, Sale Sa’adu’s harassed by soldiers. His two feet were burned from jumping on a burning tyre.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Not indicated</td>
<td>Reported abuse and torture of 189 suspects checked at the Zaria Army Depot. Abuse ranged from denial of food and water to severe beatings.</td>
<td>4 people reportedly died from the abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>Saturday, April 23, 2011</td>
<td>131 people, including women and children reportedly fleeing Southern Kaduna to Sokoto were intercepted at Kaduna-Abuja express way, arrested and detained at the Nigerian Army Depot, Zaria. Commandant of the Depot, Brigadier-General Husseini Abayomi Saliu allegedly failed to give the reason(s) for their detention. The detainees were eventually released on Monday, April 25, 2011. The Soldiers also arrested and detained several Okada riders fleeing the violence.</td>
<td>Women and children locked in a hall without adequate ventilation. Reasons for detention not given.</td>
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</table>
| Various                        | Not indicated | Reports of other casualties of violence in various parts of Kaduna. | • Prof. Ali Obge of the Department of Guidance and Counseling, Faculty of Education Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria, killed  
• Unidentified female student of Samaru Campus, ABU, killed. Her remains severed into two and dumped near a rail line (unconfirmed)  
• About 100 churches in Ikara burned  
• House of Amb. Sule Baba, DG of Yakowa-Nakowa campaign organization set on fire  
• Alh. Habibu Dobani, zone 1 chairman of PDP burned  
• 2 houses, petrol stations, belonging to Alh. Hassan Jumare, speaker of Kaduna State House of Assembly burned.  
• Alhaji Rabiu Jafaru, Commissioner of Lands and Survey’s house burned  
• Homes of Sadaunan Badarawa and Hon. Tambuwal burned | Rioters | Saturday Vanguard, April 23, 2011, p.7 |

### 2. KANO

| Kawo Quarters, Kano city | Monday, April 18, 2011 | After the announcement of the election results, Pro-Buhari Youths went after the supporters of Jonathan who came out to the streets to celebrate his victory, and this resulted in a stampede. By 9.30 am, crisis had broken out in different parts of the city. | • 10 people reported dead by eyewitnesses in Kawo quarters (DT)  
• Several houses believed to be occupied by non-Muslims attacked  
• Properties belonging to notable personalities were also burned including, Kano Politician and ANPP Chieftain, Bashir Tofa’s Residence and vehicles; Former speaker of the House of Representatives, Ghali Umar Na’Abba’s house; Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero’s Palace, and his Councilors jeeps; Kano traditional ruler, Galadiman Kano | Irate Youths/Mob, Buhari Supporters | • Daily Trust, Tuesday April 19, 2011, p.2  
• The Guardian, April 19, 2011, p.6 & April 20, 2011, p.12;  
• Daily Sun, April 19, 2011, p.9, & April 24, 2011, p.5  
• The Nation, April 19, 2011, p.6 |
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<td>Dala, Gwale, Fagge and Tarauni LGAs</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>In Dala and Gwale LGAs, unidentified political thugs took to street after announcements of the election results. Tyres and PDP supporters’ houses were burnt, Lives were lost and a Security Alert of</td>
<td>NAPENs live report, available at <a href="http://nev.org/reports/view/585">http://nev.org/reports/view/585</a> and</td>
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| Sabon Gari | Wednesday, April 20, 2011 | Fresh violence in Sabon Gari (predominantly Christian neighbourhood) and Kawo (predominantly Muslim neighbourhood). Exact cause not known but suspected to be: (1) Between (Christian) victims of the Monday, April 18 riots who had their properties destroyed and were retaliating against pro-Buhari (Muslim) rioters, the alleged perpetrators of the destruction. (2) Fighting resulting from unconfirmed speculations that a church was being burnt in Sabon Gari which led Christians in the area to think that they were under siege by Muslim rioters. Many vented their anger on Hausa Okada riders in retaliation. | About four persons feared dead, several wounded, vehicles vandalized. (DS 4/19)  
- Reports circulated that the casualties figure got to 200  
- Peter Ikpe Abonyi, indigene of Akwa Ibom state and an Okada passenger had his head broken by rioters along Kuma road after they asked him if he voted for Buhari (DS)  
- Area Superintendent of the Apostolic Church, Kano Area Territory, Pastor Felix Olotu stated that 15 children from the church were missing since the beginning of the violence; he also stated that church members have lost millions of Naira in the violence. (DS 4/21)  
- Rioters  
  - Daily Sun  
    Thursday April 21, 2011, p.7 and April 24, p.7  
  - The Punch, April 20, 2011, p.15  
  - Daily Trust, April 22, 2011, p. 9  
Kano state Police Commissioner, Dan Azumi Doma refuted media reports that death toll in Kano from presidential PEV that started on Monday 4/18 got to 200. He initially stated that there had been no reports of deaths to any of the police stations. Later on, at a press conference, he confirmed 2 persons |
### Badawa, Gedawa, Monday April 18 and Tuesday April 19, 2011

Several other persons were attacked physically and had their properties destroyed during the riots.

- **Sunday Adega:** Lives in Badawa. Came back home from work to see his house on fire
- **Regina Odo:** Mother of 4, residing at Gedawa, outskirts of Kano metropolis, beaten by three unknown persons at Hadejia roundabout
- **John Opaleyeye:** Attacked by boys carrying machetes and cutlasses on 4/19
- **Kingsley Onyike:** Attacked by protesters. He stated that “…we were told their targets were people like us that voted for our Christian brother” (TG, 4/20)
- **Joseph Agula,** 25: Petrol station worker being treated in the Kano hospital for a machete wound to the head said "They burned my house and I was running from the rioters when I fell and broke my leg and they got me." "They said, are you Christian or Muslim? I lied and said I was Muslim but they didn't believe me and they beat me and cut me. I heard them ask people PDP or CPC? If they saw a PDP poster they burned the building."

