{"id":3633,"date":"2024-10-03T12:41:22","date_gmt":"2024-10-03T12:41:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/?p=3633"},"modified":"2024-10-03T13:16:11","modified_gmt":"2024-10-03T13:16:11","slug":"recall-of-legislators-under-the-nigerian-constitution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/recall-of-legislators-under-the-nigerian-constitution\/","title":{"rendered":"Recall of Legislators under the Nigerian Constitution"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Under the Nigerian Constitution, elected officials including the President, Vice President, Governors, Deputy Governors are not subject to recall. The Constitution stipulates a process for their impeachment by the legislative arm of government, while State laws provide the procedure for the impeachment of Local Government Chairmen and Vice Chairmen. Under the Constitution, these elected officials may be impeached under procedures that are well articulated and spelt out. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The challenge however comes with the\nremoval of legislators. In this analysis, PLAC is reviewing the current state\nof affairs regarding the recall of an elected member of the National Assembly,\na State House of Assembly or a member of an Area Council of the Federal Capital\nTerritory (FCT) . The Constitution makes provisions for the recall of members\nof the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly in sections 69 and 110, respectively.\nImplementation however is where the problem lies and there has not been a\nsingle case since 1999 (25 years and counting) where a legislator has\nsuccessfully been recalled under the Constitution. The right to recall an\nelected legislator is one of the cornerstones of democratic governance,\nempowering constituents to hold their representatives accountable. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Section 69 provides that: <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>A member of the Senate or of the House Representatives\nmay be recalled as such a member if<\/em><em>:<\/em><em>\n<\/em><em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><em>there is presented to the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral\nCommission a petition in that behalf signed by more than one-half of the\npersons registered to vote in that member\u2019s constituency alleging their loss of\nconfidence in that member and which signatures are duly verified by the\nIndependent National Electoral Commission; and <\/em><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><em>(b) the\npetition is thereafter, in a referendum conducted by the Independent National\nElectoral Commission within ninety days of the date of receipt of the petition,\napproved by a simple majority of the votes of the persons registered to vote in\nthat member\u2019s constituency. <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Section 110 of the Constitution makes\na similar provision with respect to the recall of a member of the State House\nof Assembly. These sections of the Constitution were amended in 2010 to include\nthe words, \u201c\u2026<em>and which signatures are duly verified by the Independent\nNational Electoral Commission<\/em>\u201d. This amendment adds a layer to the recall\nprocess by requiring that the signatures of the petitioners must be verified. The\ninitial provision which did not include this phrase was loose, necessitating &nbsp;an amendment. However, it will seem that\nlegislators were much more concerned about increasing the impossibility of\ntheir recall by adding the clause that requires verification of petitioners\u2019\nsignatures. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Electoral Act in section 2 (c)\nalso empowers INEC to conduct any referendum required under the Constitution\nwhile section 113 of the Act provides for the recall of a member of an Area\nCouncil of the FCT&nbsp; by a similar\nprovision stipulated in the Constitution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The recall process in Nigeria can\nbe segmented into three main parts \u2013 submission of a petition signed by more\nthan 50% of registered voters in the legislator\u2019s constituency, verification of\nthe signatures by INEC and the conduct of a referendum. While the process appears\nstraightforward in theory, these provisions present significant challenges that\nmake recalling a legislator in Nigeria almost impossible in practice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Although INEC has come up with Guidelines\ndetailing the procedure for recall of elected legislators, it is unclear how\nthis will achieve the removal of ineffective or failing legislators in\npractical terms. A cursory look at these Guidelines reveals that upon receipt\nof a petition from constituents by INEC, an exercise for verification of\npetitioners\u2019 signatures and a referendum will hold. The processes for the two\nexercises are akin to the conduct of an election. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><br>\nTo further breakdown the elements for a recall, a petition signed by more than 50% of registered voters in\na constituency is a\ndaunting requirement. In a country like Nigeria, where voter apathy is common and turnout in\nelections is often low, gathering such a large number of signatures can be extraordinarily\ndifficult. For context, in many\nconstituencies, the number of registered voters can range from a few\nthousands to tens of thousands or more. Mobilising half\nof that population, especially outside of an election cycle, poses logistical\nand financial challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moreover, the Nigerian voter registration process is fraught with\ninaccuracies and incomplete data, which further complicates the signature\ncollection process. Many registered voters may have relocated, lost their\nvoting cards, or may simply be unavailable to participate in a recall process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Assuming that INEC\nsuccessfully verifies the signatures of all petitioners, the conduct of a\nreferendum introduces\nyet\nanother