



## **DEFENCE SECTOR REFORM & OVERSIGHT FOR LEGISLATORS AND LEGISLATIVE STAFF**

This Primer answers the following basic questions:

1. What is defence reform and why is it important?
2. What are the distinguishing characteristics of a reformed defence sector vis-a -vis a non-reformed defence sector?
3. Which entities comprise the Nigerian defence sector?
4. What legal frameworks govern this sector?
5. What are the different areas in which defence reform is conducted?
6. Who are the principal actors involved in defence reform?
7. What kind of armed forces or military should defence reform strive for?
8. What is the National Assembly's (NASS) role in developing a security and/or defence policy?
9. What is the National Assembly's role in strengthening the defence sector/defence reforms?
10. How can the role of NASS in defence reform be strengthened?
11. What attempts have been made at defence reform in Nigeria ?
12. What is defence budgeting? What factors may influence defence budgeting?
13. What are the common items in Nigeria's defence budgets?
14. What is the role of NASS during the budget approval phase per existing laws?
15. What is the extent of NASS powers in amending or influencing the defence budget?
16. How can the National Assembly better Oversight Defence Budgets?
17. How can NASS Mainstream Gender and Human Rights in Defence Reform and Budgeting?
18. What is Defence Procurement?
19. How does Defence Procurement differ from other types of government procurement?
20. What actors are involved in Defence Procurement?
21. What role should NASS play in Defence Procurement in Nigeria?
22. How can the role of NASS in defence spending and procurement be strengthened?
23. What is the legal basis for the use of the military in civilian law enforcement?
24. How can NASS advance respect for human rights by the military in civilian law enforcement?
25. What is Civil-Military Relations? How does it differ from Civil-Military Coordination/Cooperation? And why should NASS care about these Concepts?
26. What are some good examples or practices on defence oversight from other countries?

## 1. What is defence reform and why is it important?

---

Defence reform is described as “the transformation of the defence sector of a given State so that the institutions are under civil control; abide by the principles of accountability and good governance; maintain an appropriately-sized force; have representative composition in terms of gender, ethnicity and other factors; are trained and equipped to suit their strategic environment (which may include contributing to peacekeeping and regional security organisations); and abide by international law, thus contributing to national and international goals of peace and security.”<sup>1</sup>

Defence reform is important and necessary to promote progression towards conflict prevention and stability; contribute to sustainable economic development, professionalise the military and democratise security.<sup>2</sup> Sustainable defence sector reform requires effective, efficient, and transparent security sector governance, and an up to date threat assessment on which to base security needs analysis. The ultimate goal of defence sector reform is to establish well-led, honest, accountable, legitimate institutions that operate within the confines of the rule of law and respect human rights. <sup>3</sup>

## 2. What are the distinguishing characteristics of a reformed defence sector vis-a -vis a non-reformed defence sector?

---

A reformed defence sector is built on systematic democratic control of the military. It can be seen within the context of the 'good governance' agenda, characterised by a substantive concern for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. On the other hand, a non-reformed defence sector exemplifies the concept of 'poor governance' which is characterised by “arbitrary policy-making, unaccountable bureaucracies, un-enforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged in public life and widespread corruption.”<sup>4</sup> It is also characterised by lack of transparency and flourishing corruption especially in arms procurement; lack of the rule of law due to a non-existing or weak legal regime; lack of professionalism; poorly trained units; selection and promotion of servicemen on the basis of nepotism instead of merit; organisational structures that are ill-suited to new security threats; political abuse of the military such as manipulation of political

---

1 Cheryl Hendricks and Lauren Hutton. “Defence Reform and Gender.” Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit. Eds. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek. Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008.

2 See: Born, H, Fluri, Ph., Lunn, S. (eds.) (2003), Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and Its Reform: A Collection of Articles on Foundational Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector.

3 Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice - [https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson\\_Defence\\_Sector\\_Reform\\_Note\\_FINAL\\_12dec09\\_1\\_1.pdf](https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson_Defence_Sector_Reform_Note_FINAL_12dec09_1_1.pdf)

4 See: The World Bank, Governance: The World Bank's Experience, (Washington, DC: World Bank 1994).

enemies, as well as the use of the military to intimidate or neutralise political enemies; a de-motivated personnel due to a lack of professionalism; poor career opportunities; inadequate salaries; low esteem of the military in society; misuse of soldiers for personal gain, and illegal activities.<sup>5</sup>

### 3. Which entities comprise the Nigerian defence sector?

---

The Nigerian defence sector comprises the following entities:

- The Ministry of Defence;
- The Three Services: the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force;
- The Defence Headquarters;
- Training institutions of the three services such as, schools and colleges, secondary/primary schools, as well as their business concerns (e.g. hotels, guest houses, companies);
- Joint training institutions and centres including the Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji, National Defence College Abuja, Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, Nigerian Army University, Defence Intelligence College); and
- Others: Military Pensions Board, Defence Space Agency, Defence Research Agency, Nigerian Armed Forces Resettlement Centre, Defence Industries Corporation.

### 4. What legal frameworks govern this sector?

---

The Constitution of the Federal; Republic of Nigeria (as amended) – which gives NASS powers to legislate on the use of armed forces, authorise a state of emergency or the state of war, etc.

- The Armed Forces Act
- Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (Exclusion of Armed Force Armament Depot) Act
- Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria Act
- Nigerian Defence Academy Act
- Armed Forces (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Special Provisions) act

---

5 See: Born, H, Fluri, Ph., Lunn, S. (eds.) (2003)

- Armed Forces Comfort Fund Act
- Armed Forces Pension Act
- UN Instruments
  - o Arms Trade Treaty (2014)
  - o Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2002)
- ECOWAS Instruments
  - o Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978)
  - o Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981)
  - o Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999)
  - o Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001)
  - o Convention of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2006)
  - o Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in Africa (2006)
  - o ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008)

## 5. What are the different areas in which defence reform is conducted?

---

### Box 1

#### Different areas in which defence reform is conducted

- Military doctrine, rules of engagement (ROEs) and operating procedures;
- Weapons systems, logistics and defence infrastructure;
- Force size and structure;
- Management and budget systems;
- The ownership of defence establishment property;
- Personnel policies (professionalisation, recruitment, right-sizing, training, promotion, retirement and the representativeness of a country's defence establishment);
- Relationships among the services (jointness), and with other security forces at home and abroad (interoperability), as well as with other parts of the security sector;
- Relationship with the media and the public;
- Legal frameworks.