### Rioters/Protesters

- **The Guardian,** April 20, 2011, p.12

3. **GOMBE**
<p>| Gombe metropolis | Saturday, April 16, 2011 | Youths began rampage in Gombe on the evening of Saturday April 16, 2011 soon after voting. Vandalisation and violent protests by Pro Buhari supporters started when results were being counted and collated. PDP members and non-Muslims were allegedly targeted. There was vandalism at INEC Headquarters in Gombe. To escape death everyone in the premises had to join and chant “Buhari, Ya Chi” meaning Buhari has won. (SV) | Pro-Buhari/CPC supporters |
| Gombe metropolis | Sunday, April 17, 2011 | Anti-PDP riot on Gombe streets. Youths armed with machetes and clubs attacked the house of Governor Danjuma Goje and tried to set it on fire. The youths moved to the center of town abusing the Resident Electoral Commissioner, the PDP, and Governor Danjuma Goje. Houses of prominent persons were also torched. | Angry youths |
| Gombe | Sunday, April 17, 2011 | Continuation of anti-PDP Protests | Irate Youths/Mobs, CPC Supporters |
| | | PDP chairman, Mr. Jack Gumpy's house and vehicles burned; 9 people were trapped in the house fire and killed (Some reports say 11 persons were killed) | |</p>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bagadaza, Kagarawal, Funakaye LGA</strong></td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Collation process of the presidential election results suspended for over an hour because some youths forced their way through INEC gates and overwhelmed the security men on duty. Riots also continued in other parts of the State. vandalized INEC office and Commission's office windows&lt;br&gt;• A Church in Bagadaza area, police barracks, pastors house and a few Christian houses in Kagarawal attacked&lt;br&gt;• 3 buses set on fire along Federal college of Education (FCE) road and INEC office in Bajoga, Funakaye LGA.</td>
<td>Angry Youths&lt;br&gt;• Daily Trust, Tuesday April 19, 2011, p.4&lt;br&gt;• Guardian Tuesday April 19, 2011, p.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ECWA church in Gombe attacked</strong></td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Pastor of the church, Reverend Reuben Yaro’s house set on fire, Church razed down; His neigbour, Daniel Samburu’s house was also razed. (SV)&lt;br&gt;• Eugene Igwe’s house and cars burned in Dawaki Gombe. His wife macheted and injured (SV)</td>
<td>Hoodlums&lt;br&gt;• Saturday Vanguard, April 23, 2011, P.8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Minna, Sabon Gari</strong></td>
<td>Sunday, April 17, 2011</td>
<td>Alleged pro- CPC supporters began protests in Minna soon after the announcement of the results of the election. About 200 hoodlums attacked Sabon Gari, an area mainly populated by non-indigenes. The crisis lasted for over three hours (TG).&lt;br&gt;Unnamed sources informed journalists that the crisis in Minna began after the removal of theОсновной чемодан&lt;br&gt;• Some Igbo traders allegedly wounded (TG)&lt;br&gt;• Eyewitness reports seeing a police officer who just closed from work at Kpagungu police station in the metropolis being beaten to a pulp&lt;br&gt;• An officer of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) had his arm chopped off (DI &amp; DS)</td>
<td>Hoodlums and CPC supporters in Minna&lt;br&gt;• The Guardian, April 19, 2011, p.6&lt;br&gt;• Daily Sun, April 19, 2011, p.9&lt;br&gt;• Daily Independent, April 19, 2011, p.2&lt;br&gt;Police arrested about 24 protesters from different parts of Minna</td>
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“Sarkin Kasuwa”, Market Leader of Minna in Chanchaga LGA and that of Kontagora in Kontagora LGA for allegedly campaigning for the CPC presidential candidate (DS)

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Parties Involved</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td>Minna</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Protesting youths stormed NCCF (Nigerian Christian Corpsers’ Fellowship) lodge in Minna, forcibly locked in about 50 Corps members and set it on fire. They were able to escape after one of them broke down the door</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Protesting Youths</td>
<td>Daily Trust, Wednesday, April 20, 2011, p.6; Daily Sun, April 20, 2011, p.12; The Nation, April 20, 2011, p.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bida</td>
<td>Not indicated</td>
<td>In Bida, 2 youths went to the palace of the Etsu of Nupe, Alhaji Yahaya Abubakar with plans to attack and dethrone him for supporting PDP at the elections. But, they were shot and killed by 2 youths shot dead by men of the joint security patrol for attempting to attack the Etsu of Nupe, Alhaji Yahaya Abubakar. 5 other persons shot and injured for throwing pebbles at officers. They are: Security Operatives (Joint Security Patrol)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Security Operatives (Joint Security Patrol)</td>
<td>Daily Trust, Wednesday, April 20, 2011, p.2; Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 2011, p.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Suspects</td>
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<td>Bida</td>
<td>Friday, April 22, 2011</td>
<td>Protests in Bida LGA by CPC supporters who accused the Local Government Chairman, Alhaji Bako Ndayawo of hiring thugs to remove Buhari’s posters. Eyewitness, Mallam Kabiru Ndako said some youths mobilized others to storm the Chairman’s house.</td>
<td>Ndayawo escaped but part of his house was burned. His vehicle, and other properties were also destroyed</td>
<td>CPC Supporters</td>
<td>The Nation, April 18, 2011, p.6</td>
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5. **ADAMAWA**

