

BILL ANALYSIS

SPECIAL SEATS FOR WOMEN IN THE NIGERIAN LEGISLATURE

BILL TITLE: A BILL FOR AN ACT TO ALTER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, 1999 TO CREATE ADDITIONAL SPECIAL SEATS FOR WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE HOUSES AND FOR RELATED MATTERS (HB1301)

SPONSORS: Hon. Nkeiruka Onyejeocha (Deputy Chief Whip, House of Representatives), Rt. Hon. Femi Gbajabiamila (Speaker, House of Representatives) and 85 others.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This analysis reviews the constitution alteration bill to create 111 special seats for women in the National Assembly and 108 similar seats for women in the State Houses of Assembly. It explores the use of **Temporary Special Measures (TSMs)** such as **reserved seat arrangements** to boost the numbers of women in the legislature and its potential implications on the political space and the national budget.

The analysis finds that reserved seat arrangement such as "special seats for women" is a special measure used by countries to remedy the low numbers of women in the legislature. It is also one of the very limited options that best fits with Nigeria's First-Past-the-Post/Plurality electoral system, which makes it difficult to apply affirmative action measures such as the 35% numeric target for women in legislatures as contained in Nigeria's National Gender Policy. Temporary Special Measures are designed to achieve a specific goal and are time bound i.e., they usually have an expiration date once the goal is achieved. They are meant to be a compensatory measure and response to unfair electoral competition and discrimination that women face in politics. As such, it is a **"fast-track measure"** to improved women's political representation.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

On the potential costs and benefits of the special seats bill if implemented, it was found that the cost of additional 219 new women members in the federal and state legislatures (comprising 111 in the National Assembly and 108 in the 36 states) would amount to between N5bn – N18bn per annum and N23bn – N74bn in a 4-year tenure cycle. This is less than 5% of Nigeria's annual defense spending.

Using a 3-year average (2019 to 2021 budgets), the increase in emoluments for additional 111 Federal or NASS members is projected to be at least, 0.037% and at most, 0.156% of the national budget. If both Federal and State legislators (219) are factored in, the projected increase on the annual budget would be at least, 0.0314% and at most, 0.163%. In addition, the increase in emoluments for the additional 111 NASS members on the budget of the National Assembly is projected to be between 3% and 12.9%.

Among the many benefits of more women inclusion is the established correlation between more women in legislatures and an improved economy, improved conflict resolution and reduced military spending. The greatest cost Nigeria is paying today emanates from conflict, insurgency, and other dimensions of insecurity. The value-addition of women is therefore their potential contribution to income generation and amelioration of conflicts in a society that has been enveloped by insecurity. This added value cannot be easily quantified; and such benefits could translate to or even far exceed any envisaged figures to include more women legislators in the National and State Houses of Assembly.

PART I

BILL SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS

A. Increase in the Composition of the Senate

Currently, the composition of the Senate is based on equality of States with each of the 36 States having three senators and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) having only one.

The Bill proposes to amend section 48 of the Constitution, by creating one additional seat in the Senate for each State of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory to be occupied by a woman. If the amendment goes through, each State would be expected to return four Senators while the FCT will return two Senators. This would amount to a total of 37 additional female Senators.


B. Increase in the Composition of the House of Representatives

The Constitution utilises a proportional representation system for composition of the House of Representatives (House/House of Reps). In other words, numbers are based on population of each State with a varying number of members/legislators representing different constituencies in each State. For instance, Lagos and Kano states have the highest number of members in the House with 24 representatives each. States like Ebonyi, Ekiti, Kwara and Gombe have 6 members each, Jigawa has 11, Delta and Imo 10, and Bayelsa 5. With 2 members, FCT has the lowest number of representatives in the House of Representatives. Section 49 of the Constitution however limits the total number of members to 360.

The Bill proposes to amend this section to create two additional seats in the House of Representatives from each State of the Federation and the FCT to be occupied by only women. The implication is that each State will have two women added to their already existing number totaling 74 additional Women Representatives.

If the amendment goes through, the total number of additional seats to the existing 469 seats that will be occupied by women in the National Assembly would be 111.

Figure 1: Image of 469 seats + 111 Proposed Additional Seats



C. Increase in the Composition of the State Houses of Assembly

The Bill proposes to amend section 91 of the Constitution to add three seats to the number of seats in every State House of Assembly, to be occupied by women only. The three additional women-only seats are to be in accordance with the three Senatorial districts already delineated for each state.

Currently, section 91 of the Constitution does not prescribe a uniform number of seats for State Assemblies. But it provides that it should consist of three or four times the number of seats which that State has in the House of Representatives divided in a way to reflect, as far as possible, nearly equal population. It further prescribes a lower limit of 24 members and an upper limit or cap of 40 members per State.

As an example, Lagos and Kano states both have 24 Federal Legislative seats and 40 State Assembly seats each, which is the upper limit placed by the Constitution. Gombe has 6 Federal legislative seats and 24 State Assembly seats which is four times the number of its federal seats and the lower limit placed by the constitution.

To accommodate the three special women-only seats, the bill proposes an increase of the upper limit from 40 to 43 seats. If the amendment passes, the total number of women only seats added to the 36 State Assemblies would be 108.

D. Creation of Women-only Senatorial Districts and Federal Constituencies by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

The special seats would be new women-only districts and constituencies that would not tamper with existing ones. To ascertain the constituency for the special seat to be represented by women and for the purpose of election, the bill amends section 71 of the Constitution to mandate INEC to divide every State to determine the electoral constituencies. Section 71 currently mandates INEC to divide each State into 3 senatorial districts and 360 federal constituencies.

According to the bill, for the one additional seat per state in the Senate, the whole state would constitute the woman-only district such that the woman would be elected to represent the state. For the House of Representatives, INEC is to divide every state into two so that each of the two special seats will emerge from and represent one-half of the state respectively.

By creating additional women-only districts or constituencies, this type of reserved seat in legislatures used as a temporary measure avoids existing constituencies being reserved for women. Reservation of existing seats while cost effective, is a major contention by male legislators.

Special seats not to stop women from contesting for regular seats.

It is noteworthy that the bill specifically mentions that the creation of special seats or women-only constituencies does not limit or prevent a woman from contesting for regular seats i.e., the existing 109 Senate and 360 House seats, as well as the existing seats in the State Assemblies already provided for by the Constitution. It is also important to note that the bill does not create a superior or inferior legislative status for the special seats as women occupying such seats would have equal privileges and responsibilities as other members.