*Source: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, "Defence Reform", SSR Backgrounder Series (Geneva: DCAF, 2009)*

## 6. Who are the principal actors involved in defence reform?

---

Defence reform involves a wide range of national actors, including:

- The Executive /President and Commander in Chief;
- The National Security Council;
- The Armed Forces;
- The Chief of Defense Staff;
- The National Security Advisor;
- The Ministry/Minister of Defence, other ministries with a defence-related role (e.g. Justice and Foreign Affairs);

- Other security forces that liaise and cooperate with the armed forces;
- The National Assembly and its defence and other security-related committees;
- Judicial and penal institutions, international courts (ECOWAS Court of Justice, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the International Criminal Court etc.)
- Ombudsman/oversight institutions e.g. National Human Rights Commission, Public Complaints Commission;
- Civil society actors, such as NGOs and the media;
- Think tanks that carry out research and training on defence issues;
- Private defence/security subject matter experts;
- Political parties that influence defence policy and local communities where the military is stationed;
- Non-state actors, such as private military and security companies that may need to coordinate with the military in the field or firms that supply materiel to the military;
- Several international/external actors may also be involved in supporting defence reform – either bilaterally or through multilateral frameworks or NGOs by providing support and expertise and these include the United Nations (UN), World Bank, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) etc.

## **7. What kind of armed forces or military should defence reform strive for?**

---

Defence reform should be aimed at having armed forces that are:

- Capable of deploying in a variety of operational contexts;
- Flexible enough and sufficiently equipped and manned to deal with a range of risks and threats;
- Well-led and managed, with the necessary supporting communications capability;
- Able to absorb and utilise new technologies with an emphasis on training in hard and soft skills at all levels;
- Capable of operating within multinational frameworks e.g. Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS), African Union(AU), United Nations (UN);
- Representative of Nigeria's diversity and gender-sensitive;
- Respectful of human rights, international humanitarian law and rule of law;

- Cognisant of the need for a functional division of labour between the three services, Defence Head Quarters (DHQ) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) and also between uniformed members of the defence sector and civilian personnel and;
- Cognisant of the concept of democratic control of the armed forces – democratically controlled and effectively overseen by national legislative, executive, judicial and civil society institutions as well as international organisations.

Overall, Nigeria's defence reform efforts should strive to achieve a military that is Appropriate, Accountable, Affordable, and Adequate.

## 8. What is the National Assembly's role in developing a security and/or defence policy?

---

The country's national security policy is usually developed by the executive arm of government and articulates the security interest of Nigerians, challenges, threats and risks to the country's security, and measures for addressing them. A National Security Policy, also referred to as a plan, strategy, concept or doctrine, is often a cohesive document covering different subject areas and different from subordinate sectoral security policies or strategies such as cyber security, counter terrorism, or defence policies, which all derive from the main strategy/policy document. This policy is very important to Defence Reform because it informs priorities and policies for the defence sector.

There is a widespread belief that security policy making is a natural task for the executive while the Nigerian National Assembly (NASS) is regarded as an ill-suited institution for agenda setting on security. However, this is a misperception as parliaments around the world often do play a role (to varying degrees) in security and defence policy making. The involvement of the legislature is important because of its unique oversight, representation and law making roles, as well as its power over use of public funds. It is also important because they can enhance or frustrate the implementation process.

In furtherance of its constitutional role, NASS can influence the development and implementation of the nation's security or defence policy, which requires ownership and support by the citizens it seeks to protect. This is more so as such policies directly involve citizens' welfare, freedom, liberties, finances (e.g. citizens pay taxes to maintain the military. Also, the amount of money devoted to security affects funding for other critical sectors of the economy). As the elected representatives of the people, NASS is expected to both influence and highlight these interests in security policy discourse.

NASS can and should play a stronger role in debating and reviewing these policies, ensuring that any proposed legal framework adequately reflects the new thinking about security, and scrutinising the financial implications of such. Other specific actions that NASS can take include examining any major policy initiatives announced by the Ministry of Defence,

how the minister is discharging his/her policy responsibilities and any information being shared on the government's intentions regarding the defence sector.

## 9. What is the National Assembly's role in strengthening the defence sector/defence reforms?

---

Some of the roles of NASS here include:

- **Legislating for reforms:** NASS can debate, and pass into law, defence sector bills proposed by the executive. It can also propose its own bills. In doing so, it however needs to ensure that proposed bills align with the broader national security strategy, promote good security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) practices and have a measure of executive buy-in for it to be successful.
- **Approval of top military appointments:** Civilian or democratic control of the armed forces entails that the latter is subordinated to democratically-elected authorities. Consequently, in democratic societies, legislatures are legally empowered to establish criteria for top security personnel and/or scrutinise and confirm their appointment. For the Nigerian Armed Forces, this power is granted to NASS by Section 18(1) of the Armed Forces Act, which empowers NASS to confirm appointment of service chiefs. While this provision is usually observed in breach, judicial pronouncements<sup>6</sup> have reinforced this legislative power following an attempt by the Executive during President Yar'adua's administration to dispense with the requirement via an Executive Order, purportedly issued pursuant to S.315 (2) of the 1999 Constitution. This provision, which was adopted in the Constitution following Nigeria's transition to democratic rule in 1999, retains the law making powers of the executive and requires urgent review by NASS. In addition, the practice of approving executive appointments ex post facto i.e. retrospectively comes across as a fait accompli by the executive. NASS needs to address this practice to avoid the public perceiving it as a "rubber stamp" legislature.
- **Holding the military accountable through legislative oversight:** Oversight is crucial to advancing civilian supremacy and democratic governance. NASS can through its legislative committees in charge of defence, utilise this power to give voice to citizens' needs and concerns on security.
- **Ensuring judicious use of defence budget:** To this day, one of the legislature's most important mechanisms for controlling the executive is the budget. As defence sector