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Suspects</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jada, Yola</td>
<td>Saturday, April 16, 2011</td>
<td>Houses belonging to some prominent persons were set on fire or destroyed. CPC supporters burned the house of Governor Nyako's adviser on youth empowerment, Alh. Bala Buba Jada, for allegedly keeping stolen election materials and stuffing ballot boxes in his house; an allegation he reportedly denied.</td>
<td>House of Governor Nyako's adviser on youth empowerment, Alh. Bala Buba Jada, burned in Jada Town</td>
<td>CPC supporters</td>
<td>Sunday Trust, April 17, 2011 and Daily Trust, April 18, 2011, p.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Yola, Munia, Machida, Viniklang | Sunday, April 17, 2011 | Enraged voters took to the streets shortly after release of results of presidential polls. The protests reportedly began from the main market after a man from the Igbo tribe was heard rejoicing over Jonathan’s win. (A基因 Daniel, PPRO said a man jested in the market place that his candidate won and this sparked protested leading to destruction) | • 5 people feared dead in Yola, Munia and Machida towns  
• Over 50 houses and business places burned.  
• INEC office, Jonathan campaign office, and houses of PDP chieftains and supporters razed  
• Gov. Nyako’s event organizer, Alhaji Uba Dan Arewa’s vehicles destroyed. He also narrowly escaped being lynched  
• 5 people treated in Maiduguri Teaching hospital for gunshot injuries  
The Guardian, April 20, 2011, p.3  
Daily Independent, April 19, 2011, p.4  
This Day, April 19, 2011                  | The State police could not give exact figures of casualties (DT, 4/19; TG 4/20)  
Gov. Nyako blamed foreign
Hospital sources confirmed that about 10 persons were killed in Mubi North LGA.
- Over 20 buildings and shops were razed to the ground while more than 10 vehicles were destroyed. Many others had their windscreen smashed and vehicles vandalized. Over 60 shops belonging to mostly Igbo traders were looted. (TD)
- CPC Supporters also burnt cars in Viniklang area of Adamawa (NAPEN)

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**Yola: Jimeta, Shinko**  
_Sunday, April 17, 2011_  
Serious fighting in the Jimeta area of Yola involving two prominent rival groups of political thugs. Trouble started from the Shinko area of Yola after news of election results filtered in. CPC supporters allegedly removed bill boards and vandalized.  
Damage to properties. No report of casualties from this incident  
Political Thugs

- Nigerian Tribune, April 18, 2011, p.3
- Daily Independent, April 19, 2011, p.4
objects with PDP logo while chanting “Sai Buhari” (“Up Buhari”)

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<th>6. BORNO</th>
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<td><strong>Maiduguri</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sunday, April 16, 2011</strong></td>
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<td>Explosion at <em>Galadima</em> Junction in Maiduguri. Unidentified individuals threw improvised explosives at a team of mobile policemen.</td>
<td>The explosives destroyed the windscreens of the police van that conveyed the team to the area. The Police said there were no casualties.</td>
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<td>Four under-aged suspects were arrested, according to the State Police Commissioner, Mike Zuokumor</td>
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<td>Sunday Trust, April 17, 2011, p.49</td>
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<tr>
<th>Maiduguri</th>
<th>Sunday, April 16, 2011</th>
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<td>A Police Inspector shot in the afternoon at a polling center in <em>Ummarari</em> area</td>
<td>Police Inspector, Elias Dawa killed</td>
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<td>Suspected Boko Haram Members. One suspect was arrested, while others fled with gunshot wounds after exchange of fire with the police</td>
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<td>Sunday Trust, April 17, 2011, p.9</td>
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<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Irate youths barricaded major streets in Maiduguri setting tyres on fire. Youth trooped out in their thousands around 11am protesting what they called “the rigging out of Mai Gaskiya.” Protesters made bonfires at Ahmadu Bello Way roundabout, Gwange, Baga road, and Lagos street. Other major roads were also barricaded. None reported in the media.</td>
<td>Daily Sun, April 19, p. 9, The Nation, April 19, p. 7</td>
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<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Hundreds of armed Policemen and soldiers took over the major streets of Maiduguri, as part of efforts to contain protests on outcome of presidential elections. CPC chairman, Comrade Zanna Shettima accused security operatives of shooting CPC supporters in Maiduguri. He said &quot;They deliberately targeted and shot our members without any provocation. Our members were on the street for peaceful demonstration.&quot; No casualty figures given by the CPC Chairman.</td>
<td>Security Operatives, Daily Trust, Tuesday April 19, 2011, p. 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Wednesday, April 20, 2011</td>
<td>Borno State Police Command announced the death of a police inspector in a bomb explosion in “London Ciki Ward” of Maiduguri Wednesday Night. Police PRO told newsmen that the bomb targeted police vehicle that was conveying policemen to deposit bodies of two persons that were shot dead earlier in the day around Zannari. Police Inspector, Luckday Amadi, killed in the bombing; 2 other officers were injured.</td>
<td>Boko Haram Militants, Daily Trust, April 25, 2011, p. 9, Daily Independent, April 22, 2011 p.1/2, This Day, April 22, <a href="http://www.thisdailylive.com/articles/another-explosion-kills-police">http://www.thisdailylive.com/articles/another-explosion-kills-police</a>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
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<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Sunday, April 24, 2011</td>
<td>Triple Blasts in Maiduguri. 3 bombs simultaneously detonated in Maiduguri. 2 exploded at the Tudu Palace Hotel and the third at a popular place known as “Tashar Kano”. Residents allegedly heard agonizing sounds at 8.30pm and saw the sky enveloped with smoke. An eyewitness named Mohammed Nur said he saw the police evacuating people from the hotel.</td>
<td>Several persons feared dead. Actual numbers of casualties are unknown.</td>
<td>Unknown Daily Trust, April 25 2011, p.9</td>
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### 7. BAUCHI

