THE SENATE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
AD-Hoc Committee on Nigeria Security Challenges

REPORT
OF THE
AD-HOC COMMITTEE
ON
NIGERIA SECURITY CHALLENGES: URGENT NEED TO RESTRUCTURE, REVIEW AND REORGANIZE THE CURRENT SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

Tuesday, 17th MARCH, 2020
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REPORT OF THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON NIGERIA SECURITY CHALLENGES: URGENT NEED TO Restructure, REVIEW AND REORGANISE THE CURRENT SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Senate at its sitting on Wednesday, 29th January, 2020 considered a motion moved by the Leader of the Senate, Senator Yahaya Abdullahi on: Nigeria Security Challenges: Urgent Need to Restructure, Review and Reorganize the Current Security Architecture, and resolved among other things to:

constitute an Ad-Hoc Committee to:-

a. engage the Security Agencies and report to the Senate;

b. engage the National Security Adviser on the implementation modalities of the December, 2019 National Security Strategies;

c. engage the National Security Institutions to discuss their operational structures, funding, equipment and staff disposition with a view to reviewing the national security architecture to make it more responsive in tackling the myriad of security challenges facing the nation and the people; and

d. produce a blueprint on the ways and means of tackling the current insecurity challenges for the consideration of the Senate.

The Ad-Hoc Committee was given two weeks to undertake the assignment and report back to the Senate.

2.0 MEMBERSHIP OF THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE
The Ad-Hoc Committee comprises of the following members:

1. Distinguished Senator Yahaya A. Abdullahi - Chairman
2. Distinguished Senator Eyinaya H. Abaribe - Member
3. Distinguished Senator Aliyu S. Abdullahi - Member
4. Distinguished Senator Mohammed A. Ndume - Member
5. Distinguished Senator Aliyu M. Wamakko - Member
6. Distinguished Senator Dauda H. Jika - Member
7. Distinguished Senator Kashim Shettima - Member
8. Distinguished Senator Bala Ibn Na'Allah - Member
9. Distinguished Senator George T. Sekibo - Member
10. Distinguished Senator Ibrahim A. Gobir - Member
11. Distinguished Senator Suleiman A. Kwari - Member
12. Distinguished Senator Kabiru I. Gaya - Member
13. Distinguished Senator Gershom H. Bassey - Member
14. Distinguished Senator Stella A. Oduah - Member
15. Distinguished Senator Ibikunle O. Amosun - Member
16. Distinguished Senator Abba P. Moro - Member
17. Distinguished Senator Abubakar Y. Yusuf - Member
18. Distinguished Senator Abdullahi Adamu - Member
19. Distinguished Senator Oluremi Tinubu - Member

The Ad-Hoc Committee co-opted the following Members:

1. Distinguished Senator Ibrahim Hassan Hadejia.
2. Distinguished Senator Elisha Cliff Ishaku.

2.1 SECRETARIAT

1. Mrs. Vivian N. Njemanze - Clerk to the Ad-hoc Committee.
2. Mr. Usman Gubio - Asst. Clerk to the Ad-hoc Committee.

2.2 TECHNICAL ASSISTANTS

1. Dr. Kabir Adamu - Special Adviser (Security and Intelligence) to the President of Senate.
2. Air Comdr Labaran Haliru RTD - SA to the Senate Leader.

3.0 BACKGROUND

In early 2018, the 8th Senate of the National Assembly set up an Ad-Hoc Committee to review the Security Infrastructure and Architecture in the country, following the upsurge of the various security threats that faced the country with direct impact on the lives and safety of the citizenry. These challenges included but are not limited to the following:

i. Boko Haram insurgency;
ii. Terrorism, violent extremism and separatist agitations;
iii. Armed banditry;
iv. Kidnapping;
v. Farmer-herders conflict and cattle rustling;
vi. Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons;
vii. Cross border crimes and drugs smuggling; and
viii. Organized crimes.

2) The culmination of these efforts was the Summit on National Security which was organized by the 8th Senate of the National Assembly and held between 8th and 12th February, 2018.

3) Copious observations were made which resulted in astute recommendations that were passed as resolutions of the Senate in order to address the multiplicity and severity of the security challenges.

4) Highlights of the 8th Senate resolutions are as follows;

   i. The need to comprehensively review the Nation’s Security Infrastructure and Architecture and the management of the National Security Institutions through Executive action and Legislations;

   ii. The need to isolate security challenges from political partisanship because of their existential threats in the unity of the nation and wellbeing of its people;

   iii. The overstretched nature of the Nation’s Security assets and the need for increased funding and reorganization;

   iv. The need for seamless collaboration among the various Security Institutions through operational platforms and the sharing of intelligence;

   v. The need to increase the utilization of Technology and other Force Multipliers in National Security and Intelligence Operations;

   vi. The need to examine options other than the use of naked force in resolving conflicts that could be solved through negotiations before they escalate into violent conflagrations;

   vii. The need to monitor and stop the influx of small arms and light weapons through the Country’s porous borders;

   viii. The need to engage the International Community, particularly our neighboring Countries in the fight against insurgency, terrorism and cross border violent crimes;
ix. The need to address the problems of internally displaced persons in the North East and throughout the country;

x. The need to make substantial investments in the Education & Health sectors and create job opportunities for the Nation’s growing youth population;

xi. The need to tackle the pervasive and devastating incidents of poverty and corruption in the Nation’s economy and body polity;

xii. The need to address the deterioration of the environment occasioned by climate change and population growth particularly in the Lake Chad basin; and

xiii. The need to address trade and consumption of illicit drugs and others.

5) As good and purposeful as these resolutions were, they appeared to have gone unheeded like several other recommendations, resolutions and White Papers before them. This failure to operationalize and implement well-meant resolutions and reports have been largely responsible for the deterioration of the situation and contributed to the recent escalation of the security crisis that face the nation. Almost every day you hear of fresh Boko Haram attacks; villages burnt and people killed by bandits, people kidnapped with excessive and unreasonable ransom demands, also cattle rustling and herder-farmers’ clashes and organized crimes are daily occurrences all over the country. It has now come to the point where these crises have apparently overwhelmed the capacity and capabilities of the security architecture and its institutions.

6) It is at this point that the Senate decided to intervene in keeping with its responsibilities and the Oaths subscribed by its Members to defend the unity of the Country and secure the lives and protect properties of its people.

7) Hence the major mandate of the Ad-Hoc Committee, as can be seen from its Terms of Reference, is to examine the Security Institutions that make up the security architecture and whose under performance is largely responsible for the escalation of the security crisis.
4.0 METHODOLOGY

In pursuance of the above objectives, the Ad-Hoc Committee held several meetings with Security and related Institutions and other critical Stakeholders on the contemporary security challenges.

2) The meetings were arranged over a Two (2) week period. The meeting also consulted several previous national security reports and documents which provided useful knowledge and information regarding previous efforts of reforming some of the security institutions.

3) The interactions were organized into groups, as follows;

GROUP A
1. Honourable Minister of Communications and Digital Economy.
2. Honourable Minister of State for Budget and National Planning.
3. Honourable Minister of Interior.
4. Honourable Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the Federation.
5. Comptroller-General, Nigeria Customs Service (NCS).
7. Executive Vice Chairman, Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC).
8. Managing Director, Galaxy Backbone.

GROUP B
3. Conservator General, National Parks Service (NPS).
5. Commandant General, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC).

GROUP C
1. Executive Governor of Ekiti State.
2. Executive Governor of Cross River State.
3. Executive Governor of Rivers State.
4. Executive Governor of Borno State.
5. Executive Governor of Taraba State.
6. Executive Governor of Benue State.
7. Executive Governor of Niger State.
8. Executive Governor of Zamfara State.
9. Executive Governor of Kaduna State.
10. Executive Governor of Anambra State.
11. Executive Governor of Ebonyi State.
12. Executive Governor of Lagos State.

GROUP D
1. Honourable Minister of Police Affairs.
2. Inspector General of Police with the AIGs of Various Zones.
4. Director General, Department of State Security Service (DSS).
5. Director General, Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA).
6. Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI).
7. Chairman, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).

GROUP E
1. Honourable Minister of Defence.
2. Chief of Defence Staff.
3. Chief of Army Staff.
4. Chief of Naval Staff.
5. Chief of Air Staff.

GROUP F
1. AVM Mohammed Ndatsu Umaru rtd.
2. Air Chief Marshal (rtd.) Oluseyi Petinrin.
3. Barr. Mike Ejiofor FSi, pum, KSI.
5. Civilian Joint Task Force.
8. Dr. Ona Ekhomu, President Association of Industrial Security and Safety Operation of Nigeria.
GROUP G
1. National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS).

5.0 SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS BY STAKEHOLDERS

A. MILITARY AND DEFENCE INSTITUTIONS

1. THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

1) In his presentation, the Hon. Minister of Defence began by commending the Senate for its genuine concern over the security of our country as demonstrated through the Ad Hoc Committee on Security Challenges.

2) He stated that since assumption of office in August 2019 as the Honourable Minister of Defence, he had taken major steps to reposition the Ministry and the Armed Forces for effective delivery on its mandate of securing the sovereignty and territorial integrity. He explained that his reform measures were in recognition of the security challenges currently confronting the nation including Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, armed banditry in the North West, Herders-Farmers clashes in the North-West and North-Central, kidnapping and other nefarious criminal activities in many parts of the country.

3) He expressed regret that the above insecurity challenges have overwhelmed the Nigeria Police and other paramilitary agencies compelling the armed forces to intervene in Internal Security Operations which is outside its traditional role. He stated that in spite of the additional responsibilities, the armed forces of Nigeria have been able to achieve commendable results in the war against insurgency in the North East. He noted however, that the security situation has recently become complicated with the remnants of insurgents and other criminal elements fueling terrorism noting that globally, terrorism is a peculiar phenomenon which has proved difficult to stamp out as early as would be desired.

4) He stated that at the moment, the involvement of the armed forces in ISOS has seriously affected the performance of its traditional responsibilities of defending the territorial integrity of the country. The armed forces is presently compelled to continue to hold on to territories in the North East which were previously liberated.
from the Boko Haram terrorists. Ordinarily such areas should have been handed over to the Nigeria Police for protection of lives and property.

5) The Honourable Minister informed the Committee that the Federal Ministry of Defence has in the recent times embarked on a number of initiatives designed to further strengthen the Defence sector to perform optimally. He highlighted some of the initiatives to include recent investment of Government in procurement of equipment, training and welfare of the Armed Forces, review of the National Defence Policy approved in 2017, Reform of the Ministry of Defence following realization of some worrisome gaps in the structure and operations of the Armed Forces in the interface between the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, promotion of synergy between civilian and military components, among the services and among the security agencies in the country etc.

6) He suggested that in the spirit of the revised Nigerian National Defence Policy and bearing in mind the capital intensiveness of providing security, it is imperative for government to look beyond the annual budgets and its envelope system to fund the armed forces of Nigeria. Accordingly, the Honourable Minister recommended adequate funding of the armed forces of Nigeria through special legislative intervention such as the introduction of Armed Forces Communication Tax, Dedication of a percentage of the Federation Account as the Armed Forces of Nigeria Fund, Dedication of a percentage of VAT Revenue for further funding of the AFN and release of the AFN funds as First Line Charge.

7) In conclusion, the Honourable Minister submitted that the war is not between the insurgents and criminals and the AFN rather it is a war between insurgents and Nigerians. Nigerian leaders must therefore promote economic activities, enhance the welfare of the people and create employment for our teeming youths. The problem of ignorance must also be tackled since ignorance is another factor fueling insecurity. He cautioned that as long as there is continued existence of ungoverned spaces, there will be insecurity.

8) In his response to one of the questions posed by a member of the Committee, the Hon. Minister admitted that on assumption of office, he realized that a lot needs to be done in order to build an army that will stand the test of time. He lamented that the Nigerian Army even if we are to compare it with that of Sudan, we have nothing to show. He said SUDAN manufacture its own equipment but in our own case even
though we started DICON like India and Brazil, today we have nothing to show for it.

2. CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

1) In his presentation, the Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. A.G Olonisakin, narrowed his submission to the Committee into two broad areas namely, the current operations and interventions of the Armed Forces in the war against terrorism, and challenges facing the Nigerian military in their effort to deliver on their constitutional mandate under section 217 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended.