---

6 See: Festus Keyamo v President, Federal Republic of Nigeria and 4 others (Suit No.FHC/ ABJ/CS/611/08), which set aside as unconstitutional, the Armed Forces Modification Order, 2008, No. 50, made by late President Yar'Adua purportedly pursuant to S.315 (2) of the Constitution, which sought to dispense with NASS confirmation of appointment of Service Chiefs.



organisations take up a substantial share of the State's budget it remains essential that NASS monitors the use of the State's scarce resources both effectively and efficiently. Through the budget and annual reports, NASS can monitor the availability or adequacy of trainings and implementation of critical issues such as observance of human rights and gender sensitivity by the armed forces.

- **Enhancing public awareness and discussions on defence matters:** Since NASS members are elected representatives who often have direct and regular contact with their constituents, they can improve the opportunities for informed and open debate on defence issues and subsequently raise citizens' security concerns at plenary sessions and ensure that they are reflected in defence policies or laws.
- **Ensuring Respect for Human Rights norms:** Because the Nigerian military are confronted with a new security environment and evolving security threats, new counter-measures are constantly adopted or put into place. It is therefore important for NASS to ensure that the decisions and actions of the military are at all times, consistent with the constitution, international humanitarian and human rights law.
- **Developing parliamentary cooperation with neighbouring and regional countries:** By so doing, NASS contributes to the exchange of experiences and enhances the understanding of problems in organising and controlling the defence sector, thus enabling a relevant global approach. Also, NASS can contribute to defining Nigeria's views on sub-regional, regional and global security, as well as bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. In doing this, NASS sets the pace and extent of defence reforms.

## 10. How can the role of NASS in defence reform be strengthened?

---

To strengthen NASS' role in defence reform, its knowledge and capacity in defence matters need to be enhanced through capacity building, external independent experts' support and access to materials on different defence issues. Lawmakers also need to assert the role of NASS more firmly on defence and security matters, in order to redress the executive's longstanding dominance. In furtherance of this, there is need for NASS to partner with relevant CSOs/NGOs or retain independent subject matter experts so that they can better review budgets and debate policy options instead of just relying on information provided by the Ministry of Defence and Service Chiefs. They could also explore training or peer exchange programs with the legislatures of more advanced democracies.

## 11. What kind of attempts have been made at defence reform in Nigeria?

---

Since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, there have been several un-sustained attempts to reform the sector. In 2000, the Obasanjo administration restored bilateral military aid

programs by seeking the aid of foreign governments such as the US and UK. For instance, the administration sought the expertise of the Military Professionals Resource Incorporated (MPRI), a United States based private security company, to facilitate a re-professionalisation program for the armed forces. It also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the British Government to provide a British Defence Advisory Team (BDAT) for the military<sup>7</sup>. Drafting of a National Defence Policy document began in 2001 and, the Policy was formally adopted in 2006. The same Obasanjo administration also set up a Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) chaired by the late Justice Oputa to inquire into rights violations by the military. There is however no evidence that its findings led to indictments or sanctions, nor its recommendations on ending the military's impunity implemented. In the years that followed, subsequent cases of human rights abuse by the military that went unacknowledged, lack of political leadership to drive reforms, and escalation of the Boko Haram Insurgency have often scuttled reform efforts.

In recent times, there have however been attempts at improving civil-military relations, initiation of inquiries into arms procurement deals<sup>8</sup> and increasing the relevance of legislative committees in charge of defence within NASS. In spite of these, many gaps still remain, with legislative oversight being further weakened by high turnover of legislators after elections and cases of widespread abuse and corruption in the sector still prevalent.<sup>9</sup>

While reform initiatives may be well intended, they are insufficient as they have focused largely on the military services not the wider defence sector, and being a self-driven process, lacked the buy-in of the non-military stakeholders crucial to sustaining reforms. What is needed is a more fundamental, comprehensive and inclusive approach. Introducing a comprehensive reform program and effectively implementing same will improve Nigeria's capacity to address current security challenges, and possibly spare it future challenges.

## 12. What is defence budgeting? What factors may influence defence budgeting?

---

Defence budgeting or military budgeting is the process of determining and allocating financial resources to raising and maintaining an armed force or other methods essential for

---

7 The UK currently has a resident British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in Nigeria that provides training and capacity building support to the Nigerian military to help it counter the violent extremist organisation, Boko Haram.

8 See: PLAC, "House to Investigate Presidency's Committee on Arms Procurement." Available at: <https://placng.org/wp/2016/11/house-to-investigate-presidencys-committee-on-arms-procurement/>.

9 Transparency International places Nigeria's military in the second highest risk category for corruption in the security sector. See: <http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/nigeria/>

defence purposes. Factors that may influence defence budgeting include the following:

- i. Whether the country is at peace or at war- internal or external. Countries at peace generally spend less on defence. Countries at war in general increase their defence budget<sup>10</sup>.
- ii. Size of the country's economy.
- iii. Whether the country is facing an internal rebellion or insurgency or not. Where civil wars are ongoing military expenditure is greatly elevated.
- iv. Other financial demands on the country.
- v. The willingness of the government or people to fund such military activity.
- vi. Neighbourhood effects (arms races). Military expenditure often reflects a country's existing fear of its neighbours or aggressive intentions towards them. The level of military expenditure chosen by a government could, to an extent, be influenced by the level of expenditure adopted by its neighbours. Defence budgets often reflect how strongly a country perceives the likelihood of threats against it, or the amount of aggression it wishes to conjure vis-a-vis its neighbours or potential adversaries. It also gives an idea of the role the country intends to play in the sub-regional, regional or global power politics.
- vii. Beneficiaries and vested interests.
- viii. Arms control agreements or mechanisms to which the country is a party.