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unguwam Dumi</td>
<td>Sunday, April 16, 2011</td>
<td>Aliyu Bello, an election staff at Unguwam Dumi Polling Station and student of the Department of Food Science and Technology, Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi, was attacked and killed by thugs. The incident was confirmed by the Public Relations Officer of the school, Mallam Rabiu Mohammed.</td>
<td>Aliyu, a native of Lere in Samanika Local Council of Kaduna state died as a result of injuries he sustained from machete cuts and other dangerous weapons used on him during the attack</td>
<td>Political Thugs • The Guardian April 21, 2011, p.12 • Daily Sun, April 21, 2011, p.11</td>
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<td>Bauchi town</td>
<td>Sunday, April 16, 2011</td>
<td>Protests began as soon as news started filtering in that Jonathan was leading in the poll results. And angry youths had already began to attack people.</td>
<td>Joy Alozie, 45, a grocery shop owner was attacked in her home. She, her husband and children all ran in different directions. Her shop and family house was torched. She managed to escape from the rioters that stormed the house with her daughter, but her middle aged husband was never found and declared missing.</td>
<td>Hoodlums, Youths. See, Daily Times, May 20, 2011, available at <a href="http://dailytimes.com.ng/article/looking-my-husband">http://dailytimes.com.ng/article/looking-my-husband</a></td>
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<td>Protesting youths in different LGAs</td>
<td>10 persons killed (DS)</td>
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<td>in different parts of Bauchi when election results started filtering in.</td>
<td>State Police Commissioner, John Abakasanga confirmed death of 4 corps members, a cleric, two police officers (Female police corporal in Giade LGA and DCO of Ja’amare LGA), and, the burning of Police stations in Itas, Ja’amare, Giade, Dambam and Misau LGAs. - (DT 4/20; TG 4/20)</td>
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<td>Places of worship and properties in Bara village were destroyed.</td>
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<td>DPO and DCO of Dambam LGA critically injured and taken to the hospital (DS)</td>
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<td>At least, 3 churches including Gospel Life Church and Deeper life Church in the state capital were burned, while another in Bara, Alkaleri LGA was burned (DS; NT)</td>
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<td>Chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in Bauchi State, Rev. Lawi Pokti alleged that 10 CAN members were killed in the Zango area of Bauchi (DS; DT 4/20)</td>
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<td>Zango village in Tudun Wasan Daniya and several places of worship burned. Several persons injured in the attack (DT 4/20)</td>
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<td>Unnamed witnesses report seeing 3 corpses in Zango and 5 injured people (DT 4/20)</td>
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<td>A building on Bakaro Street allegedly belonging to FCT minister, Bala Mohammed burned. (DI)</td>
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<td>Protesting youths, 2 arrested; Adamu Buba and Nafi’u Isa</td>
<td>Over 200 suspects arrested. 10 locally made guns recovered (DT; DS)</td>
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<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bauchi, Kofar-Dumi, Azare, Misau</td>
<td>Monday April 18, 2011</td>
<td>CPC supporters protesting PDP success at the polls and claiming that their success was possible as a result of insufficient ballot papers at some of the polling units took out their anger on people believed to be PDP supporters.</td>
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<td>• Several persons beaten</td>
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<td>• 3 killed in <em>Wunin-Dada</em> and <em>Guru</em>, suburbs of Bauchi; 2 in <em>Kofar-Dumi</em>, behind the Emirs palace</td>
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<td>• House of PDP Chairman, Ibrahim Yaro-Yaro burned in <em>Azare</em>, headquarters of <em>Katagum</em> LGA</td>
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<td>• House of PDP Deputy National Secretary, Dr. Musa Babayo burned</td>
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<td>• Chairman of <em>Kirfi</em> LGA, Ibrahim Galadima and Chairman of Bauchi LGA, Sabo Abdullahi were harrassed and their vehicles burned</td>
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<td>• <em>Misau</em> home of the Secretary to the State Government (SSG), Ibrahim Ahmed Dandija burned</td>
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<td>• An NYSC member serving as INEC ad-hoc staff beaten up and taken to an undisclosed hospital in Bauchi</td>
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<td>• Campaign office of Governor, Isa Yuguda burned</td>
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<td>Mostly under aged youths believed to be CPS supporters. Reports say that the police arrested some political thugs called <em>Sara Sukas</em> (TN)</td>
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<td>• The Nation, April 18, p.6</td>
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<td>• Nigerian Tribune, April 18, p.4</td>
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<td>• Daily Independent, April 18, p.2</td>
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<td>• The Guardian April 20, 2011, p.2</td>
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<td>• Daily Independent, April 18, p.2</td>
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<td>• The Punch, April 20, 2011,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bauchi, Dambam, Misau, Jama'are, Itas-Gadau</td>
<td>Monday April 18 and Tuesday April 19, 2011</td>
<td>Looting and Burning of INEC offices</td>
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<td>• State Resident Electoral Commissioner, Iliya Audu stated that 4 INEC offices were burned in <em>Bauchi, Dambam, Misau and Jama'are</em> LGAs. (DT, NT, DI) Reports also say a fifth INEC office was burned in <em>Itas-Gadau</em> (NT, DI,TG, TP)</td>
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<td>• One INEC officer molested in <em>Misau</em> (no indication on the nature of molestation or sex of victim) (DT)</td>
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<td>• 500 laptops used for voter registration stolen by irate youths. (DT); 13 power generator sets, file cabinets and other valuables looted from commission’s offices(TG, DI)</td>
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<td>Mostly under aged youths believed to be CPS supporters. Reports say that the police arrested some political thugs called <em>Sara Sukas</em> (TN)</td>
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<td>• The Nation, April 18, p.6</td>
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<td>• The Punch, April 20, 2011,</td>
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<td>Giade, Misau,</td>
<td>Monday, April 18,</td>
<td>Corps members, who were fleeing the “Youth Corps Members Lodge” that had been set on fire by rioters, ran into a police station at Giade for safety. Over 300 rioters went after them, overpowered the policemen, set the station on fire, and beat some of the corps members to death. Some of their corpses were also burned. Two of the female Corps Members were raped before being hacked to death. A Corps Member and survivor named Wunmi, stated “It was a war situation...They were inflicting machete cuts on us. They hit me on the shoulder, back and neck, but we kept on running”. The police confirmed the killing of 4 Corps Members (TP 4/20, DS 4/20) on April 20, 2011. The State Commissioner of Police, John Abakasanga, stated that of the 51 Corps Members sent to conduct elections in Giade, Misau, Katagum, Jama’are, Dambam and Itas Gadau councils, 20 were rescued from protesters by the police, 4 killed, and the remaining 27 escaped.</td>
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<td>Katagum, Jama’are,</td>
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<td>Dambam and Itas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Nigerian Youth Corps Members were killed. (TP 4/26). A list of Nine Corps Members killed at the Giade Police Station was released to the media. They are:  
  - Teidi Tosin Olawale (from Osun State, BSc Computer Science)  
  - Nkwazema Anselm Chukwunonyerem (Imo State, HND Electrical Electronic Engineering)  
  - Okpokiri Obinna Michael (Abia State, BSc Environmental Management)  
  - Adowei Elliot (Bayelsa State, BSc Computer Science)  
  - Adewunmi Seun Paul (Ekiti State, BSc, Social Sciences)  
  - Adeniji Kehinde Jehleel (Osun State, BSc Banking & Finance)  
  - Gbenjo Ebenezer Ayotunde (Osun State, BSc, Education Economics)  
  - Ukeoma Ikechukwu Chibuzor (Imo State, BSc Medical)  
| Angry Mob/Rioters. State CP reported arrests of over 200 suspects across the state in connection with the protests |                                    |
The list of 9 deceased Corps Members was eventually released to the media, and after that, the Bauchi State Police command confirmed that a total of 11 Corps Members were killed in the violence that occurred during the week of April 16th (SS, DT).

