{"id":4297,"date":"2026-11-12T18:08:07","date_gmt":"2026-11-12T18:08:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/?p=4297"},"modified":"2026-11-12T18:49:11","modified_gmt":"2026-11-12T18:49:11","slug":"whither-nass-constitution-reform","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/whither-nass-constitution-reform\/","title":{"rendered":"WHITHER NASS\u2019 CONSTITUTION REFORM?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>The 10<sup>th<\/sup> National Assembly is running out of time to deliver its Constitution reform promises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>More than three years after its inauguration in June 2023, extensive consultations, public hearings, and committee retreats have produced limited progress towards the decisive stage of the process, which is voting on the proposed amendments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The State Police amendment has passed both Chambers and secured the required State approvals, while the wider reform package remains unfinished. Can the National Assembly still deliver a substantial constitutional reform programme before its term ends in June 2027? The answer depends increasingly on decisions its leadership must take in the coming weeks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Extensive Consultation, Repeatedly Postponed Decisions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Both Chambers established Constitution review committees, chaired respectively by Deputy Senate President Barau Jibrin and Deputy Speaker Benjamin Kalu. Their work has covered proposals on local government autonomy, electoral and judicial reform, women\u2019s representation, citizenship, devolution of powers, and institutional accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By late 2025, the House committee reported that 260 Constitution alteration Bills had passed second reading, with 44 proposals prioritised for an initial package. A further package published in June 2026 identified 37 priority Bills.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The next stage was for the National Assembly to vote on the proposed amendments. The House initially scheduled voting for 14 October 2025, before announcing 9 and 10 December 2025 as the new dates. The exercise nevertheless entered 2026 without the promised decisions on the wider reform package. Both Chambers subsequently scheduled 11 June 2026 for voting, but only the House of Representatives proceeded, while the Senate deferred its vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The State Police amendment was the only proposal from the wider reform process to advance to the State Houses of Assembly, having proceeded through a separate Executive Bill transmitted by the President. After the two chambers passed different versions, the House withdrew its earlier proposal and adopted the Senate-passed version to produce a uniform text. The harmonised Bill was transmitted to the State Houses of Assembly on 16 September 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At the November 2025 joint retreat with State Assembly Speakers, committee leaders had spoken of transmitting approved Bills to the States before the end of that year, recognising their decisive role in determining the outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, the principal obstacle has remained at the Federal stage, as the wider package of proposed amendments cannot reach the State Houses of Assembly without first securing the required votes in both Chambers of the National Assembly. The committees\u2019 extensive work and prioritisation of Bills have therefore not translated into parliamentary approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Consultation is indispensable to legitimate Constitution reform, but its purpose is to prepare the legislature to decide. Repeatedly announcing that the process has reached its \u201cfinal stage\u201d loses credibility when voting does not follow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>State Police Shows What Political Commitment Can Achieve<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The progress of the State Police deserves recognition, as its receipt of the necessary State approvals demonstrates that a major constitutional reform can advance when the executive, legislative leadership, and State institutions sustain attention to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On 3 November 2026, the Clerk to the National Assembly confirmed that authenticated approvals had been received from 28 State Houses of Assembly, exceeding the required 24. Subsequent announcements put the number higher, with transmission of the Bill for presidential assent being arranged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Given the urgency of Nigeria\u2019s security crisis, prioritising policing reform is understandable. However, why has comparable urgency not been applied to reforms addressing political exclusion, local government accountability, and weaknesses in democratic institutions?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The lesson is that sustained political commitment must now extend to the rest of the agreed agenda, and the legislature should be able to advance its own reform priorities alongside proposals enjoying strong executive support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Important Reforms Remain Unresolved<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The outstanding Constitution amendment proposals concern issues on how Nigeria is governed, including whether local governments can function with meaningful autonomy, whether women can secure fairer political representation, whether citizens can contest elections independently of political parties, and whether powers and responsibilities are appropriately distributed across the federation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The package also includes judicial reforms, proposals on electoral offences, traditional institutions, and citizenship rights. These are matters on which Nigerians have made submissions and invested considerable advocacy effort.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Local government reform illustrates why legislation requires attention beyond a general declaration of support.&nbsp;To give local governments meaningful autonomy, the proposed Constitution amendments must clearly define their responsibilities, financing, democratic accountability, and protection against arbitrary interference.