### **13. What are the common items in Nigeria's defence budgets?**

---

Nigeria's defence budget is broken broadly into recurrent and capital expenditure. Recurrent expenditure for all three services is similar in that it covers personnel costs i.e. salaries and emoluments, which is by far the largest portion of the budget.<sup>11</sup> However, for the capital expenditure while there are common items between the three Services there are also unique line items due to the peculiarities of each Service. In general, items under capital expenditure for the military include: construction of new barracks/bases, renovation of barracks, kitting/uniform, purchase of ammunition, armaments /pyrotechnics, purchase of equipment (land combat vehicles and weapons for the Army, naval boats/helicopters

---

10 From return to democracy in 1999, through the Boko Haram insurgency which started in 2019, Nigeria's defence budget has not risen to more than 0.5% of GDP. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) *Military Expenditure Database*. Available at ; [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org)

11 Between 2009 to 2014, only about 14.3 per cent of Nigeria's cumulative defence budget went to capital expenditure, including investments in hardware.

for the Navy and aircraft, spares and ground equipment for the Air Force).

The three Services use different terminologies and do not use the same functional categories, which complicates oversight.<sup>12</sup>

## **14. What is the role of NASS during the budget approval phase per existing laws?**

---

The Constitution gives NASS the power of the purse in Section 80, (2) , (3) and (4). In exercise of this power, NASS considers annually, the President's appropriations bill acting under Section 81 (1) and (2) which requires the President to send revenue and expenditure estimates i.e. proposed annual budget to NASS for approval. These estimates include funding for numerous defence activities. During the consideration of the President's budget request for a fiscal year, in making approvals, NASS can make amendments, increases and deductions to certain aspects of the defence budget consistent with policies and priorities. The President may request, and NASS may approve, additional funding for selected activities, in the form of supplemental appropriations.

## **15. What is the extent of NASS powers in amending or influencing the defence budget?**

---

While it is often wrongly assumed that defence budget is the sole preserve of the Executive, NASS has powers to amend the defence budget and reallocate priorities. Section 217 (2) of the Constitution gives NASS the powers to make laws for the equipping and maintaining the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for carrying out their tasks. Therefore, NASS may decrease or increase one item or the other. Whatever the Executive proposes as defence budget, the reality is that NASS has a vote, and indeed the final word. If for instance, NASS considers that training on human rights and procurement of non-lethal weapons are necessary for the armed forces to operate effectively, NASS can set aside funds for the human rights training and purchase of non-lethal weapons even if the Executive had omitted such. However, while NASS is constitutionally empowered to influence defence allocations, it seldom does so.

---

<sup>12</sup> Global best practice is for all military services to list defence budget items under harmonised functional categories. For example, the UN uses groupings under three functional categories that have specific opportunity costs: Operating Costs , Procurement & Construction , Research and Development. An alternative grouping is used by the all U.S. military services with 5 main items: Military Personnel; Operations and Maintenance (which includes civilian pay); Weapons Procurement; Military Construction; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E).

## **16. How can the National Assembly better Oversight Defence Budgets?**

---

For legislators with no military service background, one major challenge is insufficient knowledge and expertise to perform defence budget oversight effectively in an increasingly complex environment. Many members of Defence Committees are naive on defence and military matters, and often lack good investigation skills. To better carry out oversight of defence budgets, NASS members must understand the defence sector, particularly how the Nigerian military is organised, administered, how it functions, as well as what gaps exist in terms of equipment, training and doctrine. Without such knowledge and information, NASS members will continue to face hurdles in monitoring the defence budget, scrutinising defence-related legislation, proposing amendments, as well as handling secrecy laws. While the military may or may not be willing to give out such information, for better budget oversight, it is absolutely essential that NASS does not rely solely on the information coming from the military or rely on their financial support in the conduct of oversight. NASS should partner with CSOs, NGOs, academia and think tanks to enhance their knowledge and that of their legislative staff on this subject. NASS should also seek the services of independent subject matter experts to get alternative views to those given by the military to ensure that the country gets value for money. Alternatively, to improve access to information, NASS may adopt a process of vetting or scrutinising defence related committee members and staff or administering on them, oaths of confidentiality where it involves sensitive security information to address concerns of information leakage.

## **17. How can NASS Mainstream Gender and Human Rights in Defence Reform and Budgeting?**

---

Through the prioritisation of gender and human rights issues, NASS members, as civilian representatives of the people, can help reform the mindset, value system, and attitudes of the military to ensure that they mainstream gender and uphold the principle of protecting human rights and dignity in their doctrines, recruitment, training, and operations, which will lead to greater effectiveness in the long run. This can be done by overseeing and ensuring that the curriculum and training of the armed forces training institutions include such topics in their curriculums. During the budget approval process, they can ensure that funds for knowledge and skills building on these issues are allocated. Another effective way is to create via legislation, an Annual Mandatory Training List which is to include specified number of hours of training on Human Rights and Gender for every uniformed personnel. NASS can also utilise oversight visits to military facilities to examine whether, for example, provision has been made for separate barracks and hygiene facilities for men and women. The oversight can be extended to confirm the existence or adequacy of women's employment conditions, health care and maternity benefits. Finally, NASS can request to examine via the Ministry of Defence, human rights and gender related doctrines, guidance, handbooks, manuals, directives, instructions, Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and other normative material issued to military personnel.