E. Direct Election and Franchise for Special Seats

The Bill amends sections 77 (1) and 117 (1) of the Constitution to subject the special seats to direct elections like every other legislative seat. In other words, the women must be voted for directly by constituents who are entitled to vote. For the Senate, this would include every registered voter in each State. For the House of Reps, this would mean every registered voter in the women-only constituencies to be created by INEC by dividing the state into two halves. For the State Assemblies, this would include registered voters in each of the three existing senatorial districts in the state who would be expected to return one woman each.

This provision is important because in some countries operating reserved parliamentary seats for special groups like women, the seats are filled by indirect elections or appointment/nomination thus raising issues of electoral legitimacy and loyalty to constituents. In addition, the use of direct elections ensures that women campaign and compete for the seats so as to ensure voter involvement. It would also promote accountability towards citizens and building of their own power base or constituency, which is useful when the temporary measure ends and a full reversion to regular seats is required.

F. Seat Reservations for Women as a “Temporary Special Measure”

The seat reservation for women is designed to be a Temporary Special Measure (TSM). The principle behind temporary measures is that they have a “temporary character” i.e., they should be discontinued when their desired results have been achieved and sustained for a period. This is also to address concerns over affirmative action provisions becoming entrenched in the Constitution in a way that it becomes detrimental in the long run.

If this bill passes, it shall commence after the current life of the National and State Houses of Assembly i.e., in the next Assembly starting in 2023. Furthermore, the bill has a clause mandating the review of the special seats provision after four general election cycles, that is, 16 years. This is to emphasise its temporary nature and provide an opportunity for its repeal or renewal as the case may be.

G. Required Legislative Steps for Successful Constitution Alteration

The Special Seats for Women Bill (HB 1301) is a House of Representatives Bill. Despite its broad co-sponsorship and support which includes the leadership of the House, its provisions must be adopted by at least 2/3rd majority of members of the House (at least 240 of 360). Also, a 2/3rd majority of the Senate (at least 73 of 109) must concur or also adopt the provisions of the Bill. In line with the constitutional requirement on alterations, it must thereafter be approved by a resolution of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the States (at least 24 States). Finally, it would require Presidential Assent to become law.

It is also important to mention that to facilitate implementation by 2023 as prescribed in the bill, it is crucial that the proposal is adopted on time to enable the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to put necessary implementation mechanisms in place.

PART II

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RAISED FROM THE BILL

This bill raises several issues such as the objective behind Temporary Special Measures, whether it is a good alternative for increasing women's representation, criticism of tokenism and discrimination against men, and in countries like Nigeria – potential increase in the cost of governance. Some of these issues are highlighted and discussed below.

1. Understanding Affirmative Action Policies like Temporary Special Measures (TSMs) and Special Seats Arrangement

Temporary Special Measures (TSMs) are described as “measures aimed at accelerating the improvement of the position of women with a view to achieving substantive equality, and to effect the structural, social and cultural changes necessary to correct past and current forms and effects of discrimination against women.” These measures come in a “wide variety of legislative, executive, administrative and other regulatory instruments, policies and practices, such as outreach or support programmes; allocation and/or reallocation of resources; preferential treatment; numerical goals connected with time frames; and quota systems.”

According to the United Nations (UN), the meaning of the word “special” is that the measures are designed to serve a specific goal. They are not intended to confer some superior status on the beneficiaries.

In the context of quota systems in politics, TSMs can come in the following forms:

- i. **Reserved seat quotas:** Within the legislature, a certain number or percentage of seats (called a quota) will be set-aside for an under-represented group, such as women. This ensures that there is a guaranteed minimum number of women in the legislature. Measures like seat reservations/special seats are typically enshrined in the constitution of countries adopting them to ensure that it is legally secured. However, to be considered a temporary measure, the legal provision has to indicate that it will only operate for a period or lapse at a prescribed time.
- ii. **Legislated candidate quotas:** Requires political parties to field a certain minimum percentage of women candidates. These could either be constitutional or electoral. Again, a time limit has to be prescribed for it to be considered a temporary measure.
- iii. **Voluntary candidate quotas:** These are not seen as TSMs in a strict sense as they are non-binding targets pledged by political parties on the number of women candidates they intend to put on the ballot. They are legally unenforceable and require strong political will to work. For instance, many political parties in Nigeria adopt numeric targets for disadvantaged groups on paper i.e., party constitutions and manifestoes, but they are rarely, if ever implemented. Political parties prefer to give free or reduced fees for nomination forms to women, which contributes little to getting their names on the ballot.

Note: Reserved seat quotas are “**results-based**” and alter the structure of the institution itself, whereas candidate quotas are “**nomination-based**” and control the behaviour of political parties towards female candidates. Unfortunately for countries operating a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system where male incumbents stand a better chance in elections, candidate quotas do not guarantee that nominated women are elected. This is important because as can be seen below, the electoral system being operated by a country is instrumental for the successful adoption of gender quotas/special measures.

2. How Nigeria's Electoral System Contributes to Women's Under-Representation in the Legislature

With women occupying only 21 out of 469 seats in the National Assembly, the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU) identifies Nigeria as the worst performer in the West African region on the representation of women in parliaments and the second worst after Eritrea in the whole of the African continent. The records at the State level are worse. See table below.

Table 1: Number of Women in the State Houses of Assembly

S/N	STATE	NUMBER OF SEATS	NUMBER OF WOMEN	PERCENTAGE
1	ABIA	24	-	0%
2	ADAMAWA	25	1	4%
3	AKWA IBOM	26	2	8%
4	ANAMBRA	30	1	3%
5	BAUCHI	31	-	0%
6	BAYELSA	24	3	13%
7	BENUE	30	2	7%
8	BORNO	28	-	0%
9	CROSS RIVER	25	5	20%
10	DELTA	28	2	7%
11	EBONYI	24	3	13%
12	EDO	24	-	0%
13	EKITI	26	4	15%
14	ENUGU	24	4	17%
15	GOMBE	24	1	4%
16	IMO	27	2	7%
17	JIGAWA	30	-	0%
18	KADUNA	34	1	3%
19	KANO	40	-	0%
20	KATSINA	34	-	0%
21	KEBBI	24	-	0%
22	KOGI	25	-	0%
23	KWARA	24	-	0%
24	LAGOS	40	3	8%
25	NASARAWA	24	-	0%
26	NIGER	27	1	4%
27	OGUN	26	4	15%
28	ONDO	26	1	4%
29	OSUN	26	2	8%
30	OYO	32	1	3%
31	PLATEAU	24	1	4%
32	RIVERS	32	1	3%
33	SOKOTO	30	-	0%
34	TARABA	24	-	0%
35	YOBE	24	-	0%
36	ZAMFARA	24	-	0%
	TOTAL	990	45	4.5%

Compilation by PLAC

Apart from the well-known political, socio-economic, cultural, and religious obstacles to women joining politics and contesting elections, one important factor influencing the likelihood of women being elected to a legislature is the type of electoral system used in the country. Electoral system simply refers to the way in which votes are translated into seats.