2) On the state of ongoing operations by the Nigerian Armed Forces, the CDS submitted that the AFN is currently conducting various operations across the country as part of efforts to address the security challenges. He listed these military operations to include –

a. Operation Lafiya Dole established in July 2015 as the AFN onslaught against the Boko Haram insurgents in the North East States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States;

b. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established by the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) States (Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger Republic and Benin) to deal with cross border activities of Boko Haram and other terrorists groups in the LCB States with 4 sectors operating in Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger respectively to checkmate terrorism;

c. Operation Hadarin Daji (OPHD) headquartered in Gusau, Zamfara State. It was activated on 10th May, 2019 to deal with security challenges such as armed banditry, cattle rustling and kidnapping in Zamfara State;

d. Operation Whirl Punch (OPWP) was activated in November 2018 to combat banditry, cattle rustling, kidnapping, armed robbery and other forms of criminalities along Kaduna-Birnin Gwari Road and its environs as well as Forest Reserves in Kaduna and Niger States;
e. Operation Thunder Strike activated in May 2019 to deal with the problem of kidnapping/sundry crimes and ensure free movement of commuters along Abuja-Kaduna highways and rail lines;

f. Operation Safe Haven was activated in January 2010 to deal with insecurity involving indigene/settler crisis in Plateau State with areas of operation covering Kaduna and Bauchi States;

g. Operation Whirl Stroke activated in June 2018 to address farmers-herdsmen clashes and banditry activities in Benue, Nasarawa and Taraba States;

h. Operation Delta Safe activated in June 2018 to protect oil and gas infrastructure and checkmate militancy, sea robbery, crude oil theft and other forms of criminalities that could impact negatively on economic activities in the Niger Delta;

i. Operation Awatse activated in June 2015 to dominate and secure NNPC Petroleum pipeline infrastructure from Atlas Cove Terminal to Mosimi covering Lagos and Ogun States;

j. Operation Safe Corridor activated in April, 2016 to conduct a Deradicalization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration for surrendered insurgents. This is located in Gombe State.

3) In terms of the major challenges facing the AFN, the CDS submitted that a number of challenges militate against the operational capability of the AFN in the performance of their constitutional duty of assisting the civil authority in Internal Security Operations (ISO). These challenges include inadequate manpower, Dearth of military hardware, difficulty in procuring military hardware, porous borders and inadequate, maritime and air assets.

4) In terms of recommendations, the CDS aligned himself with the recommendations of the Minister of Defence on the ways to strengthen and reposition the AFN to perform optimally.

5) In his response to questions by members of the Committee, the CDS said that the expected synergy is a work in progress. He said that when discussing insecurity, the
judiciary should not be left out. He also decried the involvement of the youths with drugs saying that it is denying the army of quality manpower because during last year’s recruitment exercise for instance, out of 800 applicant that passed the exams, only 200 passed the medical test because of the problem of drug abuse.

3. CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF (COAS)

1) In his presentation the COAS emphasized that the AFN is a critical component of Nigeria’s defence and security as recognized by section 217 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended. He stated that the mission of the AFN is to “win all battles in defence of the Nation”.

2) He explained that the threat against the security of Nigeria has both domestic and external dimension at both regional and global levels. At the global level he said attacks by ISIS in Syria, Al Qaeda in the Magreb and the ISIS in Greater Sahara are growing. At the domestic level he said the combined activities of Boko Haram in the North Eastern States and incessant acts of armed banditry in the North Central and North West States continue to persist despite efforts by some State Governors to stem the violent trend. Additionally, he said communal conflicts remain endemic in the North Central States of Benue and Taraba while pipeline vandalism and oil bunkering are on the rise. On the socio-political front, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) continue to carry out their attacks.

3) In terms of ongoing operations by the NA to curb existing security threats in the country, the COAS indicated that NA is involved in several operations across the country namely Operation Lafiya Dole, Hadarin Daji, Mesa and Safe Conduct. Additionally, the NA is involved in exercises such as Ayem A’ kpatuma, Crocodile Smile and Atilogwu Udo.

4) He however stated that unique nature of contemporary security challenges facing the nation since the beginning of Boko Haram in 2009, the NA has managed to adopt its conventional war fighting equipment to fight the new war it faces. He said the equipment needs of the NA include main battle tanks, Armored Personnel Carriers, Mine Resistance and Ambush Protected Vehicles, etc. Most of this equipment he said, are now in State of disrepair. He said that in a bid to mitigate this challenge, the NA recently restructured the Nigerian Army Central Workshop and Rigachukun, Kaduna State to ensure provision of requisite equipment and other
classes of equipment. Also, there is ongoing collaboration between the Command Engineering Depot and the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) which has begun to yield result as DICON has produced the first indigenous Mines Resistance and Ambush Protected vehicles named 'Ezugwu MRAP'.

5) The COAS stressed the need for the NA to have an aviation corps and disclosed to the Committee that an aviation corps was established for the NA in 2014 but still lacks the platform to function effectively. He suggested that the NA aviation corps needs light utility helicopters for its operations and appropriate helicopter simulators for training as well as operational bases etc. He also lamented that manpower and funding are also major challenges faced by the NA.

6) In terms of recommendations, the COAS recommended that the National Assembly should increase budgetary allocation to the NA in line with requirement to surmount contemporary security challenges; continue to advocate for improved welfare package for defence and security sector; and sustain collaborative efforts between the National Assembly and agencies in the defence and security sector. He finally aligned himself with the recommendations of the Minister of Defence.

7) In his response to questions by members of the Committee, the COAS decried a situation where the Nigerian Army is being ridiculed in the public in spite of sacrifices made daily by men and officers on the battle field. He stated that the problem confronting Nigeria is a national problem saying that if we denigrate the armed forces, the whole system will collapse.

8) On the need to restructure the defence and security architecture of the country, he responded by saying that we must first ask ourselves whether the existing architecture has been tested enough to determine its suitability or not.

4. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF (CNS)

1) In his presentation, the Chief of Naval Staff highlighted the major operations of the Nigerian Navy (NN) in the maritime areas of the country particularly operations against crude oil theft and the involvement of the Navy in Joint operations meant combat insecurity in the country.

2) He stated that the operations of the NN over the years has contributed significantly to improved security within the nation’s maritime domain leading to arrest of
several persons and vessels involved in piracy and other criminal activities. He explained that the operations of the NN in the last four years have denied oil thieves, pirates and other criminal elements of over N100 billion illegal funds which could have been used to procure illegal weapons and illicit drugs for criminal activities.

3) He explained that between 2016 and 2019, close to 200 vessels have been arrested in connection with piracy cases and in the last 3 months 26 suspected rogue vessels and 190 persons were arrested by the NN while attempting to flee Nigerian waters with stolen crude oil and related criminal activities. The destination of these stolen petroleum products is our neighboring countries. The NN has continued to mount public enlightenment against piracy and crude oil theft.

4) In terms of strategy, the CNS explained that the strategy of the NN is to employ surveillance, response and law enforcement in its operations. He said in the area of coastal surveillance, the NN has achieved dominance but the radar needed to be installed to achieve land surveillance is yet to be installed because the River State Government is yet to grant approval for the land required to install the radar.

5) He recommended that there is a need for immediate prosecution of arrested vessels either through the establishment of Special Maritime Courts. He also decried the loss of 5 vessels belonging to NN in the Escravos areas. He further suggested that there is need for proper dredging to enhance the operations of the NN in the maritime area of Nigeria. He said funding is also a major challenge for the NN and therefore urge the Committee to consider the recommendations of the Minister of Defence on the funding of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

6) In his response to questions and comments posed by members of the Committee, the Chief of Naval Staff explained we need to learn from the United States in terms of how the U.S addressed the problem of lack of synergy between security and defence operatives by establishing the Department of Homeland security. He explained that since the end of the Nigerian civil war, this will be the first time the armed forces will be working together to provide security so some of the lapses should not be blown out of proportion.

7) He suggested that there was a platform for synergy known as the Harmonized Standard operating Procedure which was launched by the Vice President in 2016 and it is to guide all security agencies to work together and that document should be legislated into law.
5. THE CHIEF OF AIR STAFF

1) In his own presentation before the Committee, the Chief of Air Staff thanked the Senate for its concern over security in the country. He narrowed down his presentation to address two fundamental issues namely, what the Nigerian Air Force is doing and the challenges faced in its effort to tackle insecurity in the country.

2) He stated that Nigerian Air Force is involved in military operations in all the 6 geopolitical zones to support with air power and interdiction of Boko Haram insurgents. He said the Nigerian Air Force has been restructured to protect Nigeria’s air spaces and to support the military with air power when needed.

3) He explained that the Nigerian Air Force is currently facing manpower gaps even though more recruitment has been done in the recent past, the NAF still lacks adequate manpower to prosecute the war. The NAF has also resorted to Research and Development (R & D) to maintain its aircraft because there is always unreasonable delay in getting spare parts especially for our Russian Air Crafts so there is now effort towards local fabrication of spare parts for our aircrafts. The NAF has also trained over 100 pilots and have over 160 pilots in training within and outside the country. The NAF also needs to train to protect its bases from attacks.

4) In terms of challenges he submitted that the issue of governance is a major challenge because security and development are two sides of the same coin especially at the Local Government Level. It is therefore important for government to ensure provision of employment, infrastructure and agricultural development. He stated that flying aircraft is very expensive because they require aviation fuel which is very expensive. He explained that for every 24 hours, an aircraft must be maintained and consumables must be procured. So funding is a major challenge that must be addressed. Once there is no funding or delay in the release of approved funds, the aircraft will be grounded. Funding through budget is therefore problematic. He suggested that the parliament has a role to play in interacting with their American counterparts on the issue of procurement of military hardware.

5) In his response to questions by members of the Committee, the Chief of Air Staff suggested that on the issue of R&D, there is a need for a law to guide the nation.
on national research priority. He also explained winning the war is becoming difficult due a number of factors and recently most of the ISIS fighters have migrated to join Boko Haram fighters bringing their combined experiences to bear on Boko Haram attacks on our soil. He also explained that while Boko Haram uses women and children as human shields, the Nigerian Air Force can never bomb without caution so it is wrong to exaggerate the problem of lack of synergy.

B. INTERNAL SECURITY AND LAW AND ORDER INSTITUTIONS

1. PRESENTATION BY MOHAMMED ABUBAKAR ADAMU, THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (IGP) HELD ON MONDAY, 10TH MARCH, 2020.

In response to the questions by the Members of the Ad-Hoc Committee, the IGP gave the organogram/structure for Nigeria Police as follows:

Note: 6 DIOs + Force Secretary. (Management Team)

Note: 12 Zones, Department in the FHQs, Police Academy and Police Staff College.

Note: States, Department, Police Staff College, Force Academy and Police College Jos.

Fig2: organogram/structure for Nigeria Police.
He also gave the zones as follows:

a. Zone 1 - Kano, katsina and Jigawa States
   **Headquarter** - Kano

b. Zone 2 - Lagos and Ogun States
   **Headquarter** - Lagos

c. Zone 3 - Yobe Adamawa and Borno States
   **Headquarter** - Yobe

d. Zone 4 - Benue, Nasarawa and plateau States
   **Headquarter** - Makurdi

e. Zone 5 - Edo and Delta State
   **Headquarters** - Benin

f. Zone 6 - Cross River, Rivers and Bayelsa States
   **Headquarter** - Calabar

g. Zone 7 - Abuja, Kaduna and Niger States
   **Headquarter** - Abuja

h. Zone 8 - Kwara, Ekiti and Kogi States
   **Headquarter** - Lokoja

i. Zone 9 - Imo, Anambra, Enugu, Abia and Ebonyi States
   **Headquarters** - Umuahia

j. Zone 10 - Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara States
   **Headquarters** - Sokoto

k. Zone 11 - Osun, Ondo and Oyo States
   **Headquarters** - Oshobo

l. Zone 12 - Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba
   **Headquarters** - Bauchi

2) On recruitment, the IGP stated that Personnel are recruited at the Local Government Levels, while States supply names of eligible applicants. Police Service
Commission does the recruitment process after which the different strata are segregated into constables, inspectors etc. and sent back to the States accordingly.

3) On the observation by a member on the need to have skilled personnel who can adapt to the local environment and be equipped to tackle the criminality of the locality; the IGP agreed on the need to reform, expand and beef up the number of marine Police-formations and get additional equipment such as specialized gun boats and specialized personnel with special skills to operate in riverine and inland water terrains.

4) A member wanted to know the modalities and possibilities of harnessing the man power of repentant criminals and converting them into vigilante groups so that they can be used to track criminals in the communities and such become useful contributions for intelligence gathering and community policing. In response to this, the IGP opined that this issue can be resolved at the Local Government Level where the recruitment of community Policemen and women is to be handled.

5) Another Member observed the congestion of the five Eastern States into a single zone noting that while the Eastern States have a total land mass of 29,000km with over 16 million population, Niger State with 29 million population has a land mass of 733 km. The ratio of each being 850 to 52 persons per km for Eastern and Niger States respectively. He recognized population density as a factor to be considered in recommendation for zoning.

6) Another Member noted the lack of synergy and intra-Agency rivalry as bane to operational success of the Outfits/Agencies.

7) The IGP demanded for improved welfare of Personnel through insurance policies and pension benefits for Retirees.

8) He further called for streamlining of overlapping jurisdictions existing among sister Agencies through Legislation noting that the original Act establishing Civil Defence did not assign it the role of keeping law and order.

2. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

The Honorable Minister of Interior in his presentation to the Committee and in response to questions and comments from Distinguished Members made the following statements:
i. That the current security threats in the country such as terrorism, insurgency, ethno-religious crises, farmers-herders' clashes, armed banditry, kidnapping for ransom, militancy and vandalism of national assets among others were inherited by this administration in 2015;

ii. That the present administration focused on addressing these issues and has reduced the activities of terrorists and insurgents to occasional attacks on soft targets;

iii. That the ethno-religious and farmers-herders' crises have also been drastically contained;

iv. That the militancy in some regions have been tackled and activities of vandals have been significantly reduced;

v. That the government continues to tackle the menace of armed banditry and kidnapping for ransom;

vi. That the Ministry through the Nigeria Immigration Service and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corp is taking steps to towards improving the internal security in the country;

vii. That currently a number of activities/programmes and policy measures are being carried out by the NIS to ensure the security concerns related to immigration and border security are addressed;

viii. That the New Visa Policy will in line with the administrations objectives aid to diversify the nation's economy for national development;

ix. That despite liberalizing the visa processing and facilitation of passenger clearance processes at all entry points in the country, measures are put in place to ensure that National Security and Interest are not compromised;

x. That the new e-passport with polycarbonate data page was rolled out in 2019 with additional twenty-one (21) security features as tamper-proof against forgery, to ensure that Nigerian passport does not get into the hands of non-Nigerian or forged by criminals for the purpose gaining access into the country;
xi. That the passport database has been harmonized with the National Identity Management System towards achieving one identity for each Nigerian;

xii. That the Nigerian Immigration Service has developed a comprehensive Border Management Information System (BMIS), a platform upon which all border management solution are aggregated, thereby aligning the BMIS with Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) at its core; and to strike a balance between speedy clearance of passengers and National Security;

xiii. That among the advantages of MIDAS is the ability to capture the biometrics and biographic features of visitors coming into the country and allows easy adaption to Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) functions which are now mandated by ICAO and UN Security Council Resolution 2396 of 2017. This strategy, he said will also fully integrate border data, visa information, suspect index, national alert list and INTERPOL I - 24/7 with MIDAS;

xiv. That the BMIS Strategy is to enable control and intelligence gathering before, on arrival and after arrival and operate in line with global best practices and that this strategy and its implementation are articulated in the National Border Management Strategy, 2019 – 2023;

xv. That the NIS Migrated from the manual and paper based Alien Registry to an electronic Migrant Registry System effective from 12th July, 2019 when Mr. President commissioned the e-Migrants Registration Centre in Abuja and also flagged off the nation-wide electronic/biometric registration of migrants in Nigeria, during which he granted six (6) months amnesty period for undocumented migrants;

xvi. That the purpose is to provide an effective migrant identity management System in the country to aid identification, control and monitoring migrants within Nigeria. This, he said, will aid intelligence gathering and sharing with its significant positive impact on National Security;

xvii. That as of 14th January, 2020, a total of 217,644 migrants, out of which 68% (148,705) are regular migrants, have been registered. xviii. That twelve (12)
Border Patrol Forward Operation Base (FOB) have been established with four (4) already commissioned in Mazanyan/Libya in Katsina State, Maigateri in Jigawa State, Saki in Oyo State and Ojaodun/Ldroko in Ogun State, for Strategic purposes of quick response, detection and prevention of irregular migration and trans-border crime along the flanks of Nigerian borders;

xviii. That the e-border solution project recently approved by the Federal Government for easy monitoring of border security using ICT will be of immense benefit to national security when fully operational; and

xix. That the Biometric Visa Regime introduced in 2017 to ensure visa system through which biometric of applicants are captured and details profiled before granting approval on arrival of such persons in Nigeria is currently being implemented in nineteen (19) location across the world.

3. MINISTRY OF POLICE AFFAIRS REPRESENTED BY MUHAMMAD MAIGARI DINGYADI, THE HONOURABLE MINISTER OF POLICE AFFAIRS

The Hon. Minister of Police Affairs, made the following submissions;

i. That in the effort to strengthen the internal security architecture of the country, the Federal Government re-established the Ministry of Police Affairs out of the Ministry of Interior in August, 2019;

ii. That the mandate of the Ministry is to among others; initiate, formulate and implement policies and programmes relating policing and internal security and provide administrative support to the Nigerian Police Force, the Police Academy, and the newly established Police Trust Fund;

iii. That the Ministry is also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the overall implementation of policies, programmes and projects relating to policing and internal security, as well as sanitize and engage appropriate stakeholders to promote funding and investment on policing and national security;

iv. That the policy thrust and guiding principle of the Ministry in the attainment of its mandate includes:
a. Building effective synergy, co-operation and understanding between the Ministry and the Nigerian Police;

b. Increasing the number of Police Personnel for effective policing of the country;

c. Building a well-motivated Police Force with enhanced welfare and condition of service;

d. Involvement of communities, individuals and organization in Policing to support Security Architecture of the country through deliberate policies such as community policing; and

e. Instituting a mechanism that will ensure regular and effective training in the Nigerian Police Force.

f. That since the re-establishment of the Ministry in August 2019, it has made remarkable progress in the attainment of its mandate such as:

i. Re-establishment of functional Departments in the Ministry and the constitution and inauguration of ministerial project coordinating Committee;

ii. Recruitment of ten thousand (10,000) Police Constables recently into the Nigerian Police Force;

iii. Graduation and passing out parade of over 600 Police Cadets at the Police Academy Wudil, Kano State;

iv. Establishment of Police crime and incident database centre;

v. Commissioning of State of Art Nigerian Police Force National Command and Control Centre; and

vi. Rehabilitation of the GSM Tracking System at Katampe, Abuja, etc.

vii. That some of the challenges facing the Ministry include:
a. Inadequate funding for both the Ministry and the Nigeria Police Force;

b. Inadequate personnel for the Nigeria Police Force;

c. There are several supervising bodies for the Nigerian Police Force, thereby creating distraction and duplication of function;

d. Delay in the passage of the Police Reform Bill;

e. Lack of adequate and befitting office accommodation.

The Honourable Minister of Police affairs made the following recommendations:

i. That constitutional provision for the regulation of the Nigerian Police Force be reviewed to enhance proper supervision and coordination of the Nigerian Police Force by the Hon. Minister of Police Affairs;

ii. That appropriate legal framework should be put in place to ensure stable institutional arrangement and continuity of the Ministry of Police Affairs;

iii. That the Ministry should be properly funded to enable it perform its role of providing policy direction, administrative support, supervision and coordination of the Nigerian Police Force;

iv. That a permanent and befitting office accommodation should be provided for the Ministry; and

v. That the Nigerian Police Force should be adequately funded to enable it perform its functions in dealing with the numerous security challenges confronting the country.

4. NIGERIA POLICE FORCE REPRESENTED BY DIG ABDULMAJID ALI, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS, FORCE HEADQUARTERS, ABUJA.

The DIG Abdulmajid Ali, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Department of Operations, made the following submissions:
a. The challenges faced by the Nigeria Police are well known by the Government, including the legislature. However, a quick reminder is given below:
   a. Inadequate funding;
   b. Inadequate logistics;
   c. Inadequate technical Equipment and Data Base;
   d. Inadequate manpower;
   e. Lack of strong legislation to punish offenders;
   f. Lack of cooperation with various key stakeholders;
   g. Lack of synergy in intelligence sharing among security agencies and other stakeholders;
   h. Slow and delayed trial of suspects.

b. The following are the needs and recommendations:
   a. Provision of adequate fund;
   b. Personnel capacity building, through training and re-training;
   c. Recruitment of additional man power;
   d. Withdrawal of Police Personnel from authorized VIPs/Downsizing of the number of Police Personnel attached to VIPs;
   e. Procurement of modern Equipment;
   f. Provision of Helicopters/Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), at least 2 per State/FCT;
   g. Provision of Office/Residential Accommodation;
   h. Better Re-numerations for the Personnel;
   i. Better Retirement Scheme (Pension/Gratuity)
   j. Robust Community Policing Strategy;
   k. Establishment of a Comprehensive Data Base to boost forensic/Scientific Investigation;
   l. Review of obsolete Laws to improve the criminal justice system especially in the area of appropriate and commensurate award of punishment;
m. Improved Synergy among sister security agencies and other stakeholders in intelligence sharing and joint operations.

5. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION REPRESENTED BY ALHAJI MUSILIU A. K. SMITH CFR, FWC, IGP (rttd.), THE HONOURABLE CHAIRMAN, POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION

The Honourable Chairman of the Police Service Commission, in his presentation to the Committee and in response to questions and comments from Distinguished Members, made the following submissions:

i. That the current strength of the Nigerian Police is put at about Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand (350,000);

ii. That this number of personnel is grossly inadequate to Police the country with a land size of 923,763 sqkm and a population of over 200,000,000 people and that the present Police-population ratio of 1:600 is far higher than the 1:400 recommended by the United Nations;

iii. That it is from the indicated Police strength that personnel are deployed to the Presidential Villa, National Assembly, Judiciary, top government officials at the federal and State levels, foreign embassies, prominent traditional rulers, banks; key vulnerable points and Police formations across the country;

iv. That the Police have continued to lose its personnel on daily basis because of the serious insecurity situation in the country and that in year 2019, Two Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty Six (2,866) officers from the rank of ASP - DIG retired from the Service, thereby depleting the strength of personnel;

v. That urgent attention should be given to increasing the strength of Police force to at least Five Hundred Thousand (500,000) covering Cadet ASPs, Inspectors and Constables;

vi. That initial training for Cadet Officers be shortened to nine months while that of Recruit Constables should run for six months;

vii. That available records have shown that Officers of the Nigerian Police Force perform far better outside the shores of Nigeria when on international assignments than when at home because they are properly motivated;
viii. That training facilities available to the Force have become substandard and obsolete and therefore, the urgent need to upgrade and modernize facilities at Police Colleges and training schools;

ix. That proper screening, vetting and thorough background checks on applicants during recruitment exercises should be intensified;

x. Training syllabus and modules for Police Officers should reviewed to include ICT and Intelligence driven policing and to reflect present realities on National Security;

xi. That steps should be taken to stop the misuse of fire arms by Police personnel against citizens are supposed to protect;

xii. That the State of Police stations, officers and residential accommodation across the country have become deplorable and that efforts should be made to increase capital allocation for their maintenance:

i. That the number of Police personnel who enjoy residential accommodation is not up to a quarter of the total strength of the entire force and this makes it difficult to mobilise them for operations when the need arises;

ii. That highway crimes have increased due to lack of effective patrol teams on the highways. There is the need to revive Federal Highway Patrol nationwide to deal the problem;

iii. That thick forests in the country such as Sambisa, Dogon, Daji, Falgone and many others which have become operational hideouts for bandits and kidnappers be turned to training grounds for security agencies;

iv. That government should pursue the revival of the Defense Industries, Corporation of Nigeria established since 1964 with the mandate of producing defense equipment; and

vi. That the Police Service Commission is poorly funded.
6. NIGERIA IMMIGRATION SERVICE (NIS)

The Comptroller General of Nigeria Immigration Service, Muhammed Babandede, MFR submitted as follows;

i. VISA POLICY: The NIS operates a comprehensive biometric based new Visa Policy that addresses all areas of interest and concern. The service also reviewed visa applications to include embassies, visa application centres, Visa on Arrival and the introduction of electronic (eVisa);

ii. New Enhanced e-Passport with polycarbonate data page has additional 21 security features as tamper-proof against forgery and was rolled out in 2019. This is to ensure that Nigerian Passport does not get into the hands of non-Nigerian or forged by criminals for the purpose of gaining access into the country;

iii. The Passport database has also been harmonised with the National Identity Management System towards achieving one identity for each Nigerian;

iv. The NIS has put in place well equipped Document Fraud Unit at the Service Headquarters and a unit established at all entry points for verification and validation of genuine travel documents. The ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) and Public Key Infrastructure for secured verification and validation of Passports at entry points is also being implemented as a means to strengthen border control and security;

v. Border Management Information System (BMIS) The NIS has developed a comprehensive Border Management Information System (BMIS) which is a platform upon which all border management solutions are aggregated. The system fully aligned NIS Border Management Information System (BMIS) with Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) at its core. This strikes a balance between speedy clearance of passengers and national security. It allows easy adaption to Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) functions which are now mandated by ICAO and by UN Security council resolution 2396 of 2017. The strategy will also fully integrate border data, visa information, suspect index, national alert list and INTERPOL I-24/7 with MIDAS;
vi. Migrants e-Registration The NIS migrated from the manual and paper based Alien Registry to an electronic Migrant Registry system and flagged off the nation-wide electronic/biometric registration of migrants in Nigeria on 12th July, 2019 and granted six (6) months amnesty period for undocumented migrants. This is strategic in order to have the record of migrants in our midst;

vii. Border patrol forward operation base (FOB) Presently, 12 FOBs have been established with four commissioned in Mazanya/Jibiya in Katsina State, Maiqatar in Jigawa State, Saki in Oyo State, and Ojaodun / Idiroko in Ogun State. The establishment is strategic to the operations of NIS for quick response, detection and prevention of irregular migration and trans-border criminalities along the flanks of Nigerian borders. As a result of this approach, 106 irregular migrants were intercepted, 72 smugglers arrested, 255 human traffickers arrested in 2019;

viii. e-Border Solution for easy monitoring of security situation and work efficiency by using ICT system in border control. When the project comes into operation it would be manned and monitored 24 hours.

ix. Border Drill the NIS is jointly participating with other security agency under the coordination of the Office of the National Security Adviser. The exercise has greatly contributed to the reduction in number of irregular border crossing from neighbouring countries;

x. Biometric Visa Regime The Federal Government flagged off the biometric visa regime in 2017 to ensure a secured visa system through which biometric of applicants are captured and details profiled before granting approval on arrival of such person in Nigeria;

xi. Technology building, the building is strategic to technological advancement of the Service to assume a full-fledged IT-driven organization. The building will house the database of the Service that are currently in silos. It will enhance delivery of the operational mandate of the Service through

b. Real-time-online connectivity with other agencies and Nigerian Missions abroad for data sharing.
c. Search engine will contribute to fighting transnational organized crime – INTERPOL i/24/7 & local list of wanted person.
xii. Harmonization and Integration of systems with each other such as Passport, Visas, MIDAS, Residence Permits, National and International Watch lists, Migration Records and Monitoring through entry points will be possible when the building is completed and this will go a long way in enhancing our border security, National Security and Public safety and Economic prosperity of the country.

xiii. On the ECOWAS Treaty on free movement of Persons Comptroller General of Nigeria Immigration Service highlighted some safeguards in the treaty to include:

a. FREE MOVEMENT PROTOCOL:

   Community Citizens need to have;
   i. a valid travel document and
   ii. an international health certificate in the territory of Member States

b. VISA FREE ENTRY:

   i. if visit does not exceed 90 days and
   ii. enters through the official entry point
   iii. if the citizen has cause to stay longer than 90 days, he/she is required to obtain a permission for this extension

Member States have the right to refuse "inadmissible immigrants" Definition of inadmissible immigrant – laid down in the respective national legislation.

c. EXPULSION OF ECOWAS CITIZENS

A decision to expel any citizen of the Community from the territory of a Member State shall be notified to the citizen concerned as well as the government of which he is a citizen and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. The expenses incurred in the expulsion of a citizen shall be borne by the Member State which expels him.