## 18. What is Defence Procurement?

---

Defence procurement widely defined refers to any procurement carried out by contracting authorities in the field of defence such as goods, equipment, services or works or, non-military items like food. Narrowly defined, it refers to acquisitions by authorities in the defence sector intended for military use such as submarines, weapons systems and ammunition. Although defence procurement process may differ from country to country, it usually includes the following stages:

- assessment of threat and operational requirements;
- specification of technical requirements;
- exploration of supplier options and/or solicitation of tenders;
- negotiation, evaluation and selection;
- delivery management; and review.<sup>13</sup>

## 19. How does Defence Procurement differ from other types of government procurement?

---

Defence procurement differs from other categories of government procurement and by its very nature, has some distinguishing features. For instance:

- It usually departs from the general standards of openness and transparency seen with other procurements, enjoys exemptions from competition requirements and allows for a wider use of discretion by contracting authorities. Unfortunately, this increases the risk of mismanagement and corruption.
- In Nigeria, apart from the Public Procurement Act, there are no specific laws in Nigeria governing defence sector procurement. And even then, national security related procurements are granted special exceptions or waivers in the law, with audit of procurement of "Special Purpose Goods" such as armaments, ammunition, mechanical, electrical equipment or other things for the use of the Armed Forces, being subjected to the President's discretion. See sections 5(p), 15(2), 42(f) of the Public Procurement Act.
- The marketplace for defence procurement is very different from the commercial market. The market is monopolistic; it has limited buyers (governments) and limited sellers.

---

13 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, "Parliament's Role in Defence Procurement", SSR Backgrounder Series (Geneva: DCAF, 2006)

- It requires long-term planning due to long lead times, including development, testing, production and maintenance, none of which are likely to fit neatly within yearly budgeting assessments.
- It often involves complex technologies and thus requires investment in Research & Development (R&D). In this regard, there is need for NASS to take cognisance of the fact that technological obsolescence is rapid in the modern military sector. This is a challenge that the Nigerian Air Force currently faces i.e use of obsolete machines such as fighter jets that are expensive to maintain and whose parts are hard to replace.
- It requires a balance between secrecy regarding technical and operational issues and the access to information necessary to ensure transparency and accountability.
- Because of its high cost and importance to national security, defence procurement often attracts public exposure and political sensitivity, as well as, the attention of the media and civil society, especially when large weapons systems are involved.
- It requires the consideration of a number of international dimensions that do not typically affect other types of procurement e.g. the concerns of other states, foreign military assistance, interoperability needs (i.e. the ability of military equipment or groups to operate in conjunction with each other) and project collaboration as well as international law, arms control arrangements and embargoes/sanctions.<sup>14</sup>
- There is the challenge of comparing defence products bought, produced, or used in one country with that of another country. This is because the degree of product differentiation or uniqueness makes comparability of like with like difficult. For example, the unit cost for Nigeria's Tucano aircraft may differ greatly with the unit cost of same Tucanos bought by other countries due to the fact that while the base aircraft is the same, features such as armament and avionic suites may be different. There could also be add-on requests such as spares and associated training, thus making it difficult to equate one product purchased with another.
- Given the general secrecy with which military data is shrouded, and the genuine difficulties of obtaining information even if available, the data set required for efficient computation is not easily available. The difficulties are exacerbated by trade in second-hand weapons, hidden subsidies, foreign aid, compensatory trade agreements, illegal imports and smuggling against embargoes, purchase of weapon systems without adequate information on operating and support costs and many other such problems.

---

14 (DCAF, 2006)



## 20. What actors are involved in Defence Procurement?

---

Apart from the National Assembly, several other actors are involved in defence procurement and each has its specific and overlapping roles. These actors include the following:

### Box 2

#### Actors involved in Defence Procurement

- **The three military services**, who consult with the ministry of defence (MoD) regarding their capability and procurement needs; assist the executive in producing budget proposals; and often handle their own procurement of many smaller items and services.
- **The Ministry of Defence (MoD)**, who prepares security budgets and procurement proposals (in cooperation with the military and other executive bodies); negotiates with domestic and foreign firms, as well as with foreign governments; may grant licenses for arms production, trade and exports; usually handles tender processes; and usually also produces supplementary reports and documentation as needed or requested by NASS and others charged with defence procurement oversight. Generally, the executive or the MoD will have a special unit focused on procurement issues.
- **National Defence Industries**, including all firms that produce military or security-related equipment academic and other research institutions, with whom governments frequently cooperate to develop military technology;
- **Foreign suppliers**, which most countries utilise to meet their military needs, especially smaller countries that do not possess an advanced defence industry;
- **Academic and research institutions**, with whom governments frequently cooperate with to develop military technology;
- **Civil society and media**, who scrutinise both specific procurement proposals and the overall distribution of resources;
- **International organisations, defensive alliances and other cooperative security arrangements**, who may play a role in defence procurement through mechanisms such as arms embargos (e.g., the UN, EU or AU, ECOWAS), trading regulations (e.g., the EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Sales).



## 21. What role should NASS play in Defence Procurement in Nigeria?

---

- **Preventing corruption** - Transparent, competitive procurement practices and strong NASS oversight are essential to countering corruption. In this regard, NASS needs to improve existing procurement frameworks and address the use of Security Votes i.e. monthly extra-budgetary funds disbursed to certain federal, state and local government officials, which is not grounded on any law, is used at will, and not subject to audit.
- **Ensuring transparency** - Even in cases where some technical details of weapons programs must remain secret, NASS members should have access to this information. This may require a vetting process to ensure their reliability to manage such information.
- **Preventing parochial concerns from harming the national interest** - When domestic suppliers are involved, politicians may be tempted to secure funds for projects in their constituencies or that otherwise benefit their own constituency or ethnic group at the expense of the national interest. National security cannot be negotiated based on ethnic or political party affiliation because its consequences knows no party or interest. Policymakers therefore have to grow above partisanship to build harmonised responses on a national platform on defence issues
- **Establishing the proper role for the domestic defence industry** - In many countries, governments try to favour domestic companies in defence procurement to benefit the national economy and maintain a degree of independence vis-à-vis foreign suppliers. However, this should be approached with caution as decisions to award contracts to domestic industry may be affected by political considerations or even corruption, though of course this may also occur with foreign suppliers.
- **Ensuring that the military invests in modernisation and readiness** rather than expansion of its structures.