Nigeria operates a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) /plurality electoral system for elections into the legislature. It is a simple majority system where a candidate in an election with the highest number of votes in a constituency is declared the winner – not minding the total number of votes obtained by other losing candidates which may be larger when combined.

While FPTP system is seen to be very simple to operate, one of its [disadvantages is that it does not allow for fair representation](#) of diverse voters or voices in a constituency since a candidate can win an election without winning majority of the popular votes. In addition, FPTP system has been found to entrench larger parties and dominant groups so that smaller parties and disadvantaged groups who have been excluded from electoral politics over the years, such as women, have weak chances of disrupting the system and being elected. In addition, it is known to be difficult to combine FPTP with quota systems.

On the other hand, in countries that operate a [Proportional Representation \(PR\) electoral system](#), which allows political parties to win seats in accordance with the percentage of votes they win at elections, it is easier to apply quotas as political parties can easily allocate seats to women to meet numeric targets such as 35%. In fact, majority of the countries being cited for their high numbers of female legislators such as Rwanda, South Africa and Senegal use PR electoral systems.

It is important to mention that expert studies and electoral reform panel reports such as the 2008 Uwais Electoral Reform Panel Report have suggested that Nigeria adopts a PR electoral system to improve inclusion of women and other disadvantaged groups in the political space, however this recommendation has not been taken forward.


Studies have frequently concluded that gender quotas or TSMs for women can be ineffective unless they are context-appropriate and relevant to the electoral system. In spite of this, it has been found that specific types of quotas/TSMs can be successfully used in countries with FPTP systems like Nigeria. The two major types that have been identified include the following:

- a. Special districts or seats for female candidates only:** This is the same as a Reserved Seat arrangement and involves creating special seats or an additional tier of women representatives elected on a separate ballot but joining the same elected body. This is used in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and India. The advantage of this system is that it guarantees results as such seats are open only to women. Also, it addresses the idea that quotas are non-meritorious as it can be designed to ensure that the woman campaigns and competes for votes like every other candidate, often times in larger districts. This system is what the bill in question is proposing. The criticism of this system is the cost of adding more representatives to an already existing legislature.
- b. Rotating districts:** This approach does not need creation of new districts but maintains the existing structure of the parliament and voting system. It requires that a proportion (e.g., 1/3rd) of the regular constituencies are reserved for women candidates one out of three electoral cycles. Different constituencies fall under the reservation for each electoral cycle - through a rotation system - so that a portion of seats are reserved for every election, and over subsequent cycles the impact is spread geographically. This approach is used in India's local level elections following constitutional reforms to their local government system, thus providing the opportunity for the expansion of the numbers of women at that level from 5% to 40%.

If the 1/3rd formula is applied to Nigeria in practical terms, it would entail reserving 1 (one) of the existing 3 (three) senate seats in each state for a woman per election and reserving about 120 of the existing 360 House of Reps seats for women per election.

The disadvantage is that it places an effective term-limit of two terms on male incumbents in the process of the rotation and this may be seen as a restriction on constituencies that may prefer to field a male candidate in a particular election cycle. In addition, voters and candidates may feel that their political choice and/or liberties are being infringed upon if women-only seats are allocated from existing seats. The advantage of this system is that it is cheaper than adding new seats.

Figure 2: Example of district/constituency rotation in a 4-year election cycle



3. Global Response to Women's Under-Representation in Parliaments

The International Parliamentary Union (IPU) reports that over 100 countries utilise some type of special measure or gender quota to increase the numbers of women in parliaments. Many African countries ranging from Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda to conservative countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have successfully implemented electoral quotas to ensure an increase in the number of women in their various governments. The same applies outside Africa. For example, in 2013, Saudi Arabia appointed 30 women to its Shura Council, which as of today accounts for 20 percent of seats represented by women.

The adoption of Special Measures in the form of women-only districts are not new. Women-only constituencies exist also in **Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania**. In **Uganda**, the constitution requires that each national district have a woman representative in parliament, irrespective of the number of constituencies in the district. There are 112 districts therefore 112 women representatives are directly elected by all voters on a special ballot in each district for women candidates only.

In **Kenya**, 47 special elective seats are created for women in the constitution to be contested by women only from the country's 47 counties thus allowing 47 women to be directly elected to the National Assembly.

In **Tanzania**, women members must not be less than 30% in the National Assembly, which consists of 350 members. Of these, 102 seats are reserved for women. The special seats for women are distributed among the political parties in proportion to the number of seats awarded to them in parliament. These three countries operate a First-Past-the-Post electoral system.

4. Arguments of Discrimination and Tokenism

Even though various special measures and quota proposals have been adopted successfully in many countries, it remains highly controversial in others like Nigeria. Critics have expressed concerns about quotas being a form of discrimination against men, a violation of the principle of fairness, an unfair advantage to women and a tokenistic measure that will dilute the quality of leadership and result in unqualified women who are not elected based on merit.

Proponents on the other hand argue that elections to representative bodies are primarily about "representation." They argue also that arguments of merit, quality and qualification are rarely extended to men, and fail to consider, the system of privilege that has enabled men to dominate the political sphere such as voting rights that date back to 1922, access to financial resources and political structures.

They further note that the barriers girls and young women face in obtaining basic tools necessary for political life such as money and quality education (which is now exacerbated in parts of the country plagued with insurgency and insecurity) already puts them at a disadvantage and imposes critical limitations on their capacity to take up political leadership roles in the future.

Moreover, the reality and experience of women in Nigerian politics is that there is no level playing ground especially where political parties act as gatekeepers and are more likely to present male candidates to voters.

Some have also argued that nothing in the law stops women from contesting for elections, however real equal opportunity does not exist just because there are no legal barriers for women to contest elections. This is because direct discrimination and hidden barriers prevent women from gaining political influence. Critics often ignore unique challenges women face like gender-based violence, domestic and family commitments and even discrimination based on indigeneship or State of origin. For instance, there have been cases where female aspirants born or originating from one State have been prevented from obtaining party tickets or running in their husband's State. In this instance, the political parties play safe by choosing a man instead thereby consolidating women's under-representation in politics.

Viewed from the prism of fairness and exclusion, special measures are therefore a compensation and remedy for structural barriers that prevent fair competition.