- Akonyi Ibrahim Sule (Kogi State, HND Business Administration)
- Another unnamed female Corps Member killed in a separate incident as a result of injuries she sustained during an attack on her at Dombam LGA, which increased the number of deceased Corps Members in the state to 10
- Reports say that the death toll of NYSC members in Bauchi went up to 11. The identities of the 10th and 11th victims were not published.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Giade, Itas/Gadau and Ja'amare LGAs | Sexual assault on female Corps Members posted to serve in Giade, Itas/Gadau and Ja'amare LGAs | • A female Corps Member (who refused to be named) posted to serve in one of the LGAs mentioned stated that a group of CPC supporters armed with guns and machetes and other dangerous weapons “…took all the girls to one room, about five of us and started squeezing our breasts. It was a horrible experience.” She also added that 11 Youth Corps Members were killed in Giade which was confirmed by the Bauchi State Police command (DS)  
  • Bauchi State police command confirmed the rape, assault and molestation of an unspecified number of female corps members in Gadau village (SS) | Daily Sun, April 21, 2011, p.16  
  Sunday Sun, April 24, 2011, p.5 |
| Bauchi metropolis, Kirfi, Misau, Katagum, Jammare, Alkaleri, Ningi, Gamawa, Darazo and Dambam, Itas Gadau | Attacks on Christians and Churches. | • Chairman of CAN, Bauchi State Chapter, Bishop Musa Mwin Tula said that about 32 Christians were killed (TG; DS; DI)  
  • 82 churches destroyed across Bauchi state (TG, 4/21 & DI). 84 churches, according to Daily Sun (DS, 4/21). He broke down the figures at an NUJ press conference in Bauchi as follows: Bauchi Metropolis and environs 11 Christians Killed, several wounded, 4 churches burned, property worth millions of naira destroyed; Alkaleri LGA: 9 churches burned, many | Daily Sun, April 21, p.11  
  The Guardian, April 21, 2011, p.12  
  Daily Independent, April 21, 2011, p.3  
  Saturday Independent, April 23, 2011, p.8  
  Saturday Independent |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Damage Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kirfi LGA</td>
<td>Christians badly wounded; Kirfi LGA, 2 churches burned in Bara village and several properties destroyed; Toro LGA, 2 churches, 5 in Magama Gumau and one in Tilde Fulani. Darazo LGA: 2 christians killed and 9 churched burnt/destroyed. Misau LGA: 13 churches in and around Misau. Katagun LGA: Several Christians killed 18 churches and residential houses, vehicles and properties burned/destroyed. Jama’are LGA: 10 churches and several properties burnt or destroyed. Itas Gadu LGA: 3 Christians killed (2 corps members and one other), many wounded and property destroyed. Giade LGA: 4 churches burned, 16 Christians brutally killed, including a Christian police woman and another victim whose hands were mutilated. Churches also burnt in Ningi, Gamawa and Dambam LGAs</td>
<td>Tribune, April 23, 2011, p.33; Saturday Vanguard, April 23, 2011, p.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misau LGA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Trust, Tuesday April 19, 2011, p.4; Daily Sun, April 20, 2011, p.12; Daily Independent, April 21, 2011, p.6; Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 2011, p.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itas Gadu LGA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Independent, April 21, 2011, p.6; Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 2011, p.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katagun LGA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Independent, April 21, 2011, p.6; Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 2011, p.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama’are LGA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Independent, April 21, 2011, p.6; Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 2011, p.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giade LGA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Independent, April 21, 2011, p.6; Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 2011, p.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern States</td>
<td></td>
<td>The combined figures of displaced persons across the Northern States as at April 21 exceeded 40,000 (DI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. **TARABA**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date and Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jalingo, Bali, Gassol, Mutum-Biyu, Ardo-Kola,</td>
<td>Saturday April 16 through Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>On Saturday, April 16, some youths in Jalingo protested alleged manipulation of the results of election but were dispersed by Police tear gas. The protests eventually spread to neighboring towns of Bali, Gassol (country home of Gov. Danbaba Suntai), and Mutum-Biyu. There was fighting between party supporters. Arrests were made. Rival members of political parties were involved, but not identified. Jubilant youths burnt tires and sped around the town on bikes honking horns.</td>
<td>Daily Trust, Tuesday April 19, 2011, p.6&lt;br&gt;The Nation, April 19, 2011, p.7&lt;br&gt;Nigerian Tribune, April 19, 2011, p.4&lt;br&gt;This Day, April 18, 2011 available at <a href="http://www.thisdailylive.com/articles/five-killed-houses-burnt-in-bauchi-yola-jalingo/89842/">http://www.thisdailylive.com/articles/five-killed-houses-burnt-in-bauchi-yola-jalingo/89842/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalingo</td>
<td>Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Massive protests in Jalingo by CPC supporters over election results. Roads leading to the Central Market, Ministry of Works, Barde and Hamaruwa were taken over by protesters who chanted praises of Buhari in defiance of armed security operatives.</td>
<td>The Guardian, April 19, 2011, p.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIGAWA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumel</td>
<td>Saturday, April 16, 2011</td>
<td>Hundreds of rampaging youths went on a violent anti-PDP protest alleging rigging of the Presidential Elections. A building in the Government Residential Area (GRA) of Gumel which had been converted into a Government house was set on fire around 8.30pm</td>
<td>Irate/Anti-PDP youths Sunday Trust, April 17, 2011, p.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Not indicated</td>
<td>Destruction in Hadejia. Mob razed people’s homes and cars in Malam-Madori town</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadejia, Malam-Madori</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 persons killed in Hadejia, many injured • Home of State Universal Basic Education (UBE) Secretary, Ibrahim Nagodi torched • 4 corpses discovered in Malam-Madori town • Home of Malam-Madori Council Chairman, Baffa Maigari burnt</td>
<td>Mob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadejia, Jahun</td>
<td></td>
<td>No reports of human casualties • St. Theresa’s Parish, Priests residence, and Catholic School in Hadejia burned • Catholic Church in Jahun burned • Witnesses also report seeing shops being burnt in Hadejia</td>
<td>Rioters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 NASARAWA