### Box 3

**In furtherance of its constitutional role, the National Assembly should, in specific terms:**

- Exercise adequate oversight over the government actors mentioned above;
- Seriously debate and scrutinise both annual and supplementary defence budgets;
- Regulate the use of security votes by demanding its appropriation, subjecting it to legislative oversight and independent audit;
- Establish a legal framework for procurement, including guidelines on the type of information on defence budgets and procurement that is either classified or can be disclosed;
- Request reports from or hold hearings with government and industry officials regarding specific tenders and contracts;
- Scrutinise the Ministry of Defence's compliance with the Freedom of Access to Information (FOI) Act as it relates to information on defence spending;
- Conduct evaluations of procurement as part of a larger defence review process;
- Insist on quality over quantity, as well as vigilance over wasteful and duplicative prestige acquisitions for equipment and projects that do not add to the operational capacity of the military.

## 22. How can the role of NASS in defence spending and procurement be strengthened?

---

NASS's role in defence procurement can be strengthened by the following:

- **Creation of a clear legal basis for legislative oversight** to enhance transparency in defence purchases. Because the issue of unauthorised appropriations is a big possibility and can be particularly contentious, NASS could consider passing laws to strengthen its oversight mechanism on this issue. NASS could insist through legislation that defence procurement should be competitive for all non-emergency purchases and may consider passing laws that require their approval for defence contracts above a certain value.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> For example, Title 10 of the United States Code — the body of law that governs the Department of Defense and the military services — provides that "no funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year to or for the use of any armed force or obligated or expended" for specified categories of expenditures "unless funds therefor have been specifically authorised by law."

- **Enhancing legislators' access** to necessary resources, such as support staff and the possibility to call on independent expertise and consultants to give alternative views to those provided by the services. This would require that committees efficiently manage its own resources to accomplish this.
- **Building relatively stable membership in defence related committees** so as to help NASS develop expertise for their review and oversight functions. NASS leadership should also provide relevant committees with sufficient funding and support to perform their duties.
- **Partnership with relevant CSOs, NGOs, think tanks and independent subject matter experts** for capacity building, training of legislators and legislative staff as well as the production of knowledge products on contemporary defence related issues.

## 23. What is the legal basis for the use of the military in civilian law enforcement?

---

The legal basis for the use of the military in civilian law enforcement can be found in Section 217 (2) (c) of the Constitution which outlines the functions of the armed forces as including "suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly". The use of the military in civilian law enforcement is also implicit in Section 217 (2)(d) which provides that the armed forces can perform such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. Also, Section 8(1) of the Armed Forces Act provides that the President shall determine the operational use of the armed forces. Operational use is defined under section 8(3) of the same Act as including the use of the armed forces for maintaining and securing public safety and public order. Outside of the Constitution, and to give effect to the Constitution, there is a requirement and command responsibility for the three military services either singly and/or jointly, to promulgate and issue Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Rules on the Use of Force (RUF) on the use of military in civilian law enforcement for each and every operation and to provide training on such.

## 24. How can NASS advance respect for human rights by the military in civilian law enforcement?

---

NASS can do the following:

- Commission research on the use of the military in civilian law enforcement giving the pros and cons and international comparisons to inform further legislative action;
- Request that the Executive should make public, the report of the 2017 Presidential Investigation Panel on Review of Compliance of Armed Forces with Human Rights Obligations and Rules of Engagement with a view to implementing its recommendations;

- Legislate for ROE/RUF trainings to be made a mandatory annual training requirement for all military personnel;
- Mandate the MOD/DHQ/the three armed services to draft and issue ROE/RUF guidance documents during law enforcement operations;
- Specifically, through the budget and annual reports, monitor the availability or adequacy of trainings and implementation on human rights by the armed forces;
- Legislate on the use of the armed forces by developing rules for their use in civilian law enforcement. For instance, the United States has a federal statute; the "Posse Comitatus Act", which restricts government's use of Armed Forces in civilian law enforcement and internal security.
- Examine petitions and complaints from military personnel and civilians via its Public Petitions Committees.

## 25. What is Civil-Military Relations? How does it differ from Civil-Military Coordination/Cooperation? And why should NASS know about these Concepts?

---

Civil-military relations (Civmil or CMR) can be described as the interactions between civil authority, civil society and the military. Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord or CIMIC) is described as "*the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals... It is a framework that enhances a broad understanding of humanitarian action and guides political and military actors on how best to support that action.*"<sup>16</sup>

While CIMIC refers specifically to the "interaction between humanitarian organisations and military actors for humanitarian purposes, the broader term 'civil-military relations' generally refers to the interaction between the military and a wider range of civilian actors, including civil society, government authorities, rule of law, security sector reform, human rights and development actors, and can be undertaken for a range of objectives."<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> Definition by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). See: <https://www.un-ocha.org/es/themes/humanitarian-civil-military-coordination>. There seems to be a slight difference in terminology between the UN CMCoord, which focuses on coordination, and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), which tends to look at cooperation from a military perspective. See: Cedric De Coning, Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations. Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCcivil-military-coordination-and-un-peacebuilding-operations/>

<sup>17</sup> See: Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon (2012). Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination: A review of the literature. Overseas Development Institute. Available at: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7679.pdf>

NASS needs to inform itself of these concepts, their objectives, and how they might intervene, in light of recent strained relationships between citizens, the media and the military, as well as escalating tensions between the military and humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) providing relief services in the ongoing insurgency war in the country. These tensions manifest in allegations of human rights violations from one side and sabotage of counter-terrorism efforts from the other. While the fundamental goal of the military is to secure the environment, that of NGOs is to deliver assistance to affected populations. Developing effective CIMIC means accepting, understanding and harmonising these differences. In addition, recent discussions within NASS amidst pressure from the military to regulate the activities of NGOs and/or development of a legal framework for humanitarian and emergency-related aids to conflict-ridden areas in Nigeria, also makes exploration of these issues by legislators imperative.