7. NIGERIA CUSTOMS SERVICE

The Nigeria Customs service made the following submissions;

i. Provision of suitable equipments capable of monitoring and detecting illegal activities within 72 radii should be looked into by collaborating with
technically equipped corporate vendors for surveillance technologies applications such as drones and scanners;

ii. Completion and implementation of e-Customs project should equally be addressed without further delays;

iii. Adequate funding should as well be addressed to cater for logistics and other miscellaneous during adhoc assignments;

iv. Sensitization of the border communities to see customs and other security agencies as their friends working for the progress of the Nation and their communities;

v. Provision of befitting accommodation and other outfits in the border areas to give the officers and the leads a sense of belonging;

vi. Create a robust joint meeting of communities, the NCS and other security agencies to discuss emerging threats and find solution to them.

8. NIGERIAN SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS

1) That the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSDC) is a paramilitary agency of the Federal Government mandated by the Act of the National Assembly of 2003 as amended in 2017 to perform specific function which include:
   i. Protect Critical Assets and infrastructure;

   ii. Register, train, license and monitor the activities of Private Guards Companies in Nigeria; and

   iii. Efficiently carry out disaster management through rescue and rehabilitation as well as mitigation among others.

2) That the agency has efficiently carried out this functions and attained milestone across the country.

9. NIGERIAN CORRECTIONAL SERVICE

The Deputy Comptroller General of the Nigerian Correctional Services (NCS), John Mrabure, stated as follows;
i. That the NCS Currently has more than 2000 high risk prisoners in its custody;

ii. That the overcrowding facilities are as a result of large number of awaiting trial persons;

iii. That some of its facilities predate Nigeria's Independence and as such old and decaying;

iv. That most of its custodial centres are caught up by urbanisation which does not give room for expansion and always prone to external attack;

v. That there are insufficient cellblocks in custodial centres in urban areas;

vi. That there is general decay of its infrastructural facilities;

vii. That its manpower for professional and non-professional duties are grossly inadequate;

viii. That the Service has limited number of Arms and Ammunitions to guard and protect the 244 custodial centres all over the Federation and inadequate operational vehicles for court duties and court escort; and

ix. That the Service does not have funds for training and retraining of staff to align to the new Nigeria Correctional Service (NCoS) Act.

10. FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY CORPS

The Ad-Hoc Committees' interactions with Deputy Corps Marshal Ojeme Ewurdjakpor revealed:

i. That the corps engages in clearing obstructions on any part of the highways and abandoned vehicles that serve as bases of operations for criminal elements is a top priority of the Corps;

ii. That the Corps' deployment of the National Traffic Radio 107.1, Abuja is targeted at public education programs to improve public awareness on procedures for vehicle registration, change of ownership, obtaining driver's license and general regulation;

iii. That the Corps is firming up of the Road Transport Safety Standardization Scheme (RTSSS) such that all travelers' true and verifiable identities and of passengers become readily obtainable/ from transport organizations;
iv. That the corps maintains data of vehicle registration to avoid re-registration of stolen vehicles;

v. That the monitoring the movement of people and freight and inform the Nigeria Police Force, DSS on strange and suspicious movements;

vi. That it also maintains information portals and provide same to other Security Agencies in furtherance of National security;

vii. That it is an active participant of the 122 emergency number;

viii. That the capacity of the corps is challenged by the a staff strength of about 26,000 which serves the Nigeria population of about 200 million translating to a ratio of 1 FRSC officer to more than 7000 Nigerians;

ix. That its collaboration with State Governments under the Joint Task Board is challenged by the failure of the States to upload identities/data of allottees of number plates to the National Vehicles Registration Data Base in furtherance of proper identification;

x. That the emergence of trailer parks has increased the ungoverned areas across the nation, with their attendant security challenges;

xi. That the corps requires arms in line with Section 19 of the FRSC act 200? so that it can increase its response to dangerous situations, including night operations and at the same time avoid the current situation where it has to rely on other services for armed support;

xii. That there is no synergy with other security agencies;

xiii. That having become part of our mode of transport, the Corps is working on the introduction of special plate numbers for tricycles in order to make FRSC database more comprehensive;

xiv. That the corps requires mounted vehicle cameras and drones to capture live scenarios;

xv. That they need to deploy more technology to enable transformation to the Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR), which searches and alerts an officer when a vehicle of interest has been observed, within seconds;
xvi. That the need for transformation from the traditional driver's license to the digital driver's license to boost law enforcement through information sharing with other security agencies;

xvii. That it requires setting up of coordinating center where all intelligence will be ware housed; and

xviii. That there should be recruitment and training.

11. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

Role of National Park Service in Addressing the Security Challenges:

i. That the Nigeria National Park Service is a paramilitary agency entrusted to provide security, manage and regulate the use of the diverse and unique natural resources within the National Parks in the country by Decree 46 of 1999, now Act 46 (Cap 65 LFN 2010);

ii. That the Service is facing a lot of challenges in the discharge of its mandate such as:

   a. Organized crime (banditry, kidnapping and cattle rustling);
   b. Enclave settlement in the Parks;
   c. Inadequate number of operational equipment;
   d. Inadequate number of personnel and training;
   e. Use of obsolete and low calibre firearms and ammunitions such as Double Barrel Short Gun (DBSG), Single Barrel Short Gun (SBSG), pump action, and Dane guns;
   f. Inadequate tracks to patrol extensive areas of the Parks;
   g. Old vehicles;
   h. Poor accessibility;
   i. Maiming and killing of Rangers by Poachers/herdsmen etc.
   j. Lack of stock routes & grazing reserves; and
   k. Ineffective protection of other categories of protected areas like forest & game reserves.

C. INTELLIGENCE AND DATA MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS

1. PRESENTATION BY GENERAL MOHAMMED BABAGANA MONGUNO (RTD) THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER (NSA) HELD ON MONDAY, 10TH MARCH, 2020.
The NSA stated that the National Security Strategy of Nigeria outlines the major security concerns of the Nation for which policies and strategies have been articulated and how the government plans to deal with them.

2) The Document is general in content and its implementation depends on other national strategic documents such as the National counter terrorism strategy, cyber security policy and strategy, the National Defence Policy and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan including the review of the 2014 strategy with a view to updating it from 2020-2024 to achieve the following objectives;

a. **FOCUS AND OBJECTIVE OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES**

To secure the Nigerian State/Country in a manner that is consistency with the democratic, social and economic aspirations of its people. It is concerned with how to harness the resources and institutions of the country for the common goals of all Nigerians. The central objective is securing and enhance the lives and properties of Nigerian citizens where ever the leave and work.

3) The NSA observed that our colonial inheritance along years of military rule has affected the structure and operational modalities of our security institutions. This was largely responsible for inter and intra institutional rivalry that we have being witnessing over the years. He stressed the need to realign the institution and the psychology orientation of operator in sync with civilian democratic control. This is because in a democracy politician has the legitimacy to run the affairs of the nation.

4) Answering the question as to why there are still challenges and lack of optimal performance in respect of all the Security Agencies, the NSA attributed this to;

a. structure of the Institutions.

b. laws that created the Agencies and the need to revisit the Acts.

c. the need for the Judiciary to work unison with the Executive and the Legislature as they are not currently working harmoniously on issues of national security.

d. the fact that there exist no consequences for bad behavior to serve as deterrent to intended lawlessness and maleficence criminals.
e. the fact that modern day warfare/contemporary conflicts are so complex and require optimal application of intelligence which must be driven by human intelligence which can only be obtained from citizens support.

f. our failure to emphasis training in order to be able to convert intelligence to information. Such intelligence has to be funded and upgraded appropriately.

g. to very little central co-ordination of the Security Architecture this will require a complete review of our security strategy.

5) The NSA said he chairs;
   a. The Joint General Security Appraisal Committee
   b. The Joint Intelligence Board
   c. The Intelligence Community – DSS, NIA, and DIA
   d. National Security Council chaired by Mr. President with NSA as Secretariat.

See diagram below;

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**Fig3: Nigerian’s National Security Architecture.**

*Source: Thomas and Aghedo, 2014.*
6) The NSA observed that poverty, unemployment and illiteracy are underlying factors that fuel insecurity and as such require political decision and conscious efforts to eradicate this triple disease by Federal, State and Local Government.

7) He bemoaned the duplication of facilities/equipment purchases by security agencies and recommended a central purchasing point for the needs of the Armed Force of Nigeria (AFN) which he said was previously done by the Ministry of Defence through the Security Council who were faceless as against the current individual agencies purchases of equipment with monetary expectation attached.

8) The NSA informed the Ad-Hoc Committee that his office is indebted to the tune of 73 million dollars being service level agreement (SLA) in a bilateral commitment.

9) He further informed the Committee that the NSA’s office has not been funded from 2015 – date.

2. THE HONOURABLE MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS AND DIGITAL ECONOMY, DR ISA ALI PANTAMI, FNCS, FBCS, FIIM.

1) The Honorable Minister of Communications in his presentation and response to questions from Committee Members stated as follows:

i. That upon his assumption of office, an audit of pre-registered, semi-registered and unregistered SIM Cards were carried out and 9 million lines were discovered to be involved.

ii. That owners of improperly registered SIM Cards were asked to update their registration after which over two (2) million lines were deactivated.

iii. That there is need to have a Central Identity Register where all identity capturing bodies such as NIS, NIMC, INEC etc can store data captured or share already captured data without having to duplicate the same process.

iv. That MDAs embark on various IT related projects without inputs from relevant regulatory bodies and as such there are silos of projects and capabilities that are not properly utilised for maximum benefits.

v. That communications based security challenges can be effectively addressed through the adoption of emerging technologies.
vi. That the revised SIM Registration Policy will ensure that no unregistered SIM is active on any Mobile Network.

vii. That the Ministry is working to ensure that there is a maximum number of SIM cards, possibly three (3), that can be tied to a single individual.

viii. That the Ministry has ensured that timely provision of profiles of SIM card owners are made to security agencies within 60 minutes of request.

ix. That the National Identity Number (NIN) is now a requirement for SIM Card registration to significantly improve the quality of information received.

x. Security agencies are empowered to lawfully intercept communications for the purpose of their investigations.

xi. Mobile Network Operators should have Geolocation capabilities to enable them provide security agencies with the location of a specific Mobile Phone or Smart Device in aid of any criminal investigation.

xii. The use of technology i.e. Artificial Intelligence (AI) can greatly enhance the capacity and capability of law enforcement personnel to identify criminal activities and deploy officers accordingly.

xiii. Computerized processes can be adopted such as filing online Police reports to make it possible to examine huge amounts of data related to crime and terrorism as well as to build a good criminal data record.