5. Incremental Gains and Gradualism in Proposed Alternatives

Suggestions and efforts have been made for women to improve their education, skills, and capacities for politics. Some believe that this would immediately translate to political success for women, but this has not been the case. For instance, huge resources and efforts by donors and activist groups have gone into building women's capacity to contest and win elections over the years, but with minimal results.

Some also believe that gradual economic empowerment of women would eventually translate to greater inclusion of women in politics and then, in the legislature. Examples of the number of women ascending in the judiciary, civil service, academia, and corporate sector are often cited in comparison. While this is a seemingly logical line of reasoning, it ignores intervening factors and the fact that the rules of play in the political arena are different.

Proponents of incremental political growth of women and by implication, a gradual increase in female legislators overly focus on linear progressive change. This mechanical model ignores the uncertainty and turbulence of the Nigerian political environment, as well as possible disruption of gains by patriarchal elements. It also fails to answer key questions such as: why does the gender gap in political representation continue to exist even when other sectors are encouraging women in leadership? Why have the efforts to address the political marginalization of women failed to improve their electoral progress? Why are the numbers of women in the National and State Houses of Assembly on a steady decline?


In 2011, the House of Representatives had 27 female members – the highest number on record. In 2021, ten years later, it has dropped to 13. Similarly, there were about 68 women in the State Assemblies in 2011. Ten years later, it is down to 45 women. In addition, 15 State Assemblies do not have any female legislator.

A 2008 study of the National Assembly made projections of the composition of male and female legislators from 2011 to 2031. It predicted a gradual increase of women by about 2.3% per election cycle. So far, the projections have not come true, proving that gradual and incremental progress in numbers is not a given and can be interrupted. See table and trend map below.

Table 2: Predicted composition of male and female legislators 2011-2031

Gender	Predicted 2011-2015	Actual 2011-2015	Predicted 2015-2019	Actual 2015-2019	Predicted 2019-2023	Actual 2019-2023	Predicted 2023- 2027	Predicted 2027- 2031
Male	89.7%	93.2%	87.4%	93.8%	85.07%	95.5%	82.73%	80.38%
Female	10.2%	6.8%	12.6%	6.2%	14.93%	4.5 %	17.27%	19.62%

Source: NASS Statistical information vol 2., no.1, 2008, page 48. It also acknowledged that barring special strategies, attainment of 20% of women legislators in NASS by 2027 would be impossible.



This chart shows a steady decline against projected gradual increase.

The [World Economic Forum's 2021 Global Gender Gap report](#) tracked the global gender gap in four areas of political empowerment, economic participation, education and health, and found that the widest gender disparity is seen in politics. It further suggests that at the current rate of progress, it will take 145.5 years to attain gender parity in politics.

A 2015 Premium Times news headline read "2015 elections hold no promise for improved women representation in Nigerian politics." Every evidence available point towards a repeat of this headline in 2023 if drastic measures are not taken.

The reality is that it will take decades before all political barriers preventing equal representation of women are eradicated. For some activists, this challenges the argument of waiting for incremental changes or expecting a linear progressive development towards increased representation without special measures that target institutional change. Overall, special measures/quota systems are a **fast-track measure** to numerical presence and represents a departure from the widespread gradualism or incremental approach of many equality policies.

6. Benefits of Increased Female Representation and Effect of Numerical Presence on Substantive Representation

Still, some may ask why does female representation matter? Why does Nigeria need more women in the legislature? And what have the few women there achieved? Fears have been expressed about the co-optation of women by male political elites and the election of women whose legislative behaviour did not show an interest or responsiveness to women's issues.

In spite of these, there is tangible evidence that more often than not, women's political participation results in tangible gains for democracy, including greater responsiveness to policy issues and citizen needs.

Apart from offering greater visibility for women, quota systems have changed the face of parliaments, normalised women's presence in what is considered a traditionally patriarchal decision-making space and fostered some form of gender awareness.

Many countries that adopted special measures to increase the numbers of women in parliament such as Rwanda have experienced women sponsored legislation that were beneficial to communities in addressing issues around education, healthcare, violence, and poverty. In Tanzania, female legislators influenced the adoption of two land legislations that addressed the problem of women's land use, access, and ownership.

A [UN Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325](#) discovered a positive correlation between the inclusion of women in the policy making process and improved conflict management and reduced armed violence.

Furthermore, the [American Journal of Political Science](#) reports that women, compared to men, sponsor and co-sponsor more bills and are able to generate 9% more wealth in their districts. It has also been found that women legislate differently and effectively, are less likely to resort to war and the death penalty, and their involvement shows correlation with reduced military spending and use of force.

In Nigeria, the findings are similar. According to an [Order Paper Nigeria report](#), two female senators, Stella Oduah and Uche Ekwunife, both from Anambra State, have so far, sponsored the highest number of bills in the 9th Senate. In the House of Representatives, Lynda Chuba Ikpeazu, also from Anambra State, is reported to be one of the sponsors of the highest number of bills, many of them focused on key development issues.

To highlight a few others, Hon. Nkeiruka Onyejeocha sponsored the National Senior Citizens Centre Act 2018 and Compulsory Treatment and Care for Victims of Gunshot Act 2017. Senator Biodun Olujimi has sponsored the Gender & Equal Opportunities Bill in the past and current Assembly. Senator Betty Apiafi is currently sponsoring a constitution amendment bill to include gender in the definition of Nigeria's "Federal Character" while Hon. Aisha Dukku is sponsoring the Electoral Act and Electoral Offences Commission Bills.

There are real life consequences of the absence of women in the legislature. A PLAC [study of legislative bills on women's representation and issues](#) (such as women's rights, childcare, general healthcare, education, anti-discrimination, welfare, inclusion etc.) in the National Assembly showed that such bills introduced in each Assembly between 1999 and 2019 have been less than 4% of the total bills introduced.

The study also found that critical bills proposing affirmative action and equal opportunities for women have traveled through the Assembly over the years under different nomenclatures without successfully berthing. These include an Equal Opportunities Commission (Establishment) Bill, 2010; Gender and Equal Opportunities, Abuse and Administration Bill 2012; Affirmative Action (Equal Opportunities for Women) Bill 2012; Gender and Equal Opportunities Bill 2015; Women Empowerment and Gender Equality Bill 2015; Women Participation in Elections Support Bill, 2018. Note that this does not take into consideration, the number of constitution amendment bills or proposals on affirmative action not considered by the National Assembly. The low number of women in the Assembly is a factor for the lack of support or push for these bills. In a space where voting numbers matter, numerical presence of women is key.

So far, the Special Seats bill in question is the only special measure bill in the history of the National Assembly, that has received wide support, in terms of sponsorship. It is evident from the list of sponsors that the Bill appears to enjoy, even if at face value, a diverse array of regional, ethnic, gender, religious and political support. It therefore holds the most promise of improvement of numerical presence and substantive representation of women issues in the legislature.