&nbsp;The objective should be effective local government that answers to residents and delivers services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Likewise, the National Assembly should assess each electoral and judicial amendment on its merits. It is not required to approve every amendment placed before it, but it must, however, explain its choices and take responsibility for deciding which reforms should proceed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A proposal rejected after transparent deliberation gives a clear parliamentary outcome, whereas a proposal indefinitely awaiting a vote leaves citizens unable to distinguish substantive disagreement from institutional inaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Special Seats: Assurances Must Become Decisions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Special Seats for Women Bill is an important test of the National Assembly\u2019s commitments. Women\u2019s political representation has attracted sustained advocacy across successive constitution review exercises. The rejection of gender-related proposals in the 9<sup>th <\/sup>Assembly made the current review an opportunity to demonstrate a different level of commitment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On 2 November 2026, Senate Leader Opeyemi Bamidele again outlined a proposal for 74 additional seats for women in the National Assembly, comprising one seat for each State and the Federal Capital Territory in each chamber. He also described three additional seats in each State House of Assembly and a 16-year period before a comprehensive review.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>PLAC\u2019s account of a National Assembly Open Week dialogue records earlier consideration of an Electoral College model for filling the proposed seats, including concerns about its transparency and independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The final text placed before lawmakers must therefore make clear how the seats would be filled, who would participate in the process, what safeguards would apply and when the arrangement would commence. These provisions will determine whether the proposal can genuinely widen women\u2019s access to political representation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The approaching elections make delay consequential, as implementation would require constitutional approval and appropriate electoral and transitional arrangements. The Assembly should state plainly whether any proposed commencement date remains achievable. It should also ensure that a narrowing opportunity for implementation in 2027 does not become an excuse to abandon the reform altogether.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Constitutional Thresholds Require Organised Leadership<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Assembly still has time to act, but the available legislative window is shorter than the calendar suggests. Under Section 9(2) of the 1999 Constitution, most alterations require the support of at least two-thirds of all members of each Chamber, followed by approval through resolutions of at least 24 State Houses of Assembly. However, Bills altering Section 8, Section 9, or Chapter IV require the higher threshold of four-fifths of all members of each federal chamber, alongside the same state approval requirement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The required majority depends on the votes cast in favour of each proposal, not merely the number of members present in the chamber. Election campaigns will make attendance and coordination more difficult, making disciplined scheduling essential to securing sufficient votes for each proposed amendment before the Assembly\u2019s tenure ends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The 9<sup>th<\/sup> Assembly\u2019s record shows that Constitution amendments can still be completed towards the end of a legislative term, having passed 16 Constitution alteration Bills to which President Muhammadu Buhari assented on 17 March 2023. However, the 10<sup>th<\/sup> Assembly should be judged not only by the number of its reforms, but also by their substance and prospects for implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>What Must Happen Now<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To complete the Constitution amendment process before its tenure ends, the 10<sup>th<\/sup> Assembly should publish a definitive status report for each priority Bill, setting out its current text, the stage reached in each Chamber, and any outstanding disagreements. It should also explain the changes from the earlier package of 44 Bills to the later package of 37.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Both chambers then adopt a coordinated voting timetable, circulate the final texts in advance, and publish how each member votes. Bills securing the required support should be authenticated and transmitted promptly to the states, with an accessible record of state responses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The leadership should also distinguish reforms requiring further legislation or administrative preparation from those capable of taking effect immediately. Responsible completion requires attention to commencement and implementation, alongside passage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These steps would give citizens a means of measuring delivery against commitments and would also help State Houses of Assembly prepare for their responsibilities without another avoidable period of uncertainty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>A Record Still Capable of Improvement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Has the National Assembly still failed its Constitution reform agenda? Its final record is not yet closed, but it has so far fallen substantially short of its promises. State Police is a significant achievement, but it cannot account for the breadth of the reform programme on which citizens were consulted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The remaining months offer an opportunity to recover some of the lost ground, but this will require clear priorities, published texts and organised voting, and prompt transmission of approved proposals. Further assurances will carry little weight without those decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The 10<sup>th<\/sup> National Assembly\u2019s constitutional legacy will be determined by the reforms it completes and the reasons it gives for those it leaves behind.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The 10th National Assembly is running out of time to deliver its Constitution reform promises. More than three years after its inauguration in June 2023, extensive consultations, public hearings, and committee retreats have produced limited progress towards the decisive stage of the process, which is voting on the proposed amendments. The State Police amendment has [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":4318,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_templately_pack_id":"","_templately_imported_at":"","_templately_source":"","_templately_import_session_id":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[11],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4297","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4297","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4297"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4297\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4316,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4297\/revisions\/4316"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4318"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4297"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4297"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4297"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}