<p>| Location       | Monday, April 18, 2011 | Rampaging Youths protested the election results chanting anti PDP slogans and carrying CPC/Buhari placards. The protest began sometime between 10am and noon in Lafia when a group of armed youth barricaded major roads, set tyres on fire and harassed motorists and road users. They smashed windscreens of vehicles with Jonathan’s posters, including a commercial bus whose passengers sustained injuries. They were chanting “Nigeria, Sai Buhari” and some anti PDP slogans. Demonstrations continued in Mararaba, Karu and Abuja-Keffi road disrupting vehicular traffic. Youths kept regrouping despite No reports of casualties. Windscreens of 5 vehicles parked in front of PHCN office smashed. | Rampaging youths. 20 suspects reportedly apprehended by military personnel (DT) | Daily Trust, Tuesday April 19, 2011, p.53 This Day, April 19, 2011, available at <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/pandemonium-as-bomb-scare-violent-protests-rock-abuja/89908/">http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/pandemonium-as-bomb-scare-violent-protests-rock-abuja/89908/</a> |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lafia</td>
<td>Lafia Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Anti-PDP protesters in Lafia attack Journalist spotted taking photographs Nasarawa state correspondent for NEXT Newspaper, Umar Mohammed beaten and almost stripped naked. His digital camera, tape recorder and phone were destroyed</td>
<td>Protesters: Daily Trust, Wednesday, April 20, 2011, p.10, Daily Independent, April 19, 2011, p.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOBE</td>
<td>Potiskum, Damaturu Monday, April 18, 2011</td>
<td>Protesters took over the junctions of Texaco, Army Barracks and Sokol Junction chanting pro-Buhari slogans and burning tyres. The violence reportedly started when rumors spread that Northerners in South Eastern states were prevented from voting in the election (NT) Angry youths took over major streets in Damaturu the state capital of Yobe State, chanting Sai Baba Buhari and burning old tyres. (NAPEN) Over 2,500 youths allegedly participated in the protests (TG) 2 people dead in Potiskum (DT) Another report said 4 people in Potiskum were killed including an old woman and child (TG) 7 people were injured and admitted to Potiskum General Hospital for treatment. (TG) A man named Adamu Gwari was killed by a stray bullet in his shop. (DT, DJ) Attempted burning of the house of former Police Affairs minister, Adamu Maina Waziri and INEC office (DT; TG) Places of worship and shops burned down near New Motor Park in Potiskum. Police public Relations officer, ASP Abdulqadir Song confirmed the death of one woman. 100 people arrested, according to an Assistant Superintendent of Police, (ASP) Abdulqadir Song</td>
<td>Daily Trust, Tuesday April 20, 2011, p.6, The Guardian, April 20, 2011, p.6, Nigerian Tribune, April 19, 2011, p.3, Daily Independent, April 19, 2011, p.2, NAPEN live report, available at <a href="http://nevr.org/reports/view/591">http://nevr.org/reports/view/591</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**12. FCT**
### Zuba, Kwali, Abaji

**Monday, April 18, 2011**

Pockets of protests at Zuba.
- Youths and party supporters in Kwali went on protest, alleging rigging during the presidential polls. (DT)
- The protests further spread to Abaji Area Council (DS)
  - Witness, Mallam Yakubu said that over 50 youths set fire to tyres in the center of a bridge around Kwali /Abaji areas, which resulted in a heavy traffic jam in the Kwali-Lokoja road.
  - No human casualties reported in the media or by the Police.
- Protesters: 43 of them arrested and taken to FCT CID, according to Kwali DPO, Chief Superintendent, Olubunmi Ogedengbe

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### PLATEAU

#### Utan Settlement

**Saturday, April 16, 2011**

Protests over arrest of a youth named Zacheus by Soldiers in Utan settlement. Zacheus was allegedly involved in the killing of a motorcyclist before the election and was shot by the officer upon being identified. Residents mobilized protest and accosted other STF patrol officers who opened fire on them.

- One lady killed by STF stray bullet. STF spokesman Charles Ekeocha confirmed the incident and stated that 5 STF members have been arrested in connection with the shooting.

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#### Jos North

**Between Sunday, April 17 and Monday, April 18, 2011**

Youths from Jos North LGA took over major roads in Jos. They made bonfires on the Masalachi Jumaa road, Bauchi and Nasarawa roads, which caused panic and tension in the state capital.

- None reported in the media.