3. NIGCOMSAT SUBMISSION TO THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON NIGERIAN SECURITY CHALLENGES: URGENT NEED TO RESTRUCTURE, REVIEW AND REORGANIZE THE CURRENT SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

The Honorable Minister of Communications in his presentation and responses to questions from Committee Members stated as follows:

i. That NIGCOMSAT LTD provides strategic satellite communication support for the Defence, Security and the Intelligence Communities.
ii. That NIGCOMSAT also provides free satellite space segment for real time information gathering for the ongoing Joint Border Drill being coordinated by the office of the National Security Adviser.

iii. That NIGCOMSAT also provides a secured platform for the deployment of Command and Control Network to the Defence Intelligence Agency. This network was provided to link the DIA office in Abuja via a multi-media system to some selected Nigerian Mission offices across the west and central Africa region utilizing NIGCOMSAT satellite connectivity. This network is used for sharing intelligence and security situation report in the region.

iv. That NIGCOMSAT-1R Navigation (L-Band) payload is built to provide a Navigation Overlay Service (NOS) similar to the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) system. The system is meant to augment the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) over Africa, Nigeria in particular. The Navigation payload of NIGCOMSAT-1R was designed to support defense, aviation, maritime, transport sectors (roads & rail), public safety utility, security of strategic national infrastructure, services. However, this service has not been deployed due to lack of fund, to deploy and implement necessary and needful ground infrastructure to utilize space-based infrastructure for services and applications.

4. ENGR. PROF. UMAR GARBA DANBATTA, FAENG, FNSE, FNIIEEE. (EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN/CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER) NIGERIAN COMMUNICATION COMMISSION.

i. That the SIM Card Registration programme seeks to mitigate security concerns on the challenges of tracking criminal uses of telephones in the country by capturing data of all subscribers.

ii. That there is the need so establish a central database of SIM Card subscribers as an enabler to the overall Citizen Identification System.

iii. That currently ALL active SIM Cards in the country are registered and as at date over 151 Million registered subscriber data have been transmitted to the central database by Mobile Network Operators.
iv. That these records are undergoing duplication scrubbing via an Automated Fingerprint Identification Software (AFIS) and valid registrations are available for use by the security community.

v. That the NSIM database has been established with all system hardware and software components to enable the validation, storage, and retrieval of subscribers' records transmitted by Mobile Network Operators.

vi. That the Commission has established an Investigation and Reporting Application which provides the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) direct access to law enforcement agencies in aid of investigations.

vii. That the Commission has provided a universal, toll-free telephone short code (112) for members of the public to seek for help in times of distress/emergency.

viii. That the Commission is currently in discussions with the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and State Governments for partnership and possible takeover of the management of the ECCs.

5. GALAXY BACKBONE LTD BY PROFESSOR MUHAMMAD B. ABUBAKAR, MANAGING DIRECTOR/CEO

i. That Galaxy Backbone Ltd as the Federal Government's ICT Company is a major stake holder in security circle mandated to provide ICT infrastructure and services to Federal Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) including Security Agencies;

ii. That the use of technology, especially Information and Communications Technology (ICT) is fundamental to combating threat to National Security;

iii. That Security Agencies must leverage ICT's to stay ahead of criminal elements that are increasingly deploying sophisticated technology to their advantage;

iv. That while the agency has network connectivity infrastructure that connects Operational Head Quarters of Security Agencies in Abuja, adequate bandwidth and extension to operational offices nationwide still remains a challenge;
v. That the use of this facility by Security Agencies is however limited as Security Agencies still engage in the practice of developing similar infrastructure in silos, perhaps to address perceived security risk in sharing;

vi. That poor funding has limited Galaxy Backbone's capacity and role in providing the much needed ICT to security agencies;

vii. That there is need to revisit the operational engagement model of the Security Agencies and Galaxy Backbone in order to meet the specialized requirements;

viii. That modalities need to be worked out on secondment of security agencies' staff and security clearances for designated Galaxy Staff to meet the requirements of the Security Agencies to address the issue of apathy and reluctance to utilize Galaxy services and address perceived security risks in cooperation and collaboration.

6. MEMORANDUM OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NIA)

The DG NIA (represented by the Deputy Director General) in his presentation and responses to questions and comments made the following statements:

i. That the NIA plays a critical, strategic role in combating insecurity in the country through the rendering of timely and accurate intelligence;

ii. That the Agency deploys a significant number of human assets in countries relevant to identifying threats to National Security, as well as those that provide opportunities to enhance National development and wellbeing;

iii. That modern security challenges require new approaches to combating them by the use of technology to identify, track, apprehend and neutralize culprits;

iv. That Nigeria is faced with threats by criminals that have no borders which necessitated the NIA to pro-actively acquire necessary equipment to collect intelligence through technical means;

v. That the NIA is intensifying its role of identifying and neutralising threats to National Security through proactive intelligence operations and active collaboration with domestic and foreign partners and tremendous successes are being recorded in this regard;
vi. That Inter-agency synergy is critical for the success of the Security and Intelligence Community in confronting contemporary challenges;

vii. That Synergy within Nigeria's Security and Intelligence Community is generally considered weak and a major contributing factor to Government's inability to address insecurity;

viii. That the NIA continues to expand its collaboration with Nigerian security institutions by providing appropriate intelligence to sister agencies, such as the Department of State Services (DSS), the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Nigerian Police Force, and other relevant organizations, as well as conducting joint operations in order to address threats to national security;

ix. That through the dissemination of intelligence products, the Agency aims to provide all relevant stakeholders, beyond the Intelligence and Security sector, with key information required to advance national interest.

7. MR. YUSUF BICHI, DG DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY SERVICE (DSS)

The DGSS in his presentation and response to questions and comments from Members stated the following:

i. That the Department of State Services has been carrying out its mandate in line with the National Security Agencies Act 19 of 1986 as reaffirmed in section 215 subsection 5 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended);

ii. That the Service also derives its functions from other key National Security Policies and Enactments, one of which is the 2019 National Security Strategy recently released by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA);

iii. That the Department of State Service provides timely advice to government on all matters of national security interest;

iv. That the DSS shares or provides intelligence with sister agencies;

v. That intelligence provided to action agencies are sometimes poorly utilized;

vi. That Non-harmonization of national database operated by various MDAs is of key concern to the Service;
vii. That inadequate funding and delayed budgetary releases is affecting the ability of the Service to acquire modern and state-of-the-art equipment; and

viii. That the Service requires adequate funding to meet up with high cost of Capacity Building/Training of personnel to meet up with the required standard; Personnel Welfare; Office and Residential Accommodations; and Inadequate manpower; all of which are essential for it to operate optimally.

8. DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

i. That the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established vide Decree 19 of 1986 (now CAP No. 74 of the Laws of the Federation, 2004 as amended) as a member of the Intelligence Community. Structurally, the Agency is divided into 11 directorates, a college and a medical centre headed by directors, a commandant and a chief medical officer respectively. The directorates are DOps, DInt, DAP, DTS, DFL, DOL, DOA, DR&D, DFA, DPsy Ops and the recently established DPen. There are also operational cells strategically spread across Nigeria and 25 defence missions overseas. The Agency is headed by the CDI, a military officer with the establishment rank of Lt Gen or its equivalent, assisted by the DCDI;

ii. That the DIA is a member of the larger Nigerian Intelligence Community which consists of NIA, DSS, Defence Intelligence Services (DIS) and those of other para-military organizations including MDAs. The Agency is also a member of Joint Intelligence Board (JIB), the National Security Council (NSC), the National Defence Council (NDC) and the Intelligence Community Committee (ICC). DIA also promote liaison through joint operations and foreign liaison services. These bodies meet regularly to take decisions on well analysed intelligence concerning threats to national security;

iii. That the Agency disseminates daily, weekly and monthly intelligence reports to Appropriate Superior Authority (ASA) for Information or necessary actions against terrorism, insurgency and other crimes. These reports also contain projections and recommendations in the context of national security interest. Ultimately, the Agency produces annual combined intelligence estimates which are forecast of likely security occurrences both within and outside the country. This also constitutes an early warning mechanism for the Agency with a view to advising ASA on the above named threats; and
iv. That despite the successes recorded by the Agency in its operational activities, there were some constraints encountered largely in the area of funding, logistics, training, manpower and equipment. There is the need to have adequate operational vehicles and equipment, communication gadgets and adequate manpower to support the Agency's operations. To this end, improved funding would tremendously enhance the capacity of the Agency to effectively carry out its assigned tasks.

9. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR POLICY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (NIPSS)

i. That the institute contributes to National Security by providing models, policy options and strategies;

ii. That the Federal Government should review the existing security policies and strategies in order to harmonise them into a comprehensive internal security policy, including National Community Policing Policy and Strategy;

iii. That the Federal Government harmonise overlapping mandates in the various acts establishing existing security agencies and address ambiguities in the constitution and the capacity of States to establish security agencies;

iv. That the Ministry of Interior (Ministry of Police Affairs) should adopt a decentralized model of community policing; and

v. That the President should direct the Minister of Interior to propose a strategic intervention plan to reposition the Nigeria Police Force to perform its role as the lead agency in internal security.

D. GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

1. HON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE MR. ABUBAKAR SHEHU MALAMI

i. That the 1st October, 2010 terror attack near the Eagle Square, Abuja exposed the lacuna in Nigeria laws to deal with the magnitude of the attacks and thus Nigeria took steps and passed the Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011;
ii. That the Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011 was amended in 2013 in order to cover grounds on extra territorial jurisdiction provided under the various conventions on aspects of terrorism;

iii. That the office of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice has also gone ahead with the support of the British High Commission and the Complex other international development partners to setup a specialized unit known as the Complex Casework Group (CCG) for the persecution of terrorism cases and other complex crimes;

iv. That government has successfully proscribed violent extremists groups in line with Security Council Resolutions 130 (2001) and 1624 (2005) in order to prevent terrorists acts, cybercrime etc;

v. That in the area of Policy direction, the Ministry has initiated setting up coordination parameters for law enforcement agencies to create Joint Task Force terms, border closure and various military deployments to tackle insecurity in the affected areas;

vi. That the ministry's effort to prosecute suspects from the theatre of command is hampered by the lack of proper investigations conducted. The required proof of evidence to prosecute such grievous offences is often lacking;

vii. That the prosecutions of the cases have also been hindered by investigations that require technical skills and highly professional manpower which is grossly inadequate;

viii. That they put in place the cybercrime Act, 2015 in response that need to overhaul the entire cyber security architecture to control data communications;

ix. Recommended more funding for the needs of the Military and Police to enable them effectively tackle insecurity;

x. Called for more funding for the training of law enforcement and prosecutorial to effectively investigate and prosecute criminal cases;
xi. The Office of the Attorney-General leverages on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extraditions mechanisms to track Terrorists funding, Block foreign accounts and extradited some wanted persons to other jurisdictions for trial;

2) The major challenges confronting the fight against terrorism include:
   a. Funding.
   b. Manpower and manpower development.
   c. Lack of proper coordination and collaboration.
   d. Lack of proper investigation.
   e. Delayed involvement of Prosecutors during investigation.
   f. Lack of witnesses and witness protection programs leading to apathy in witness turn out during prosecutions.

2) He recommended that the security architecture can be restructured for effectiveness through:

   a. improved coordination between prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, on the one hand, and intelligence Community, on the other, to strengthen the effectiveness of the nation's counterterrorism efforts;

   b. development and promotion of a national counterterrorism enforcement program that would yield prosecutions against hundreds of defendants as a result of collaboration with all law enforcement Agencies;

   c. the re-organization and dramatic increase of staffing for the Office of National security Adviser with the right technical skills to promote cyber security initiative;

   d. the review, the standard operational systems of all intelligence agencies to have the legal authorities necessary to conduct intelligence operations; and

   e. the creation and staffing of a new department of Law and Policy to harmonize national security legal and policy functions for the entire department, and to promote important national security priorities, such as updating legislations, supporting cyber security efforts and strengthening counter-terrorism capabilities of our institutions.

2. LAGOS STATE

The Lagos State Government made the following submissions:
i. **PROPER FUNDING OF SECURITY AGENCIES**: There is no gain saying that a well-funded organization will be more result oriented. To this end, budgetary provisions for security agencies should be of sizeable consideration and key actors to its passage and release should expeditiously attended to.

ii. **PROVISION OF OPERATIONAL TOOLS**: An effective security force is achievable if it has requisite working facilities available. Situations where operational vehicles, modern firearms, communication equipment are in dearth supply in most Police and other security agency formations, accounts for the seeming slow response to distress calls on criminal activities.

iii. **TRAINING AND RETRAINING OF PERSONNEL**: Authorities of security agencies should as a matter of priority organize training and retraining courses for their operatives so as to sharpen their consciousness and evolve modern ways of securing lives and property.

iv. **VALUE ORIENTATION**: To promote synergy and inclusiveness in policing among non-state actors and security agencies, personnel are to be exposed to accommodate and foster civilian – security forces relationship.

v. **EFFECTIVE TRANS-BORDER SECURITY PATROL**: States with international border will ensure collaboration with security agencies in other countries to secure common borders. For example; Lagos has international border with Republic of Benin at Seme axis near Badagry LGA, activities of Trans-border crime, petroleum product bunkering, piracy, smuggling of contraband products and kidnapping are major activities going on at the Border.