7. Important Lessons from other Countries

a. Importance of design

Research studies show that quotas contribute to the effective representation of women if they are accompanied by measures ensuring that they are given political legitimacy, as well as the means to compete for positions.

One of the challenges in some countries utilising special seat reservations for women is the recruitment mechanism or mode of electing special female legislators which is different from that of regular parliamentarians. For instance, Uganda uses a male dominated electoral college system while Tanzania allows political parties to appoint the women on a proportional representation basis without having clear internal party mechanisms/ candidate selection process for the special seats. This allowed the election of women who were accountable only to the party or the men that appointed them. A lesson here is to design special measures in a way to promote the legitimacy and competitive power of women i.e., by allowing them to campaign for votes from the electorate.

b. Sustaining complementary efforts to address patriarchy and inequality

Critics have argued for the examination of the value of women participation, beyond the numbers, to ensure participatory democracy and the transformation of gender relations/equity. In other words, a successful quota system or special measure should lead to the active involvement of women, who are able to not only influence decision making as a group, but also political norms and culture. The lesson learned here is that the "top-down" special seats arrangement must complement "bottom-up" efforts to transform political norms and values, which discriminate against women and other disadvantaged groups.

c. Post-election support: Links between civil society activists and women legislators

Collaboration between independent women's organizations and female legislators is identified as crucial for promotion of gender-related issues and policies. However, some country studies indicate the absence of this collaboration especially after the women legislators are elected. For instance, reports by [International Alert](#) and [International IDEA](#) highlighted weak links between women legislators and independent women's organizations as a contributing factor in elected women not promoting women issues. This included informal, episodic, and fragile engagement on issues and interest formation, as well as a lack of common understanding between the two categories of women on how to promote women and gender equality issues.

Essentially, the lesson here is that it is only when both groups collaborate that there can be significant progress in terms of impact on public policy and legislation. Consequently, it has been suggested that the support for women to get elected should continue after they are elected via programmes to improve their skills and confidence to participate in legislative activities and influence inclusive policy making.

PART III

COST OF GOVERNANCE

The Cost of Governance Argument

The potential costs of admitting additional members to the National Assembly is the biggest criticism of the special seats bill. Public commentary on the National Assembly budget and maintenance of the current size of the federal and state legislators have been very heated, usually because of the secrecy around it or even the outright lack of information from lawmakers.

The response is hardly surprising when considered against the expenditure pattern of the country, the weak economy, budget deficits, and ineffective representation by legislators. Research by PLAC found that the expenditure profile of the nation has grown by about 2000% and that of the National Assembly by almost 6000% in 22 years and at an average of 300% annually. The economies of the States are not any better.

While the arguments for women representation have been robust, the concern for the financial implications is palpable. However, the point is made that destiny of a nation cannot be surrendered on the altar of mere numbers as in cost and budget figures, but also on proper consideration of the value addition of the human resource in women who will bring on board unique perspectives in decision making, including suggestions that will ultimately cut down the cost of governance and hopefully open new revenue sources.

PLAC calculated the possible quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits of the special seats bill if implemented and found that the costs of additional 219 new women members in the federal and state legislatures which the bill seeks, would amount to between N5bn – N18bn per annum and N23bn – N74bn in a 4-year tenure cycle.

A. QUANTITATIVE PARAMETERS

The Quantitative cost parameters of Women legislative aspirations are analyzed based on publicly reported Salaries and Emoluments of Legislators.

Two scenarios will be used for the salaries and allowances of the Federal lawmakers, unlike the State legislators, namely:

Scenario 1 – RMAFC

The Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) which is the legally authorized body to fix the salaries and allowances of the National Assembly members, has put in the public domain, the approved salary and allowances of the Federal lawmakers. These costs represent the **lower limit** of estimated costs.

These figures are available on different news sites:

- <https://www.legit.ng/1253508-what-geriatrics-senators-house-reps-members-receive-salaries-allowances.html>
- <https://www.legit.ng/1253508-what-nigerias-senators-house-reps-members-receive-salaries-allowances.html>
- <https://www.applyforajob.org/monthly-and-annual-salary-of-house-of-assembly-representative-members-in-nigeria/>

Scenario 2 – Report (Media) of Lawmakers

Two Members of the Parliament had volunteered information on their emoluments. The face value of this report will form the basis of our analysis here. These costs represent the **upper limit** of estimated costs.

- i) Senator Shehu Sani, who represented Kaduna Central had shared that Senators were on an emolument package of:

Salary - N750,000/month

Allowances - N13.5m

TOTAL N14.25m x 12 = N171m per annum

- . Source: <http://www.legit.ng/1253508-what-nigerias-senators-house-reps-members-receive-salaries-allowances.html>

- ii) Member of the House, Rep. Simon Karu representing Kaltungo/Shongom Federal Constituency of Gombe State had shared that Members of the House were on an emolument package of:

Salary - N800,000/month

Allowances - N8.5m

TOTAL N9.3m x 12 = N111.6m per annum

- . Source: <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/417971-we-earn-n9-3m-monthly-rep-member.html>

Using figures from the above sources to make calculations, modest insight is provided on the estimated additional cost of maintaining the envisaged additional lawmakers, as sought in the bill.

See tables 3, 4, and 5 below.

Table 3: Summary of legislators' emoluments using RMAFC figures

Summary:	
Scenario 1 RMAFC basis - per annum	
Legislators' emoluments	
. Senator per annum	N17.00m
. MHR per annum	N13.70m
. MSHOA per annum	N05.80m
. TOTAL (All lawmakers) per annum	N 36.5m
. Add legislative aides (National)	N9.849bn
. Add legislative aides (States)	N2.197bn
Total per-annum	N12.082bn
Scenario 1 - Per 4 years	
. All lawmakers per 4 years	N50.168bn
. Motor Vehicle	N 3.752bn
. Legislative aides	N48.184bn
. Total cost	N102.104bn
<i>Legislative aides' figures are based on field/desk research. There are 5 legislative aides per Senator & 5 per Member. Motor vehicle costs are loans to NASS members to be repaid before expiration of tenure. Total 4-year cost for all lawmakers consists of annual cost per lawmaker multiplied by 4 and by the number of legislators in each legislative house (109, 360 and 990).</i>	