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#### Riyom

**Friday, April 22, 2011**

Attacks on Bachit District of Riyom Local Government Council confirmed by spokesman of the Special Task Force (STF) Capt. Charles Ekeocha. Attack allegedly carried out without provocation

- One dead, three other injured

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- Daily Trust, April 19, 2011, p.53
- Daily Sun, April 19, 2011, p.9
- Sunday Trust, April 17, 2011, p.2
- Daily Sun, April 19, 2011, p.9
- The Guardian, April 24, 2011, p.8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 18 and 19</td>
<td>Kanam and Jos North LGAs</td>
<td>Irate youths on rampage at Dengi, Kanam Local Government of Plateau State, following the declaration of Presidential Election result when they took to the streets chanting protest songs, smashing cars and beating passers-by. On April 19, 2011- Residents of Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi areas of Jos North Local Government burnt down the houses of fellow Muslims for alleged betrayal by voting for Dr. Jonathan instead of Gen. Buhari.</td>
<td>NAPEN NEVR Final Report- Page 62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. **KATSINA**
### Funtua, Malumfashi, Kankara, Jibiya, Daura

Between Monday, April 18 and Tuesday, 19, 2011

**Attacks on churches after announcement of election results**

- St. Gabriel’s Church Daura and St. Theresa’s Parish Funtua burned down; Vehicle and residence and personal belongings of parish priest Rev. Fr. Eugene Nwachukwu razed. A Parish Clinic at Malumfashi burned (TG)
- According to the State Chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Dr. Oluwasegun Adediran, 7 persons were killed in the Christian community and over 60 churches burned. He also stated that almost all the churches in Funtua and Malumfashi were affected; 9 in Daura; 3 in Kankara. Some churches in Jibiya also affected (SS).
- The Police on the other hand reports that only 15 churches were razed which included 5 in Funtua, 4 in Daura and 3 in Malumfashi. (TN)

**Protesting youths**

- In Rimi LGA, a suspect, Abdulkadir Yahaya, 28, poured a pot of hot oil on a Divisional Police Officer (DPO), Lawal Sani Dansada, while trying to evade arrest (SS)

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### Zamfara

**Tsafe, Magazu, Gusau**

Monday, April 18, 2011

**Thousands of youths went on rampage in Tsafe LGA after the announcement of election results. They destroyed dozens of shops, and 3 churches. They also barricaded the major roads, made bonfires to disrupt vehicular movement while chanting “Ba Muso” (We don’t like the president)**

Shops were also vandalized in Magazu towns (DS)

**One person injured in the attacks**

- St. Jude’s Catholic Church, Tsafe and St. Vincent Ferrer’s church, Gusau vandalized.

**Youths.**

- State CP, Muhammad Abubakar stated that 47 suspects were arrested in Tsafe in connection with the vandalisations