3. **ZAMFARA STATE**

The Representative of Zamfara State Government, Mr. Abubakar Mohammed, Hon. Commissioner for Security & Home Affairs made the following submissions:

a. Strengthening and coordinating the activities of security formations in the State through Ministry of Security and Home Affairs.

b. Wide scale media sensitization on the need for peace and consultation with the Traditional Institutions and Local Administrators as well as relevant stakeholder on all aspect of security management, information sharing and intelligence gathering.
c. Engaged in cooperation with all neighboring States namely; Sokoto, Katsina, Kebbi, Kaduna and Niger States on matters of security challenges and way forward instead of operating independent of each other.

d. Provision of logistic support to all security and para-military agencies serving in the State.

e. Granting of Amnesty to all repentant bandits who laid down their arms and embraced peace.

f. Establishment of RUGA settlements for Fulani nomads with facilities such as schools, hospitals, vetinery clinics, potable water, etc that will make life meaningful to them.

g. That all hitherto grazing reserves, cattle routes and watering points allocated to farmers and converted in to farmlands were revoked for peace to reign.

h. All repentant bandits and outlawed “Yan-sakai” as well as other vigilante groups would be integrated in the society without stigmatization.

i. All widows and orphans left behind would be supported to earn a good living in the society.

j. A more organized and robust coordination frame-work for the covert operation that would ensure desired synergy among different actors in the society.

k. Effective and well-articulated disarmament and reconciliation efforts which should lay down the foundation for delineation of armed banditry activities are being pursued vigorously.

l. The Government would come-up with a community mapping project as a pre-requisite for effective disarmament and peace accord.

m. Enhanced mobilization on different security aspects including effort to restore peace and engagement of all relevant security stakeholders.

n. Establishment of Directorate of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation to statutorily handle all issues of insecurity with warring factions with a view to healing the old wound.

o. All Quacy informal security formations who were taking laws in to their hands were outlawed.
E. OTHER RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS

Distinguished Senator (Kano Central) Mallam (Dr.) Ibrahim Shekarau, CON, Sardaunan Kano submitted a memorandum to the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee on Nigeria Security Challenges on Way Forward for Nigeria Police with Six Point Agenda.

In his submission in averred that the surety situation in the country is so serious and can only be address properly when the Nigeria State reorganizes and reenergizes the Nigerian Police to return to their pristine position as guardian of our internal security. His six point agenda are made up of recommendation in the following areas:

i. Recruitment
ii. Training
iii. Equipment
iv. Welfare
v. Pension
vi. Funding

F. PRESENTATION BY EXPERTS

AIR CHIEF MARSHALL O.O PETINRIN (Rtd), BARR. LAWRENCE ALOBI, CP (Rtd), AIR VICE MARSHALL M.N UMARU (Rtd), BARR. MIKE EJIOFOR FSI, PNM, KSJ, BARR. WILSON ESANGBEDO, CPP, BRIG. GEN. SALEH BALA (RTD).

In the course of the Sessions, the experts made the following presentations:

They opined that no single Security Agency could effectively perform the constitutional responsibility of tackling insecurity without the support of others, and also noted that premium place of Information and Communications compels collaboration among all relevant Agencies such as the National Intelligence Agency, Department of State Services, the Nigeria Immigration Service, the Nigeria Customs Service, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigerian Correctional Service, among others, for their collective success in securing the country.

Furthermore, they pointed out that Inter-Agency Synergy in Nigeria has been seriously undermined by a plethora of factors which include the following:

i. Lack or inadequacy of training and retraining, which is inimical to professionalism, harmony and efficiency in joint operations.
ii. Inadequate or uncoordinated Inter-Service Communication and Information sharing which undermines command and control.

iii. Mutual distrust and poor mentoring of officers, which undermine valuable and mutually rewarding Interactions.

iv. Duplication of functions arising from unclear delineation of constitutional assigned responsibilities, which precipitates role conflicts among Security Agencies.

v. Unhealthy rivalry and superiority or inferiority complex which undermine mutual tolerance.

vi. Existence of obsolete laws which are not favorable to Inter Agency Synergy.

vii. Lack or inadequacy of joint training and exercises among personnel of the various Security especially at the operational and tactical levels.

2) Against the foregoing background, they made very useful recommendations, among which are the following:

a. Regular training, retraining and joint training of personnel of the Security Agencies at relevant Institutions should be encouraged to enhance proficiency and professionalism as well as for ease of blending and comradeship among Officers and Men across Agencies.

b. Synergy among Security Agencies should be enforced to develop common purpose and goal congruence in the discharge of duties, eliminate working at cross purpose, ensure efficiency, reduce cost and promote prestige and integrity of the Security Agencies at both local and international levels.

c. Government should strengthen institutional framework within which relevant superior authorities should co-ordinate activities and enforce the required synergy among the Security Agencies.

d. Effort should be accelerated towards providing adequate digital infrastructure for enhanced information sharing and promote networking among the Security Agencies.
e. Due cognizance must be taken of comparative advantage in ensuring that the most appropriate Agency is deployed to address particular security without prejudice to strategic support required from other sister Agencies.

f. Intra and Inter-Agency Synergy should be promoted across the Federal, State and Local Governments to enhance efficient security management across the three tiers of Government.

g. Multi-dimensional strategy should be employed and the combination of kinetic and non-kinetic measures deployed to strengthen the national security architecture.

h. Government should facilitate the promulgation or review of relevant legislations to enhance jointness, collaboration and synergy among the Nation’s Security Agencies.

i. The Ministry of Defence and the Office of the Chief of Defence Staff should be strengthened to effectively champion National Defence management and empowered to effectively supervise and coordinate the Tri Service for better teamwork.

j. Every Security Agency should strengthen discipline and internal control, in order to eliminate breaches of code of conduct manifesting variously in information leakages, mutual sabotage and mutual suspicion, all of which are inimical to Inter Agency collaboration.

k. Government should formally develop a comprehensive Rank Equivalent Chart to streamline command structure and instill discipline as well as orderliness when personnel from various Agencies interrelate during joint operations.

l. Inter-Agency Synergy should be inclusive enough to ensure proper training and integration of unarmed Paramilitary Agencies required to play very useful non-kinetic complementary roles.

m. The leadership of the various Security should establish a free channel of communication amongst its personnel through symposiums, Inter-Agency sports/games and joint social cultural events.
n. There should be quarterly meetings, under the leadership of the National Security Adviser, of Heads of all armed and unarmed Security Agencies. The purpose of these high level meetings would be to regularly discuss and exchange information and to develop a common framework for National Defence Security.

4) The Ad-Hoc Committee noted that the under listed Stakeholders did not respond to its invitation;

1. Executive Governor of Ekiti State.
2. Executive Governor of Cross River State.
3. Executive Governor of Rivers State.
4. Executive Governor of Borno State.
5. Executive Governor of Taraba State.
6. Executive Governor of Benue State.
7. Executive Governor of Niger State.
8. Executive Governor of Kaduna State.
9. Executive Governor of Anambra State.
10. Executive Governor of Ebonyi State.

5) The Ad-Hoc Committee in the course of the interactions with the Stakeholders, identified each security institution, structure and function within the architecture and classified them into four (4) categories as follows;

A. MILITARY AND DEFENCE INSTITUTIONS
This sector involves;
   a. The Nigerian Army.
   b. The Nigerian Navy.
   c. The Nigeria Airforce and their operations, training and Institutional Units.

B. INTERNAL SECURITY AND LAW AND ORDER INSTITUTIONS
These include;
   a. The Nigeria Police, their operational, intelligence and Training Unit.
b. Nigeria Immigration Service and Data management unit.
c. Nigeria Customs Service.
d. Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
e. Federal Road Safety Corps.
f. National Park Service.

C. INTELLIGENCE AND DATA MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS

a. National Security Adviser
b. Department of State Service.
c. Chief of Defence Intelligence.
d. National Intelligence Agency (NIA).
e. Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC).
g. Nigerian Communication Satellite (NIGCOMSAT).

D. GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

b. State Government.
c. Judiciary.

E. OTHER RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS/EXPERTS

a. His Excellency Distinguished Senator Mallam (Dr.) Ibrahim Shekarau, CON, Sardaunan Kano (APC Kano Central).

F. PRESENTATION BY EXPERTS

a. Air Chief Marshall O.O Petinrin (Rtd).
b. Barr. Lawrence Alobi, CP, (Rtd).
c. Air Vice Marshall M.N Umaru (Rtd).
d. Mr. Barr Mike Ejiofor FSI, PNM, KSI.
e. Barr. Wilson Esangbedo, CPP.

6) The Ad-Hoc Committee examined Institution’s constitutional and legal status, functions and subsidiary legislation (standard operation procedures and guidelines) and its relationship with Sister institutions within the categories listed and in the context of the overall national security network.
7) These categories of institutions are what constitute the security architecture of the nation. The nature and structure of these institutions and how they relate to one another in the conduct of their responsibilities is the determinant of effective National Defence and Security. It is in this context that the Ad-Hoc Committee makes the following findings and observations:

6.0 GENERAL FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

Based on the submissions of Stakeholders, the Ad-Hoc Committee made the following observations:

1. Almost all the Institutions have weak and antiquated legislations most of which were done either during the colonial era or under military administrations and therefore do not reflect the challenges of the moment and the desire of the democratic dispensation;

2. There are very ill-defined operational boundaries and overlapping jurisdictions among the Security Services leading to confusion in priority-setting, platform acquisition, training, direction and general orientation;

3. There is a lot of internal incoherence and inter-personnel conflict which have led to a lot of antagonism within the Security Organizations. The absence or inadequacies of effective corrective mechanisms within those institutions allowed inter-personnel disputes to fester thereby undermining the operational efficiency of the services;

4. Most of the Agencies are operating in isolation with very little, if any, coordination between them. This most unfortunate situation can be seen from the recent face-off between the office of the IGP and the Police Service Commission which degenerated into open litigation in the law courts;

5. Most recently, the public release of letters from the NSA’s Office to the Service Chiefs discountenancing their engagement with the Chief of Staff to the President bordering on security matters, is a loud testament of the level of disharmony and inter-personnel conflict and intrigues within the nation’s Security and Defence establishments;

6. Inter-Agency rivalry and endless battles of supremacy have undermined operational effectiveness. This has worked against cooperation, sharing of
information and effectiveness of intelligence and operational platforms for coordinated internal security operations;

7. The alleged non-funding of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) since 2015 has undermined the effective performance of its coordinating function in the Security Architecture has led many agencies to question its authority and relevance in various fora thereby adversely affecting inter-service cooperation and Intelligence Sharing.

8. The law governing the operation of the three (3) intelligence agencies i.e. Department of State Services (DSS), National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and Defence Intelligent Agency (DIA) is very defective and clearly responsible for the failure to define their functions, boundaries and relationships with one another;

9. There is very little effective and committed leadership to guide, motivate and focus the security institutions on the challenges of their responsibilities, and how to go about fulfilling them in a creative, innovative and cooperative manner;

10. The general absence of a performance, monitoring and evaluation mechanism within the Institutions and Services have undermined discipline and due diligence in the conduct of Security related operations;

11. Allegations have been rife that the quest for personal wealth acquisition has undermined institutional coherence and discipline and resulted in allegations of wastages of funds and squandering of appropriated resources. This is one of the sources of unhealthy competition and interpersonal rivalries within the various services;

12. The Security Agencies tend to acquire modern technology and other force multipliers in isolation which resulted in the multiplication of incompatible platforms belonging to the different Arms of Services. This affected mutual beneficial relationship and coherence of security operations;
13. Very little attempt has been made to provide reliable interface modules that could multiply capacity and simplify inter-service access to existing technological equipment and capabilities;

14. The Ad-Hoc Committee noted the cry of inadequacy of funds that was made by almost all the Security and Intelligence Agencies.

15. In almost all the Services, there is a general lack of proper acquisition and maintenance culture of the expensive equipment and platforms used for Defence and Internal Security operations;

16. The prevalence of importing all the nation’s National Security equipment and gadgets undermines the security of the Nation and amounts to colossal wastages when expensive equipment remain unserviceable due to lack of simple components, spare parts or servicing materials;

17. Absence of an effective centralized criminal database for the country.

18. Lack of comprehensive identity management data covering the country’s population with no interface of databases belonging to several institutions such as INEC, BVN, NCC, NIMC, Immigration, Customs, etc.;

19. The Communications Infrastructure in the country is generally weak so are many blind spots which need to be covered in order to ensure that every space of the country is served;

20. Generally, there is a lot of emphasis and reliance on the exclusive use of force in national security challenges to the exclusion of other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and strategies;

21. There is a general failure of governance to nip potential security breaches in the bud before they fester and result into serious security challenges;

22. General weakness of national information and orientation dissemination entities in their propagation of public enlightenment messages against insecurity and to properly educate the youth about the dangers of drugs, insurgency, criminal gangs and cultists; and
23. Most of the Security Institutions, particularly the Police lack well trained Personnel, functional and well equipped training Institutions. Where Institutions are available, they are dilapidated and training is done in isolation.

7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to achieve a proactive and effective reformation of the Security Architecture of the Country, far-reaching recommendations are suggested. These recommendations are arranged in accordance with the Four (4) group classifications that was presented above.

These recommendations have to do with the Legislative and Executive actions that will be required to ensure that the Institutions are restructured properly and reformed to function seamlessly within their group and in relation to other groups in the larger Security Architecture.