Table 4: Summary of legislators' emoluments using self-reported figures

Scenario 2 – self reported figures per annum	
Legislators' emoluments	
. Senator per annum	N171.00m
. MHR per annum	N111.60m
. MSHOA per annum	N05.80m
. TOTAL (All lawmakers) per annum	N 288.41m
. Add legislative aides (National)	N9.849bn
. Add Leg. Aides (States)	N2.197bn
Total per annum	N12.334bn
Scenario 2 – Per 4 years	
. All lawmakers per 4 years	N258.267bn
. Motor Vehicle	N 3.752bn
. Legislative aides	N48.184bn
Total cost	N310.203bn
<i>Legislative aides' figures are based on field/desk research. There are 5 legislative aides per Senator & 5 per Member. Motor vehicle costs are loans to NASS members to be repaid before expiration of tenure. Total 4-year cost for all lawmakers consists of annual cost per lawmaker multiplied by 4 and by the number of legislators in each legislative house (109, 360 and 990).</i>	

Table 5: Projected cost implication of additional Federal and State Legislators

Annual emolument expenditure (Lower limit)	
37 additional Senators x 17m=	N629.0m
74 additional M/House x N13.70m =	N1.013bn
111 members' legislative aides =	N2.331bn
108 additional State Houses x 5.81m =	N627.5m
108 x N185m (2 aides) x 12	N239.76m
Total	N4.840bn per annum
N4.840bn x 4years =	N19.361bn
Add office accommodation	N2.000bn
Add Furnishing/Facilities	N1.000bn
Add M/vehicle (111 lawmakers)	N888m
Total	N23.249bn/4years
Annual emolument expenditure (Upper limit)	
37 additional Senators x 171m=	N6.327 bn
74 additional M/House x N111.6m =	N8.146 bn
Leg. Aides for 111 lawmakers	N2.331 bn
108 additional State Houses x 5.81m =	N627.5m
Leg. Aides for 108 members (State)	N239.76m
Total	N17.671bn per annum
N17.671bn x 4 =	N70.685.978bn
Add office accommodation	N2.000bn
Add Furnishing/Facilities	N1.000bn
Add M/Vehicle (111 lawmakers)	N 888m
Total	N74.573bn /4years
Notes:	
1.	<i>All figures are estimates and not absolute costs.</i>
2.	<i>100% accuracy of estimates and figures may not be guaranteed but fits for the purpose of credible appreciation and understanding of the subject matter.</i>
3.	<i>There are two levels used in determining Federal lawmakers' emoluments – Scenario 1 – RMAFC and Scenario 2 – Testimonies of lawmakers.</i>
4.	<i>Emolument of aides are based on field/desk research as estimates.</i>
5.	<i>Cost of additional office based on projection for rent and furniture and facilities are based on extant and projected estimations from field research.</i>
6.	<i>Cost of running State Houses of Assembly do not appear to have generated the same controversy as the National Assembly.</i>

B. CRITICISMS OF NATIONAL BUDGET AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUDGET

The annual budget has been on a deficit lane for a long time and has been constantly operated through borrowings. There has been increase of the budget between 1999 and 2021 from less than N500bn in 1999, to over N13.5tr, showing an increase of close to 3000% in 22 years. The National Assembly budget has also increased over time along the national budget.

Furthermore, the debate on earnings of Nigerian lawmakers has been a recurring one - getting more controversial with time. Perhaps as a result of public outcry, the National Assembly budget has in response followed an interesting trend and path at some points.

For instance, between 2000 and 2001 there was a decrease from N29.4b to N13.2 bn. Between 2005 and 2006, the same amount was voted, then it maintained an increase up to 2010; meanwhile it came close to double between 2007 and 2008/2009, (from N113bn to N159bn) then climbed to N159bn in 2010 and came down to N150bn where it plateaued for another 4 years, further reduced to N120bn in 2015, further reduced in 2016 to N115bn, then went up in 2017 and further up in 2018. The expenditure came down to N128bn and remained at that level for 2 years (2019 and 2020). In 2021 it went up to the current level of N134bn.

Table 6: National Budget & National Assembly Budget 1999 – 2021 (Compilation by PLAC)

S/N	YEAR	NATIONAL BUDGET AGGREGATE AS PASSED	NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUDGET	NASS BUDGET TREND
		=N=	=N=	
1.	1999	484,518,094,772	2,204,150,000	
2.	2000	675,080,490,731	29,400,197,761	↑
3.	2001	818,878,456,157	13,229,483,837	↓ 55% decrease
4.	2002	1,013,507,643,521	27,826,930,230	↑
5.	2003	916,068,269,403	28,260,056,582	↑
6.	2004	888,862,494,202	34,729,324,335	↑
7.	2005	1,799,938,243,138	54,785,690,445	↑
8.	2006	1,899,987,922,467	54,785,690,445	-
9.	2007	2,309,223,949,983	66,400,867,283	↑
10.	2008	2,647,492,865,643	112,922,787,521	↑
11.	2009	2,055,959,582,738	112,922,787,521	↑
12.	2010	5,001,107,013,979	158,916,167,627	↑
13.	2011	4,484,736,648,992	150,000,000,000	↓ 5.6 % decrease
14.	2012	4,877,209,156,933	150,000,000,000	-
15.	2013	4,987,220,425,601	150,000,000,000	-
16.	2014	4,637,783,957,157	150,000,000,000	-
17.	2015	4,637,783,957,157	120,000,000,000	↓ 20% decrease
18.	2016	6,060,677,358,227	115,000,000,000	↓ 4.2% decrease
19.	2017	7,441,175,486,758	125,000,000,000	↑
20.	2018	9,120,334,988,225	139,500,000,000	↑
21.	2019	8,916,964,099,373	128,000,000,000	↓ 8.2% decrease
22.	2020	10,810,800,872,071	128,000,000,000	-
23.	2021	13,588,027,886,175	134,000,000,000	↑
	TOTAL		2,185,884,133,588	

The trend of decrease in NASS budgets in the years indicated above show some fluidity which could create space for adjustments that could admit more members as being advocated in the bill under consideration. This way, the bill holds the promise that it may not ultimately result to absolute increases or even where such increase heads are allowed, it will even out when juxtaposed against costs of exclusion and intrinsic benefits of women inclusion.

Fast Fact: The 1979 Constitution of the Second Republic, provided for 5 Senators per State and for 450 House of Representatives seats – more than the current total of 469 for both chambers in the 1999 constitution.