## 26. What are some good examples or practices on defence oversight from other countries?

---

**Box 4**

**Some Good Practices on Defence Oversight**

- **Adoption of a comprehensive defence legislative oversight plan**

The Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives mandates each standing committee to adopt and submit a two-year oversight plan to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Committee on House Administration in the first session of each Congress. This oversight plan contains a detailed list of matters for oversight and investigation to ensure the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the federal government and all its agencies. Committees still retain the flexibility to investigate instances of waste, fraud, and abuse as they emerge. In furtherance of this, the Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives usually adopts a detailed oversight plan focused on the US annual defense authorisation bill, as well as the committee's broader oversight responsibilities, which is considered by the House of Representatives at large.

In light of the current threat environment, NASS can amend its rules to mandate its committees, particularly the defence and security sector related committees to articulate and submit their plans for oversight. This is important in setting a strategic direction for the committee's work and providing guidance for external partners who may wish to support the committee's work.

- **Budget & Procurement**

- In countries like Canada, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, US, the legislature votes to approve overall budget spend before making sectorial allocations or specific appropriations.
- The National Audit Office in the UK produces annual reports to the House of Commons containing details of the largest 25 defence procurement projects of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD in turn provides parliament with an annual statement of the top 20 new defence projects.
- The parliaments in the Czech Republic and US play a role in selecting the vendor for defence procurements.
- In the US, military witnesses and political heads of service departments sometimes challenge the assessment and budgetary allocation proposals made by the Department of Defence for particular weapon systems and they are given a hearing at the Congress where a final decision is to be taken on procurement

- **Limited number of security and defence related committees and/or streamlined roles**

Many legislatures tend to have a single or limited number of committees overseeing security agencies in order to promote efficiency. In the Nigerian National Assembly, there are many committees often having overlapping mandates. This often creates challenges for synergy and harmonisation of efforts. For instance, it is not unusual to see an executive official being summoned by different NASS committees over the same subject matter that could be dealt with jointly. It is necessary for NASS to reform its committee processes to ensure that there is a coordinated approach towards legislative oversight. A clear oversight plan by committees can facilitate this synergy.

- **Legislation**

The US Congress enacted the United States (US) Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganisation Act of 1986, which made the most sweeping changes to the United States Department of Defense (DoD). It sought to improve the efficiency of the U.S. armed forces and the DoD budget process.

- **Approval of Executive Appointments**

In the US, Congress approves the President's nominee for the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When President Bush nominated General Pace to replace General Myers as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 2005, the nominee waited for over three months for congressional hearing and approval before he assumed office.

- **Security Policy Formulation**

In the UK House of Commons, each major Defence strategy document is vigorously debated by the plenary. In Romania, the President is mandated to, within 6 months after being sworn-in, present the country's National Security Strategy to the parliament for debate and approval.

## References/ Further Reading Material

---

- Armed Forces Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. Available at <https://lawsfnigeria.placng.org/>
- Anderson, E., & Page, M. T. (2017). *Weaponising Transparency: Defence Procurement Reform as a Counterterrorism Strategy in Nigeria*. Transparency International. Retrieved from [http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Weaponising\\_Transparency\\_Web.pdf](http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Weaponising_Transparency_Web.pdf)
- Aiyede, E. R. (2015). Democratic Security Sector Governance and Military Reform in Nigeria. In: Bryden, A. and Chappuis, F. (Eds.) *Learning from West African Experiences in Security Sector Governance*, Pp. 97–116. London: Ubiquity Press. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/bau.f>.
- Ball, N., Fayemi, K. J., Olonisakin, F., & Williams, R. (n.d.). *Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook*. Retrieved from [gsdrc.org/docs/open/gfn-ssr-securitysectorgovernanceinafrica-ahandbook.pdf](http://gsdrc.org/docs/open/gfn-ssr-securitysectorgovernanceinafrica-ahandbook.pdf)
- Bärwaldt, K. (Ed.). (2018). *Strategy, jointness, capacity: institutional requirements for supporting security sector reform*. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Global Policy and Development. Retrieved from <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14813.pdf>
- Born, H., Fluri, P., & Lunn, S. (Eds.). (2003). *Oversight and guidance: the relevance of parliamentary oversight for the security sector and its reform: a collection of articles on foundational aspects of parliamentary oversight of the security sector*. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Retrieved from [https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/dcaf\\_doc4.pdf](https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/dcaf_doc4.pdf)
- Born, H., & Uzochina, O. (2011). *Parliamentary oversight of the security sector: ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF guide for West African parliamentarians*. (H. Born, J. Gacond, & B. N'Diaye, Eds.). Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
- Boucher, A. J. (2009). *Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice*. The Stimson Centre. Retrieved from: [https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson\\_Defence\\_Sector\\_Reform\\_Note\\_FINAL\\_12dec09\\_1\\_1.pdf](https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Stimson_Defence_Sector_Reform_Note_FINAL_12dec09_1_1.pdf)
- Bryden, A., N'diaye, B., & Olonisakin, F. (Eds.). (2008). *Challenges of security sector governance in West Africa*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Retrieved from [https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/bm\\_WestAfrica\\_bryden\\_en.pdf](https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/bm_WestAfrica_bryden_en.pdf)
- Cole, E., Fluri, P., & Lunn, S. (Eds.). (2015). *Oversight and Guidance: Parliaments and Security Sector Governance*. Geneva: DCAF. Retrieved from [https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Oversight and Guidance Parliaments and SSG\\_eng.pdf](https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Oversight and Guidance Parliaments and SSG_eng.pdf)
- Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives. *Oversight Plan for the 116th Congress*. Retrieved from <https://bit.ly/2otFw96>



Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)

Cover, O., & Meran, S. (2013). *Watchdogs?: the quality of legislative oversight of defence in 82 countries*. London: Transparency International.