1. MILITARY AND DEFENCE SUB SECTOR

a. The National Assembly Committees on Defence, Army, Navy and Airforce should in concert with the Ministry of Defence examine the old Legislations and Acts of the National Assembly that give legal status to the Armed Forces with a view to bring them up to date and more responsive to the functions and the core mandates of the Armed Forces. For this purpose the Committees should present such Bills to both Chambers of National Assembly within 3 months;

b. All Joint Operations should be carried out strictly in accordance with extant operational procedures provided in the Armed Forces Act;

c. The Military should strictly stay within the limits of its constitutional provisions which determine its involvement and deployment;

d. Acquisition of defence related equipment should be conducted by a Centre to ensure interface and interchange of platforms for proper coordination and training;

e. Training Institutions’ curricular should be harmonized to ensure that all personnel develop the standard ethos of leadership and discipline;
f. All Military Commanders should be directly held responsible for failure to achieve operational targets and set objectives;

g. The Military should maintain proper and clear system of rewards and discipline such that there would be no discrimination or favoritism in the career management of officers and men;

h. During Defence or Internal Security operations, cash ration allowance should be discontinued in favor of 30% to 40% of basic monthly salary paid directly into the account of the officers and men involved in the operations. In this regard field kitchens and compo rations must be provided to each operational field;

i. Due to the dependence of the nation on foreign countries for defence equipment and spares, and the often complicated process involved in acquiring them, inter-parliamentary diplomacy is required. The National Assembly should be involved in lobbying its counterparts in the countries involved on behalf of the nation. In addition, leaders of the relevant Committee of the National Assembly should be included in Presidential delegation on visit to foreign countries;

j. The Nation should strive to establish a strong Industrial Complex for Research and Development and production of military related hardware, spare parts and equipment in such a way that defence equipment and hardware are protected from dependence on foreign suppliers; this call for the improvement of funding to Defence Industries Cooperation of Nigeria (DICON).

k. To this end, the Ad-Hoc Committee recommends the setting up of a National Defence Fund into which all Nigerian adults and businesses should make contributions for revival and investments in our National Defence Industry. Such fund should be backed by legislation and put beyond the reach of any form of use outside the functions for which it was established;

l. Welfare of all Personnel, Officers and Men should be enhanced through effective insurance scheme, gratuity and pensions;

m. There should be established a Department of Veteran Affairs to cater for the welfare of the discharged Officers and Men;
n. Employment opportunities should be provided for retired and discharged Officers and Men;

o. For the development and deployment of modern warfare capabilities in the form of surveillance and armored fighting drones and other UAVs; cyber capabilities and other enablers; the Ad-Hoc Committee recommends that the Federal Government should immediately:

   a) provide sophisticated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) comprising conventional drones and fixed long wing endurance drones for the Nigerian Army;

   b) provide the Nigerian Army with drone detection equipment and incapacitating technology such as anti-drone systems and laser beams for intercepting drones belonging to bandits and insurgents;

   c) launch massive and sustained combined military operations to identify, destroy camps, hideouts and strongholds of bandits, kidnappers and insurgents.

2. INTERNAL SECURITY AND LAW & ORDER SUB SECTOR

These institutions have been listed in paragraph 5b above. The Ad-Hoc Committee deliberated on the submissions that have been made by the Institutions and proffers the following recommendations:

a) POLICE

1) The Police as the lead institution in internal security and for ensuring law and order and public safety, is supposed to be integrated in the fabric of the broader society. It is supposed to be rooted in the local and national law and order structures. Therefore it should be superintended by both national and local power establishments, i.e. National and Local Authorities. As such the work of the Police and its disposition is the common concern of everyone irrespective of status in the society. Therefore respect and cooperation of everyone with the Police is vital to the security of the nation.
2) The major challenges the Nigeria Police faces today had their antecedent way back in 1968 when they were uprooted from the local community authority structures and hierarchy and reorganized in the image of the Military. From there the Police lost its public bearing and from there, it lost substantial public trust and public confidence and became more of an occupying force rather than public protection and safety institution. The very hierarchical and distant command structure, disposition and deployment of Police personnel denied the Police personnel the capacity to intervene timeously, and obtain real time intelligence to prevent crime and apprehend criminals, efficiently and effectively.

3) Therefore, it is the recommendation of this Ad-Hoc Committee that this important/vital Institution needs a major re-organization in order to bring it closer to the people and to make its operations more responsive to the security needs of the people.

4) We recommend that the Police Command structure be decentralized with operational and budgetary powers vested in the zonal commands as follows;
   a. Kano/Jigawa/Kastina
   b. Sokoto/Zamfara/Kebbi
   c. Kaduna/Niger/FCT
   d. Kwara/Kogi/Nassarawa
   e. Benue/Plateau/Taraba/Gombe
   f. Adamawa/Yobe/Bauchi/Borno
   g. Lagos/Ogun
   h. Oyo/ Osun/Ekiti/Ondo
   i. Edo/Delta/Bayelsa
   j. Rivers/Akwa- Ibom/Cross Rivers
   k. Imo/Abia
   l. Anambra/ Enugu/Ebonyi

5) This classification is based on contiguity and similarity of the security challenges because Police work unlike Military engagement is civil work that requires synergy between civil authorities and citizenry. It is the area where the legitimacy of governance is tested because it involves settlements of disputes, detection of crimes, isolation and dealing with violence and public order and
general maintenance of peace and order in the society. For this purpose it is important to bring the Police closer to the people.

6) State Security Councils;

vi. should have operational control of the Police deployed to Zones, States and Local Governments in terms of budgeting and command and operations.

viii. should have powers of recruitment particularly for general duties Officers and Constables.

ix. should also have integrated strike mobile squads, special weapons & tactics (SWAT) and intelligence units under their control for riot control and quelling insurrection before they assume serious dimensions.

x. State Security Councils should be overseen by a Civilian Security Structure, comprising of the following:
   a. Governor.
   b. Zonal AIG of Police.
   c. State Police Commissioner.
   d. Military Commander.
   e. Immigration.
   f. Customs.
   g. Correctional Services.
   h. 1st Class Emirs/Chairman of Emirate Councils.
   i. Paramount Traditional Rulers.
   j. Leaders of Faith – Based Organizations.
   k. Senators from the State.
   l. Members of the Federal House of Representatives from each State.
   m. Speaker of the State House of Assembly.
   n. Representatives of Trade Unions/Labor/Trade Organization/ Business Community etc.
   o. Any Other person or persons deemed to be useful and relevant given the peculiarities of each Zone.

7) Similar structure should be established at the Area Command, LGA and Ward levels. At the LGA levels, Local Government Chairman, District/Village Heads, Heads of Autonomous Communities, etc. should be involved.
8) All the Community Police formations should be recruited at the Local Government Level and registered and supervised by the Local Police Council that oversees recruitment and welfare of Police as well the community compliment.

9) The Police should be supported to create more and well-armed and well trained marine Police formations armed robot, gun, boat and personnel with specialize training to adopt to riverine and inland creeks and other water terrains.

10) The State Assembly should make edict to legalize community Police, established at the LGA level.

11) The States and LGAs should pay the Community Police but member of the formation should be allowed per time farming and other business engagements.

12) Funding of Community Police should be derived from the grants appropriated from the State Assembly, given to each LGA in accordance with the size of the Community Police formation based on the budget from the LGA for them.

13) STATE LEVEL – The responsibility for the Police deployed to the States is from the Zonal Command budget for the State formations. The States can however assist with recommendations and duty allowance during special operations.

14) The Federal Government is expected to give grants to the Zonal Commands, while each State should appropriate funds from its Assembly for the Zonal Commands.

15) The Zonal Commands should have budgetary control over the Police formation up to the LGA level and prepare and defend their budget before the Police Council, at the Zonal and National Level.

16) ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (IGP)

The Inspector-General of Police at the Federal Level is expected to be a general superintendent with the following roles and functions;

i. General supervision, administration and standardization.
ii. control over training institutions, personnel, equipment and curricular.
iii. kitting and Accoutrement (with each Zonal Command having a distinct insignia).
iv. Foreign operations/training.
v. Assisting the Ministry of Police Affairs in procurement of special Arms & weaponry and their deployment to Zonal Commands.
vi. Interstate Intelligence.
vii. National Criminal Record.

17) POLICE CAREER MANAGEMENT

a. This function should remain with the Police Service Commission for all officers and men of the Police Force. In the case of Community Police, the LGA Police Council should assume that responsibility.

b. Recruitment - The Police Service Commission must ensure that recruitment of new intakes balances with the number of Personnel slated for retirement.

c. Recruitment - A recent analysis by the United Nations indicates an approximate median of 300 Police officers per 100,000 inhabitants, or averagely one Police officer per 333 inhabitants (www.wikipedia.org). For example, there were 326 Police officers per 100,000 people in the European Union in 2017, an average of one officer per 307 citizens – not too far from the global average of 1:333 (www.ec.europa.eu). According to Mark Owuor Otieno, a Kenyan (writing on www.worldatlas.com), though there is no written or recommended ratio because societies differ in levels of crime, however, it is necessary for jurisdictions to have a good balance of Police per given population so as not to strain the Police service or leave citizens unprotected. Highly volatile societies definitely need more Policemen than the relatively peaceful ones.

18) MINISTRY OF POLICE AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL POLICE COUNCIL

1) The Ministry of Police Affairs should be in charge of policy, procurement and general administration of the Police. It should also provide general guidelines on the relationships between various Police Organs and Authorities as well as provide mechanism for dispute and conflict resolution.
2) The appointment of Zonal Commanders and IGP should be done by the National Council with the President as Chairman, All State Governors, and President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, IGP, Chairman PSC, Minister of Police Affairs and all Other Persons that the President may wish to co-opt.

3) The National Police Council should be in charge of the budget of the Ministry, National Inspectorate, Police Service Commission, and Zonal Commands before it is defended at National Assembly.

4) To effect this structure, the National Assembly should amend the Police Act of 1945 to reflect this structure in concert with the Presidency, office of the Attorney General of the Federation, the IGP’s office, PSC and Minister of Police Affairs.

5) This restructuring of the Police Force should be closely accompanied by development of:

a. A Modern Police Central Crime registry that is deployed force - wide in a digitalized form to guide criminal detection and law enforcement operations at zonal level and nationwide.

b. Modernization and the amendment of evidence Act to admit digital evidence such as DNA, audio and video footage and other forms of forensic evidence in prosecution in order to provide water-tight evidence that will guarantee conviction and reduce vexatious and prolonged litigation.

c. Deployment of other force multiplier technology like solar powered CCTV Cameras, body worn surveillance system, bullet proof vests and body armor, modern surveillance drones and more critically a robust and fixed air-wing that must be provided with ultra-light – aircrafts and armed helicopters.

d. The need for us to increase the size of Police to approach the UN ratio of 1:400 or below. However giving our limitations in the application of technology and other modern force multipliers, there is a need to go below this ratio to around 1:300. In during this, we must phase recruitment over a period of 3 to 5 years taking into account the number that are retiring from the Police every year.
e. The logistics and infrastructures and Force Multipliers such as transport, mobility across land, sea and air, advanced and standardized weaponry, etc. should be provided.

f. The National Defence Industry should be calibrated to produce weapons and advanced equipment for the Police force.

g. We must provide the Police with decent accommodations at all levels. This can be handled as part of contributions of LGA and State Governments to the Police Force.

h. A Veteran Affairs Department should be established in the Ministry of Police Affairs to cater for the special needs including health of retired and honorably discharged Police office and men.

i. The welfare and pension of the Police officers and men should be enhanced during operations and at retirement. This should include adequate insurance policy, post service job placement, etc.

j. All Police stations in the Country should be rebuilt and equipped with appropriate infrastructure, information and communication facilities and equipment.

k. Police training institutions should be re-habilitated and provided with teaching and learning facilities and equipment including teaching and instructional materials, firing ranges and training allowances, etc.

l. Mobile and Special Forces of the Police should be provided with armored personnel carriers and rugged and powerful transport vehicles and body armor.

m. Part of the revenue of Zonal Police Commands would be monies generated from services provided to the private sector. Such revenues are to be captured in a revenue account that will be included in the annual budget estimate of the Zonal Commands.

n. Allow each Zone to collect and put into a dedicated account from which monies would be withdrawn for the annual budget of the Police.
b) IMMIGRATION SERVICE

i. The Act establishing the Nigerian Immigration Service should be examined and amended where necessary by the National Assembly Committee on Interior in concert with the Ministry of Interior and Immigration services.

ii. The Amendment should bring the laws up to date with the demands of current border security, migration, identity, human trafficking and other threats that are currently prevalent.

iii. The Immigration Service should be clearly designated as the front line institution that is in charge of border security.

iv. Their current data management capability and interface should be calibrated with that of Identity Management Commission.

v. The work of the Immigration Service should also be technologically empowered with digital and satellite information capabilities that gives them the capability to monitor in real time the entire land and maritime borders of the nation.

c) NIGERIA CUSTOMS SERVICE

i. The Senate Committee on Customs should examine the current Act governing the Customs and Excise Service with the view to bring it up to date.

ii. The work of the Customs Service should be digitalized with modern technologies acquired based on international standards.

d) CIVIL DEFENSE

i. The Civil Defense Act is so all-embracing that it gives the civil defence powers to do everything in internal security management sphere including those areas for which they have no training capabilities or capacities.

ii. It is the view of the Committee that the core functions of the Agency be re-organized to handle the following responsibilities only;
a. Guarding and protecting key National Infrastructure such as buildings, bridges, pipelines, tank farms, pumping stations, airports, storage facilities, offices, silos, national power grids, dams and irrigation structures, etc. nationwide.

b. All issues dealing with law and order should be left to the Police at the Zonal and National levels.

c. This implies that the Police should now concentrate on their core duties of crime detection, prevention, prosecution and cease from guard duties.

d. Guarding VIP residences, supervision of registration of private guard companies, should be an added responsibility of the corp.

e) FEDERAL ROAD SAFETY COMMISSION

i. The office of the IGP should have strong Federal Highway surveillance, mobile and armed units along Federal Highways in conjunction with the Zonal Commands of the Police Force.

ii. The Road Safety should be removed and merged with VIO at the State Levels. Each State should develop strong road and inspectorate divisions armed with strong surveillance equipment system – anti-theft, medical emergency, accident prevention, towing vans and rescue equipment, etc.