C. ASSESSING POTENTIAL COSTS OF ADDITIONAL SEATS AGAINST THE NATIONAL & NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NASS) BUDGETS

Table 7: Percentage of additional increase on FGN’s budgets of 2019 to 2021

Year	Budget	% of add. 219 Members on budget (Scenario 1)	% of add. 111 Members on budget (Scenario 1)	% of add. 219 Members on budget (Scenario 2)	% of add. 111 Members on budget (Scenario 2)
2019	N8.916trn	0.543%	0.045%	0.198%	0.188%
2020	N10.810trn	0.044%	0.037%	0.163%	0.155%
2021	N13.588trn	0.356%	0.029%	0.130%	0.124%
	Average	0.0314	0.037%	0.163%	0.156%

Source: Extracts from 2019, 2020 & 2021 budgets and desk computation

As seen in the above table, using a 3-year average (2019-2021 budgets), the increase in emoluments for additional 111 Federal or NASS members is projected to be at least, **0.037%** (RMAFC) and at most, **0.156%** (using other scenarios of calculation). If both Federal and State legislators (219) are factored in, the projected increase on the annual budget would be at least, **0.0314%** (RMAFC) and at most, **0.163%**.

Table 8: Percentage of additional increase on National Assembly budgets of 2019 to 2021

Year	Budget	% of add. 111 Members on NASS budget (Scenario 1)	% of add. 111 Members on NASS budget (Scenario 2)
2019	128bn	3.104%	13.128%
2020	128bn	3.104%	13.128%
2021	134bn	2.965%	12.540%
	Average	3.058%	12.932%

Source: Extracts from 2019, 2020 & 2021 budgets and desk computation

The above table shows that using a 3-year average (2019-2021 budgets), the increase in emoluments for the additional 111 NASS members on the budget of the National Assembly is projected to be between 3% and 12.9%.

D. QUALITATIVE & OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

- i. Studies have shown a correlation between more women in legislatures, improved conflict resolution and reduced military spending. The greatest costs Nigeria is paying today emanate from conflict, insurgency, and other dimensions of insecurity. The value-addition of women which can ameliorate conflicts in a country like Nigeria where matters of insecurity have enveloped it in recent years cannot be easily quantified; and such benefits could translate to or even be far more than any envisaged figures to include more women legislators.

The table below shows Nigeria’s defense budget between 2019 and 2021. A total of about N2.5trillion has been spent, and the trend indicates a growing profile.

Table 9: Budgets of Federal Ministry of Defence & ONSA (2019 – 2021)

Year	Allocation to Defence Ministry =N=	% of aggregate national budget	Allocation to Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)	% of aggregate national budget
2019	589,955,110,099	6.62	120,712,711,220	1.35
2020	900,770,634,390	8.33	144,326,228,206	1.34
2021	966,410,067,089	7.11	179,742,734,268	1.32
Total	2,457,135,811,578		444,781,673,694	

Source: FGN Appropriation Acts 2019 - 2021

NB: It is estimated that the cost of a 4-year maintenance of the additional legislators will only amount to less than 5% of annual defense spending.

These figures do not take into account, allocations and expenditure by other security agencies and supplementary budget provisions which put together, is far more than one trillion naira. For instance, [news reports](#) reveal that in the 2021 supplementary national budget, a total of N4.8 billion was allocated to the National Intelligence Agency to monitor WhatsApp messages, phone calls, and text messages, of which N1.93 billion was allocated for “WhatsApp Intercept Solution” and N2.93 billion for “Thuraya Interception Solution.”

There are also [media reports](#) of duplicated capital projects worth N39.5 billion in the 2021 budget, federal agencies receiving allocations for “Security Votes” worth N24.3bn, and zero audit records of N10.02tn received by the security sector between 2015 and 2021.

Assuming women’s leadership brings to the table, benefits in conflict resolution, this expense picture can be drastically reduced. This would make the additional estimated expenditure for 219 new National and State Assembly women legislators to dissolve into insignificance.

Where women in political leadership can potentially address conflicts, thereby reducing defense spending by a reasonable percentage, then a proposal to inject more women in political positions is worth serious consideration.

- ii. The main cost disadvantage to women in politics is the factor of discrimination which is hard to quantify in monetary terms, and this is what the bill is centrally addressing. Hopefully, this will be frontally addressed in a legislature with improved representation.
- iii. The ‘women quota’ argument in Nigeria is also hinged on the fact that various electoral constituencies and districts in Nigeria are currently practicing quota in one form or the other, going by descriptions such as ‘rotation’, ‘zoning’ etc. The premise for such argument is that this is another project that will ‘spice up’ the political space and offer more representation to an expanding population.
- iv. The huge costs of depriving women and girls of rights and opportunities are borne not only by women and girls themselves, but also by their families, communities, and the entire economy. There are several reports showing [women’s impact on the economy](#); that [Nigeria can gain up to 9% in GDP growth](#) by 2025 if there’s an improvement in women’s participation; and the costs of exclusion. By investing in girls and women and pushing more women into leadership positions, the costs of exclusion which are unquantifiable can be reduced.

- v. Making decisions based on costs alone on issues of long-term impact is seen by some as reductionist logic, particularly where the worth of the human person which must be rated above every other resource and consideration cannot be easily quantified. Costs are the resultant effect of decisional frameworks and is not any different even in the current scenario of women representation. The inclusion of women can translate to savings in trillions of Naira across all decisional spheres.

CONCLUSION

A key indicator for benchmarking democratic legislatures worldwide is its “representativeness.” According to the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) this includes asking “how representative of women, is the composition of parliament?” It is therefore best practice for representative bodies like the National and State Houses of Assembly to have substantial representation of marginalized populations, such as women, for them to affect policy outcomes.

For many who do not see the value of the legislature, they argue that it is just one arena among many others, that can address women issues and inequality, therefore, activists and campaigners should focus on social institutions driving inequalities and other actors restricting women’s rights and access to opportunities.

While this is correct in some respect, it must be remembered that non-discriminatory and gender-sensitive laws are critical for challenging discriminatory social norms and institutions. Moreover, resources are needed to address inequality.

The reality is that the legislature is an arena for high level decision making. It remains a unique democratic institution with constitutional powers to allocate public resources and make laws with far-reaching consequences. For these reasons alone, legal measures to improve women’s representation in the legislature deserve serious consideration. Like the popular saying goes, “*women belong in all places where decisions are being made*” and this includes the National and State Houses of Assembly.