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### Sokoto

**Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 2011, p.4**

- Daily Sun, April 20, p.12
| Sokoto City, Kanwuri, Rijiyya, Mabera | Sunday, April 17, 2011 and Monday April 18 | Protests in the city of Sokoto and its environs including: Kanwuri, the area around the Sultan’s Palace, Rijiya, Mabera, Diplomat, Sahara, Bello Way, Tudun-Wada, Emir Yahaya and Sultan Atiku roads. Attempts were made to set the Sultan of Sokoto’s palace on fire. Police said perpetrators of violence were looters who took advantage of the protests to break into shops to steal. Conflicting reports say that the suspects were protesting over election results because they believed that the Aliyu Wamakko led PDP government connived with INEC officials to increase Jonathan’s vote and decrease Buhari’s. | A house at Rijiya torched(DS)  
• 2 vehicles and a motorcycle belonging to officials of Rima Radio, Sokoto burned; 5 other vehicles destroyed at the radio station and several others destroyed across the city. (DS)  
• Resident pastor of the Christ Apostolic Church (CAC), Michael Kolawole Jesuleye beaten into a state of coma by unidentified youths who went to his house at about 12.30 am (exact date not indicated) and set the Church ablaze. (SS) | Protesters and hoodlums. | Daily Sun, April 19, 2011, p.9,  
• Sunday Sun, April 24, 2011, p.8 | Police in Sokoto arrested 39 persons in connection with the protests. |
# APPENDIX II
## Profile of CSOs Working on Post-Election Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Email</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
IFES: [http://www.ifes.org/ever](http://www.ifes.org/ever) | NAPEN is a coalition that emerged from an IFES-funded Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project during the Nigeria 2007 national elections. It is comprised of 6 organizations, one from each geo-political zone:  
Forward in Action for Education Poverty & Malnutrition (FAcE-PaM), Bauchi, North-East  
Strategic Empowerment And Mediation Agency (SEMA), Kaduna, North-West  
International Center for Gender and Social Research (INTER-GENDEER), Jos, North-Central  
Women Advocates Research and Documentation Center (WARDC), Lagos, South-West  
Christian Community Initiative for Peace and Development (CCIPAD), Enugu, South-East  
Community Policing Partners (COMPPART), Uyo, South-South |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Organization</strong></th>
<th><strong>Address</strong></th>
<th><strong>Contact Information</strong></th>
<th><strong>Website</strong></th>
<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Forward in Action for Education, Poverty and Malnutrition (FACE-PAM)</td>
<td>3rd Floor, Nicon House, 26A, Abdulkadir Ahmed Road, P.O. Box 3411, Bauchi, Bauchi State, Nigeria.</td>
<td>234-8138537817</td>
<td><a href="http://facepam.org/">http://facepam.org/</a></td>
<td>They carry out activities on election violence monitoring and prevention. They were the North East Hub Organization for the Nigeria Election Violence Reporting (NEVR) Implemented by NAPEN funded by IFES/USAID (2010/2011). Also did a focus group study on youths and election violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Strategic Empowerment &amp; Mediation Agency, (SEMA)</td>
<td>The Nigerian Peace Centre, 2nd Floor, Habib Bank Building Plot C17, Box 8010 Kachia Road, Kaduna.</td>
<td>234- 62 232 673</td>
<td><a href="mailto:sema@rcl.nig.com">sema@rcl.nig.com</a></td>
<td>Also a member of the NAPEN coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4. | Women Advocates Research and Documentation Center (WARDC) | **Head Office** 9, Amore Street, Off Toyin Street, Ikeja Lagos Nigeria  
**Abuja Office** Main Suite 14 Hilltop Plaza Plot 2189, IBB Close Wuze Zone 4, Abuja  
**Abeokuta Office** MacJacob House Opposite AGGS Onikolobo Abeokuta Ogun State | Lagos: 234 1 819 7344  
Abuja: 234 – 8055951858  
Abeokuta: 234 - 8055951858 | [info@wardcng.org](mailto:info@wardcng.org)  
[womenadvocate@yahoo.com](mailto:womenadvocate@yahoo.com)  
[abuja@wardcng.org](mailto:abuja@wardcng.org)  
[abeokuta@wardcng.org](mailto:abeokuta@wardcng.org)  
[www.wardc.org](http://www.wardc.org) | Member of the NAPEN coalition |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6. Community Policing Partners</strong></td>
<td>44, Ikot Abasi Road, P.O.Box 861 Abak 532001, Akwa Ibom State, Niger Delta Region, Nigeria.</td>
<td>234-812-6662042 234-80-23811786 0806-6680864, 0705-5787802</td>
<td><a href="mailto:info@comppart.org">info@comppart.org</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.comppart.org/">http://www.comppart.org/</a></td>
<td>Member of the NAPEN coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>7. Youth Action Initiative Africa</strong></td>
<td>Faculty of Law, University of Jos, Jos, Plateau</td>
<td>234 803-2894709</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://orgs.tigweb.org/youth-action-initiative-africa">http://orgs.tigweb.org/youth-action-initiative-africa</a></td>
<td>Worked with Youth Corps members who served as ad hoc staff in the North. Allegedly spoke with members who were affected in the violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8. CRC- Civil Rights Congress of Nigeria (Shehu Sani)</strong></td>
<td>5 Katsina Road, Opp. Muslim Pilgrim Welfare Board Kaduna</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://civilrightscongressng.org/wp/">http://civilrightscongressng.org/wp/</a></td>
<td>According to Media Reports, CRC conducted interviews with victims from the PEV. They are not recorded, but CRC put forward statistics of victims of the violence based on their field work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>Reed Slack, Resident Country Director, Abuja</td>
<td>09- 413 761/62/66</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ndi.org/nigeria">http://www.ndi.org/nigeria</a></td>
<td>During the 2011 elections, NDI fielded a comprehensive and long-term international observation mission. NDI fielded a pre-election assessment team in October 2010 and 12 long-term international observers from January to May 2011. NDI also deployed 30 international observers for the presidential election.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transition Monitoring Group (TMG)</td>
<td>Plot 98A Cairo Street, Off Ademola Adetokunbo Crescent, Wuse II P.O.Box 11312, Garki, Abuja</td>
<td>096705240,4133826/4131739</td>
<td><a href="mailto:tmgabuja@yahoo.com">tmgabuja@yahoo.com</a>/tmg_nig@yahoo.com</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Nigeria</td>
<td>United Nations House Plot 617/618, Diplomatic Zone, Central Area District,</td>
<td>234-9-4618600</td>
<td><a href="mailto:registry.ng@undp.org">registry.ng@undp.org</a></td>
<td>UNDP carries out programming on elections and election-related violence in Nigeria.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. **Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)**  
   P.M.B. 2851, Garki, Abuja, Nigeria.  
   **LAGOS OFFICE**  
   16, A7 Street, Mount Pleasant Estate (CITEC), Jabi-Airport Road, Mbora District, Abuja, FCT  
   Tel: +234 (0)9 1671 6454  
   Fax: +234 (0)9 461 9687  
   [www.cddwestafrica.org](http://www.cddwestafrica.org)  

15. **Centre for Democratic Development, Research & Training (CEDDERT)**  
   P.M.B. 1077 Zaria, Kaduna, Nigeria.  
   Tel: +234 (0)804 3221 Fax: +234 (0)555 6812  
   [info@ceddert.com](mailto:info@ceddert.com)  
   [http://www.ceddert.com](http://www.ceddert.com)  

15(b). **Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research**  
   P.M.B 1023 Zaria, Kaduna Nigeria  

16. **Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE)**  
   Plot 1267, Jima Plaza Opposite Rochas Okorocha Foundation (Unity House) Adjacent Nigerian Population  
   Tel: +234 816 059 0419, +234 805 736 7172  
   [info@acenigeria.org](mailto:info@acenigeria.org)  

ACE has a contract with the UNDP-Democratic Governance for Development (DGD) project for observation of voter registration throughout the country as well as voter education and mobilization. [http://www.ng.undp.org/dgd/CSO-profile.shtml](http://www.ng.undp.org/dgd/CSO-profile.shtml)  

Member of the Election Situation Room: Platform where CSOs engage on issues relating to Nigeria's electoral process, which includes election violence.

Member of the Election Situation Room: Member of the Election Situation Room. Did a publication on election violence in Nigeria between 1952-2002 with Abdullahi Smith centre.  

Did a publication/resource book on Election Violence in Nigeria.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immunization Ahmadu Bello Way Area 11, Garki Abuja</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situation room member. ActionAid Nigeria launched a report titled “Strengthening Action Against Electoral Violence in Nigeria (SAAEVIN)”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>African Centre for Leadership Strategy and Development (Centre LSD) Suite 27, 2nd Floor, Tolse Plaza, 4, Franca Afegbua Crescent, Off Jonathan Marerie St, After Apo Legislative Quarters, Apo P.O. Box 9661, Garki, Abuja +234 98703178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situation Room Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Was active during the 2011 PEV. Issued statements during the crises. Members also victims of the violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>FOMWAN Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria 12 A. E. Ekukinam St Utako district, Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do work on election related violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Jaamatu Nasru Islami (JNI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Iwitness Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Reclaim Naija</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Community Life Project (CLP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch (HRW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Pulitzer Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Crises Watch (International Crisis Group-ICG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Nigerian Red Cross Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)</td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>Enough is Enough Nigeria</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>Forward Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>JDP/Caritas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women's Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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