3. INTELLIGENCE AND DATA MANAGEMENT SUB SECTOR

These Institutions were identified under paragraph 5C above;

a) The Nation has three (3) dedicated intelligence services namely;
   i. DSS – Domestic Security
   ii. NIA – Foreign Security
   iii. DIA – Military

All that are covered in the National Security Agencies Act CAP N74 LFN 2004.

1) The National Assembly Committee on National Security and Intelligences should re-examine this Act and in conjunction with these Agencies come up with
adequate legislations to guide their operations and distinct functions and operational boundaries.

2) The institutions should endeavor to establish one common platform which can be interfaced with national database including Police and Military for ease of access and intelligence sharing.

3) The Department of State Services should beef up its personnel and operational capacities to be able to reach right down to the ward level where they could interface with the work of community Police men and women deployed among the people.

4) Appropriate funding and office facilities should be developed for the DSS right down the ladder.

5) The DSS should also take over the responsibilities of the VIP protection from the Police.

6) Only VIPs (President, Vice President, Governors, Deputy Governors, and Heads of Sensitive Agencies etc.) who are entitled to orderlies should have Police ADCs and orderlies attached to them.

b) NATIONAL IDENTITY MANGAGEMENT COMMISSION

i. NIMC should be removed from the office of the SGF and brought back to the Ministry of Interior.

ii. The Institution should be tasked to bring up a National Identity Management database (need to make NIMC a national platform) that covers everybody in the Country, and interfaces with other data collection and management entities, particularly – INEC, Banking (BVN), NCC, Ministry of Health and National Population Commission, etc.

c) MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS & DIGITAL ECONOMY, NIGCOMSAT AND GALAXY BACK BONE

i. These Institutions should put their acts together and ensure, that the entire National Space is digitally connected and all blind spots eliminated through a
combination of ICT infrastructure penetration and connectivity, satellite communications, fiber optic cables, communications masts and cyber facilities.

ii. To this end we recommend the purchase of a new satellite for NIGCOMSAT that will have additional audio and visual facilities.

iii. There is a need for the rehabilitation and establishment of satellite ground base stations for the reception of satellite information for utilization of customers in both public and private sectors.

iv. NCC as a regulator should provide the guidelines, operational procedures and sanctions regimes to all ICT operations and initiatives in both the private and public sectors, including the intelligence Community.

4. GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SECTOR

i. In order to seamlessly implement a lot of the recommendations listed above, there must be a buy-in and commitments of all the institutions and different tiers of governance i.e. Federal, States and Local Governments.

ii. All the reforms highlighted above involve both Legislative and Executive actions that also involve Legislative and Executive Arms of Government.

iii. The Judiciary and Corrective Institutions must also have a buy-in especially when it relates to criminal justice system particularly, the re-view of the evidence Act in the Judicial Administration.

iv. The Judiciary must harmonize its relationships with the Legislative and Executive Arms of Government on matters bothering on National Security and Laws of grave criminal offences that challenge human conscience peace and integrity of the nation.

v. In order to embed these reforms and in the security structure of the country, some constitutional amendments regarding legislative lists and revenue sharing formula are imperative.
vi. Constitution amendment are required to provide for direct funding of Local Governments and their recognition in the third (3rd) tier of governance. We need to make constitutional amendments to provide for a role for States and Local Governments in the funding of the Police and Community Police at Zonal, States and Local Governments respectively.

vii. On this score the Ad-Hoc Committee suggests a 45%, 30% and 25% to the Federal, States and Local Government Areas, respectively. This is particularly so since States and Local Governments are sharing the cost of security, Police and intelligence operations. These responsibilities at the local level will also involve the need to classify offences as Federal and State offences with custodial responsibilities cascading down the administrative tiers of Governance i.e. Federal, State and LGA correction centres.

viii. The fight against drug abuse should also be intensified not only through concerted fight against offenders but also through detoxification and re-habilitation of addicts.

ix. This can be done through the establishment of Federal, State and Local Government, re-habilitation centres.

x. The NDLEA should be strengthened and provided with all necessary support to discharge its duties and operate down to the LGA and ward levels. It should also handle the responsibility of running the drug re-habilitation centres.

7.1 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

7.2 Short-Term Strategies

A. Legislations

7.2.1 UPGRADING OF OTHER DEFENCE/SECURITY LEGISLATIONS TARGETED TOWARDS SPECIFIC AREAS:

a. This may involve obtaining data as well as information on the existing Defence/Security Laws and subsidiary Legislations (Regulations) promulgated by Executive Agencies and to ascertain the adequacy and contemporaries or otherwise of these; that is to say extant laws on the Defence and Security
that might need to be reviewed in line with contemporary realities.

b. It is the view of the Ad-Hoc Committee that the existing laws governing the Security Architecture are antiquated with conflicts, overlapping of jurisdictions, lack of definition of roles among others and therefore recommends that the Senate do direct that the following Acts be amended by its relevant Committees to address the identified challenges and make them more efficient and effective:


iii. National Security Agencies Act, LFN 2004
   - Amendment of National Security Agencies Act CAP N74 LFN 2004 with a view to giving powers of control and coordination over security agencies to the National Security Adviser (NSA) on behalf of the President.

   - The Minister of Defence should coordinate the policy of the Defence Sector and supervise the operations of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) commanded by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

   - For proper border security and migration management, there should be a clearly defined legislation stating which Agency is in charge of our borders. However in the interim Nigeria Immigration Service should be the lead Agency for border control and the need for a Legislation to give more powers to the Service as the Lead Agency for border management and control, supported by other agencies.


1. The need to scrap the Alimagiri and to plough back out of school children into the normal school system and enforce the implementation of the Universal Basic Education (UBE) Act No 8, 2004 to the letter.

8.0 BLUE PRINT FOR TACKLING THE CURRENT SECURITY CHALLENGES

8.1 Identification of all the sites and location of terrorists, kidnappers, bandits and the mobilization of all the services for massive operation to root them out. Surveillance with drones and night vision gadgets, facilities etc.

8.2 Identification and apprehension of local informants who feed the terrorists and bandits with information about target Communities and Individuals. Relevant information should be extracted from them to help preempt and stop bandits and kidnappers attacks in their tracks.

8.3 Identify traditional rulers and the leaders at the locations where the terrorists and criminals are operating from and through them help the security agencies target and destroy the locations and staging areas.

8.4 The Committee has concluded that the Country is technically at war and so total mobilization of all forces is required, and simultaneous operation are required to give these bandits, terrorists and criminals no hiding place. There is therefore a need for national mobilization, to immediately overcome the resurgent Boko Haram insurgency and the murderous atrocities of bandits, kidnappers in Nigerians rural and urban space. The following are suggested in order to root out these twin evils, which are beyond politics because they pose an existential threat to the nation.
i. appointing and supporting Local/Traditional Authorities in Local Communities by re-building residences, school, clinics, roads, Police stations and barracks, etc. that where destroyed by bandits;

ii. funding of Local Authorities to mobilize and fund youths who shall eventually be enrolled into the Local Community Police structure,

8.8 Insurgency and countering it both rely on the element of intelligence gathering to shape dynamic strategy and the element of surprise. On both counts the armed forces with all the resources at their disposal appear to have conceded the upper hand. Amassing more weapons of mass destruction may not be the solution especially given the assertion that over 60% of the weaponry and mobility resource of the enemy was seized from our forces.

8.9 What is required is the technological edge which sadly again the insurgents seem to have seized using improvisation of off the shelf technology.

8.10 The army as a matter of urgency must acquire sophisticated UAVs comprising conventional drones and fixed wing long endurance which the insurgents are yet to get.

8.11 This will provide instant intelligence and surveillance for attack and ambush strategy while the fixed wing high altitude can provide sustained pervasive and dedicated surveillance lasting 24 hrs or more, so they can report location and enemy strength and provide intelligence and guidance throughout the planning and execution stage from an undetectable altitude.

8.12 With the insurgents using cheap commercial drones to survey our troop positions for attack planning it’s only a matter of time before they use their ISIS connections to weaponise them with explosive payloads similar to what ISIS is using with devastating efficiency in Syria, Iraq and Kurdistan.

8.13 It is therefore imperative that the Army be equipped with drone detection and incapacitating technology in the form of anti-drone systems which can jam radio frequencies used to control drones, causing them to fall out of the sky uncontrollably or even utilise laser beams to burn aerial drones causing internal systemic failure.
8.14 Fixed systems covering large areas can be used to protect barracks, super camps, stadia, VIP venues etc. while vehicle mounted mobile systems can accompany troops provided ad hoc protection. There are also portable units in the form of a jammer rifle that can incapacitate drones from long distance for on the move protection.

8.15 As a matter of necessity the Air-force must assert its superiority in the skies by embarking on constant and debilitating air raids on insurgent and bandit camps and supply channels to ensure near complete annihilation of men and resources and wipe out their capacity to regroup or coordinate their cells for combined aggression.

8.16 The same aircraft can be used to provide close air support for ground troops and deployed for Intelligence gathering, search and reconnaissance.

8.17 We must find a vacuum filling alternative for the super Tucano order for immediate deployment as it is apparent that the unending delays and the new delivery date of 2022 for the US order may simply be another ploy. There are alternative high endurance turboprops within the eastern blog that can fill in the gap.

8.18 The general recommendations given are far reaching and long term and will obviously follow an implementation timeline if accepted.

8.19 To achieve an incisive and immediate turnaround in the security situation and to provide much needed succor and relief to anxious Nigerians some drastic and visibly effective military programs and exercises need to be executed with the primary objective of dealing with the twin evils of kidnapping and banditry. The Insurgency in the North East is a national threat, and globally counter insurgency is a slow and tedious assignment spanning decades. However the rampant and expanding spectre of kidnapping and banditry is now overshadowing the BH threat in scale and brazenness as it is now endemic in at least 3 regions and 19 States.

8.20 Worse still it has been allowed to fester to a level where the Police who should have ordinarily handled the situation are once again being supplanted by the military, allowing an internal security situation to further deplete our forces at the frontline.
8.21 We are therefore calling for a massive and sustained combined operation to identify, destroy and annihilate the camps and hideouts of the bandits and kidnappers wherever they may be situated with no letup whatsoever.

8.22 This combined operation will involve all our security and intelligence resources because it will have to be holistically planned and simultaneously executed so we don’t repeat the mistake of dislodging them in one forest so they can relocate and re-establish in another.

8.23 The operation should make use of land and aerial attack utilizing intelligence gathering and reconnaissance technology, and all rehabilitated forests should be occupied and subjected to sustained monitoring using the National Park service and other relevant agencies to make re-occupation impossible. We should make effective use of community intelligence and cooperation to fish out embedded culprits operating in their midst and bring them to book.

8.24 The operation should be visible and conspicuous to ensure that a strong message be sent out to the effect that whoever engages in banditry and kidnapping will pay a very heavy price, since it is obvious that what is fueling the problem is the apparent impression of a lack of clear and present retribution. Stories of millions being paid in ransom have emboldened copycat instant criminals who believe the gains far outweigh the risks, and this mindset must be erased.

9.0 CONCLUSION

Mr. President, Distinguished Colleagues on behalf of the Ad-Hoc Committee, I wish to thank the Senate for the confidence reposed on the Members of the Ad-Hoc Committee and for finding us worthy to undertake this national assignment on behalf of this Distinguished Senate hoping that the Senate will find our recommendations useful.

Thank you and God bless.

Senator Yahaya A. Abdullahi, PhD, OON
Chairman,
Senate Leader.

Mrs. Vivian N. Njemanze
Clerk to the Ad-Hoc Committee.
1. Senator Yahaya A. Abdullahi

2. Distinguished Senator Eyinnaya H. Abaribe

3. Distinguished Senator Aliyu S. Abdullahi

4. Distinguished Senator Ibrahim A. Gobir

5. Distinguished Senator Mohammed A. Ndume

6. Distinguished Senator Aliyu M. Wamakko

7. Distinguished Senator Dauda H. Jika

8. Distinguished Senator Kashim Shettima

9. Distinguished Senator Bala Ibn Na' Allah

10. Distinguished Senator George T. Sekibo
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