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APPENDIX 1: FEMALE LEGISLATORS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (2019-2023)

A. SENATE

S/N	NAME	SENATORIAL DISTRICT
1.	OLUREMI TINUBU	LAGOS CENTRAL
2.	UCHE LILIAN EKWUNIFE	ANAMBRA CENTRAL
3.	STELLA ODUAH	ANAMBRA NORTH
4.	ABIODUN OLUJIMI	EKITI SOUTH
5.	BETTY APIAFI	RIVERS WEST
6.	AISHATU DAHIRU BINANI AHMED	ADAMAWA CENTRAL
7.	EYAKENYI AKON ETIM	AKWAIBOM SOUTH
8.	PROF. NORA DADU'UT	PLATEAU SOUTH

B. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

S/N	NAME	CONSTITUENCY & STATE
1.	NKEIRUKA C. ONYEJEOCHA	ISUIKWUATO / UMUNNEOCHI (ABIA)
2.	LYNDA CHUBA IKPEAZU	ONITSHA NORTH / ONITSHA SOUTH (ANAMBRA)
3.	BENI BUTMAK LAR	LANGTANG NORTH / LANGTANG SOUTH (PLATEAU)
4.	AISHATU JIBRIL DUKKU	DUKKU/ NAFADA (GOMBE)
5.	KHADIIJA BUKAR ABBA IBRAHIM	DAMATURU / GUJBA / GULANI / TARMUWA (YOBE)
6.	BOMA GOODHEAD	AKUKU TORU / ASARI TORU (RIVERS)
7.	ZAINAB GIMBA	BAMA / NGALA / KALA – BALGE (BORNO)
8.	OMOWUNMI OLUBUNMI OGUNLOLA	IJERO / EKITI WEST / EFON (EKITI)
9.	ADEWUNMI ORİYOMI ONANUGA	IKENNE / SHAGAMU / REMO NORTH (OGUN)
10.	TAIWO OLUKEMI OLUGA	AYEDADE / IREWOLE / ISOKAN (OSUN)
11.	TOLULOPE TIWALOLA AKANDE-SADIPE	OLUYOLE (OYO)
12.	ONUH ONYECHÉ BLESSING	OTUKPO / OHIMINI (BENUE)
13.	MIRIAM ONUOHA	OKIGWE NORTH (IMO)

APPENDIX 2: FEMALE LEGISLATORS IN THE STATE ASSEMBLIES (2019-2023)

S/N	STATE & NO. OF WOMEN	NAME & CONSTITUENCY
1	ABIA (0)	
2	ADAMAWA (1)	Hon. Kate Raymond Mamuno (Demsa)
3	AKWA IBOM (2)	1. Rt. Hon. Princess Felicia Bassey, Deputy Speaker (Okobo) 2. Hon. (Dr.) Charity Ido (Ukanafun)
4	ANAMBRA (1)	Hon. Beverly Ifeanyi Nkemdichie (Onitsha South II), Deputy Chief Whip
5	BAUCHI (0)	
6	BAYELSA (3)	1. Hon. (Mrs.) Ingo Iwowari Gold (Nembe II) 2. Hon. Owoko Kate (Southern Ijaw I) 3. Hon. (Mrs.) Ebiuwou K. Obiyai (Yenagoa II)
7	BENUE (2)	1. Hon. Agnes Uloko (Ado) 2. Hon. Ngohemba Agaigbe (Gboko East)
8	BORNO (0)	
9	CROSS RIVER (5)	1. Rt Hon. Regina Anyogo, Deputy Whip (Yala I) 2. Rt Hon. Elizabeth Edem Ironbar (Akpabuyo) 3. Hon. Dr. Itam Virginia Abang (Boki I) 4. Hon. Mrs. Maria Godwin Akwaji (Obudu) 5. Hon. Mrs. Cynthia A. Nkasi (Yala II)

10	DELTA (2)	1. Hon. Princess Pat Ajudua Esq., Chief Whip (Oshimili North) 2. Hon. Erhiatake Ibori-Seunu (Ethiope West)
11	EBONYI (3)	1. Hon. Okpo Franca C. (Abakiliki North) 2. Hon. Lilian Ngozi Eziuloh (Afikpo North-East) 3. Hon. Chinwe Lilian Nwachukwu (Ohaozara East)
12	EDO (0)	
13	EKITI (4)	1. Hon. Olubunmi Adelugba, Chief Whip (Emure) 2. Hon. Kemi Balogun (Ado I) 3. Hon. Yemisi Ayokunle (Ekiti SW) 4. Hon. Princess Teju Okuyiga (Gbonyin)
14	ENUGU (4)	1. Hon. Ugwu Mary Onyinye, Deputy Leader (Enugu South Rural) 2. Hon. Mrs Jane Eneh, Chief Whip (Awgu North) 3. Hon. Ethel Oyibo Ugwuanyi, Deputy Chief Whip (Igboeze North I) 4. Hon. Amaka Ugwueze (Isiuzo)
15	GOMBE (1)	Hon. Asma'u Iganus (Shongom)
16	IMO (2)	1. Hon. Uju Jovita Onwudiwe (Njaba) 2. Hon. Obiefula Ngozi (Isu)
17	JIGAWA (0)	
18	KADUNA (1)	Hon. Comfort Amwe (Sanga)
19	KANO (0)	
20	KATSINA (0)	
21	KEBBI (0)	
22	KOGI (0)	
23	KWARA (0)	
24	LAGOS (3)	1. Hon. Mojisola Lasbat Meranda, Chief Whip (Apapa Constituency 1) 2. Hon. Sangodara Rotimi, Deputy Chief Whip (Surulere II) 3. Hon. Mojisola Kehinde Alli-Macaulay (Amuwo Odofin)
25	NASARAWA (0)	
26	NIGER (1)	Hon. Binta Mamman (Gurara)
27	OGUN (4)	1. Hon. Atinuke Bello, Chief Whip (Odogbolu) 2. Hon. Sikirat Ajibola (Ipokia) 3. Hon. Bolanle Ajayi Lateefat (Yewa South) 4. Hon. Modupe Mujota (Abeokuta North)
28	ONDO (1)	Hon. Semilore Favour Tomomewo (Ilaje II)
29	OSUN (2)	1. Hon. Chief (Mrs) Elizabeth Adenike Abioye (Ifedayo) 2. Hon. Dr. Mulikat Abiola (Ifelodun)
30	OYO (1)	Hon. Wumi Bimbo Oladeji (Ogbomoso North)
31	PLATEAU (1)	Hon. Esther Simi Dusu (Jos Northwest)
32	RIVERS (1)	Hon. Linda Somiari-Stewart (Okrika)
33	SOKOTO (0)	
34	TARABA (0)	
35	YOBE (0)	
36	ZAMFARA (0)	



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About PLAC

Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) is a non-governmental organization committed to strengthening democratic governance and citizens' participation in Nigeria. PLAC works to enhance citizens' engagement with state institutions, and to promote transparency and accountability in policy and decision-making processes.

The main focus of PLAC's intervention in the democratic governance process is on building the capacity of the legislature and reforming the electoral process. Since its establishment, PLAC has grown into a leading institution with capacity to deliver cutting-edge research, policy analysis and advocacy. PLAC receives funding support from donors and other philanthropic sources.

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