Retrieved from <http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Watchdogs-low.pdf>

Congressional Research Service (1998). *CRS Report for Congress: A Defence Budget Primer*. Retrieved from [https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19981209\\_RL30002\\_40db7bbabf477fdf58b9b6ed35c8bb7160df891c.pdf](https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19981209_RL30002_40db7bbabf477fdf58b9b6ed35c8bb7160df891c.pdf)

Department for International Development (2002). *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*. DFID, UK. Retrieved from [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/supportingsecurity\[1\].pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/supportingsecurity[1].pdf)

Ebo, A., & N'Diaye, B. (Eds.). (2008). *Parliamentary oversight of the security sector in West Africa: opportunities and challenges*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Eme, O. I., & Ogbochie, A. (2014). Executive-Legislature Feud in Nigeria: An Examination of Service Chiefs Confirmation, 1999-2014. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN Chapter)*, 3(12). Retrieved from [https://www.arabianjbm.com/pdfs/OM\\_VOL\\_3\\_\(12\)/1.pdf](https://www.arabianjbm.com/pdfs/OM_VOL_3_(12)/1.pdf)

Eriksen, S., & Cardona, F. (n.d.). *Criteria for good governance in the defence sector International standards and principles*. Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector. Retrieved from <https://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/7215-Criteria-for-Good-Governance-in-the-Defence-Sector-k6.pdf>

Fluri, P., Johnsson, A. B., & Born, H. (Eds.). (2003). *Parliamentary oversight of the security sector: Principles, mechanisms and practices*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Interparliamentary Union. Available at: <http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/decaf-e.pdf>

Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service (HTACOS) of the Armed Forces of Nigeria

Hendricks, C. & Hutton, L. (2008) "Defence Reform and Gender." *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit*. (M. Bastick and K. Valasek, Eds.) Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW

Hendrickson, D., & Karkoszka, A. (2002). The Challenges of Security Sector Reform. *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, 175–201. Retrieved from <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/04..pdf>

International Crises Group. (2016). *Nigeria: The Challenge of military reform. Nigeria: The Challenge of military reform*. Crisis Group Africa Report No. 237. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5756664c4.pdf>

Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2007). *The role of parliamentary committees in mainstreaming gender and promoting the status of women: Seminar for Members of Parliamentary Bodies*



- Dealing with Gender Equality, 4-6 December 2006, Geneva.* Geneva. Retrieved from file:///Users/plac/Downloads/wmn\_seminar06\_en\_1.pdf
- Kelly, F. (2019, September 25). Nigeria: Jihadists execute ACF aid worker as army closes Mercy Corps offices. *The Defense Post*. Retrieved from <https://thedefensepost.com/2019/09/25/nigeria-iswap-executes-acf-worker-army-closes-mercy-corps/>
- Kotia, E. (2011). The Principle and Reality of Legislative Oversight in Defence Matters in Liberal Democracies: An Empirical Case. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 3(1), 57–71. Retrieved from [https://www.japss.org/upload/3.\\_Kotia\[1\].pdf](https://www.japss.org/upload/3._Kotia[1].pdf)
- McCartney, C., Fischer, M., & Wils, O. (2004). *Security sector reform: potentials and challenges for conflict transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Metcalfe, V., Haysom, S., & Gordon, S. (2012). *Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination: A review of the literature*. Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper. Overseas Development Institute. Retrieved from <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7679.pdf>.
- Møller, B. (2007). *Security sector reform and the fight against terrorism*. Copenhagen: DIIS.
- Nyager, S. (2015, July 2). Dealing with Disclosure in Nigeria's Security Sector. *Premium Times*. Retrieved from <https://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2015/07/02/dealing-with-disclosure-in-nigerias-security-sector-by-seember-nyager/>
- Nyager, S. (2015, October 23). Why Public Accountability Matters to Nigeria's National Security. *Premium Times*. Retrieved from <https://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2015/10/23/why-public-accountability-matters-to-nigerias-national-security-by-seember-nyager/>
- Page, M. T. (2018). *Camouflaged Cash: How Security Votes Fuel Corruption in Nigeria*. *Camouflaged Cash: How Security Votes Fuel Corruption in Nigeria*. Transparency International and Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC). Retrieved from [http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DSP\\_Nigeria\\_Camouflage\\_Cash\\_Web2.pdf](http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DSP_Nigeria_Camouflage_Cash_Web2.pdf)
- Perlo-Freeman, S. and Solmirano, C. (2012). *Why Arms Procurement Goes Wrong*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- Sawab, I. (2019, September 24). B/Haram: Why military authorities are at loggerheads with NGOs. *Daily Trust*. Retrieved from <https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/b-haram-why-military-authorities-are-at-loggerheads-with-ngos.html>
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *Military Expenditure Database*. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>
- Tagarev, T. (2010). *Building integrity and reducing corruption in defence: a compendium of best practices*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.







Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC)

Plot 451 Gambo Jimeta Crescent,

Guzape District,

Abuja, Nigeria.

**Website: [www.placng.org](http://www.placng.org) \*Email: [info@placng.org](mailto:info@placng.org) \*Phone: 08091899999**

## About PLAC

Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) is a non-governmental organization committed to strengthening democratic governance and citizens' participation in Nigeria. PLAC works to enhance citizens' engagement with state institutions, and to promote transparency and accountability in policy and decision-making processes.

The main focus of PLAC's intervention in the democratic governance process is on building the capacity of the legislature and reforming the electoral process. Since its establishment, PLAC has grown into a leading institution with capacity to deliver cutting-edge research, policy analysis and advocacy. PLAC receives funding support from donors and other philanthropic sources.