hurdle in the process. Getting the majority of registered\nvoters to\nparticipate in a referendum, let alone vote in favor of a recall, is a\nsignificant challenge. In the 2023 general elections, for\ninstance, voter turnout was only around 27%. It is unlikely that a\nrecall referendum would see significantly higher participation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Given that in elections,\nnot up to 50% of registered voters elect their legislators, why is there such a\nhigh threshold to recall them? <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It is not clear why the\nConstitution calls for a referendum to vote for the recall by a simple majority\n(more than 50%) of registered voters where the petition that initiates the\nrecall process is required to have been signed by the same proportion of registered\nvoters in the Constituency and verified by INEC. Since the signing of the\npetition and the referendum have the same threshold \u2013why can the requisite\nnumber of petitioners not suffice as voting for a recall if their signatures are\nsuccessfully verified? Better still, the proportion of registered voters\nrequired to sign a petition should be significantly reduced. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Recall mechanisms for legislators exist in\nsome presidential systems. However, the practice is much more common at the local or regional level in most\ncountries. In countries with parliamentary systems of government, the recall of\nelected representatives is less common than in presidential systems. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Juxtaposing the recall\nprocess in Nigeria to what is obtainable in the popular United States\ndemocracy, the Constitution does not allow for the recall of members of the US\nCongress. However, the laws of various States allow for elected officials,\nincluding State level legislators to be recalled. While widely recognised, it is not universally\navailable across the country, as only 19 States have provisions for recall. The grounds for recalling\na legislator vary depending on State lawa. Generally, the recall process includes\nseveral common steps such as filing a petition, verification of petitioners\u2019 signatures and\na recall election. Notably, the proportion of signatures required on a petition\nranges from 10% to 25% of the number of voters who participated in the previous\nelection for the office in question while the recall election requires a simple\nmajority of voters registered voters in the constituency or district in\nquestion, to be successful. The low threshold of signatures required to file a\npetition makes it somewhat easier to both gather signatures for a petition to\nkickstart the process, as well as verify the signatures, leaving the simple\nmajority threshold for the recall election as the uphill task in the process. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Another example of a presidential\nsystem with a recall process is Venezuela which has one of the most notable recall processes\nfor legislators, as well as the President. The Venezuelan Constitution allows for recall of any elected official,\nincluding\nmembers of the National Assembly. The recall process can be initiated by a petition\nsigned by 20% of registered voters in the constituency of the legislator or\nofficial sought to be recalled, with a simple majority required at the recall\nelection to remove the legislator or official. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Parliamentary systems that provide\nfor the recall of legislators include Canada, United Kingdom, India, among\nothers. In\nparliamentary systems, the recall mechanism is generally more limited, and in\nsome cases, tied to\nspecific misconduct or criminal behavior as obtains in the UK for\nrecall of Members of Parliament (MPs). However, in places like India (some\nStates) and British Columbia in Canada, recall may be for more general reasons\nbut is available at the regional or local level and not at the national level. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the UK, a recall petition can be opened if a MP is convicted\nof a criminal offence, suspended from the House of Commons for misconduct for\nat least 10 days or provides a false \/misleading expenses claim. If the petition is signed by at least 10% of the registered\nvoters in the MP\u2019s constituency, he or she is removed from office. In British\nColumbia in Canada, a recall petition signed by at least 40% of registered\nvoters in the electoral district of a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA)\nwith the signatures verified, is the requirement to declare the MLA\u2019s seat\nvacant. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While\nthe legislative recall process differs from place to place, it is important\nthat where it exists, it can be made operational. It appears that the threshold\nset for the number of petitioners to initiate a recall in Nigeria is quite high\nin comparison to other jurisdictions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>INEC\u2019s efforts to build on the\nconstitutional provision on recall by providing guidelines for the process may\nhave come to nought owing to the fact that the provisions of the Constitution\nmay be impossible to attain. In a situation where turnout at an election is\nunder 30%, it will almost be impossible to get the numbers of persons required\nto trigger a recall. Consequently, the recall of a legislator in Nigeria remains largely\ntheoretical and exceedingly difficult to achieve. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Until\nthese constitutional provisions are reformed to make the recall process more\naccessible, the concept will remain largely symbolic, offering little recourse\nfor constituents dissatisfied with their elected representatives.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Under the Nigerian Constitution, elected officials including the President, Vice President, Governors, Deputy Governors are not subject to recall. The Constitution stipulates a process for their impeachment by the legislative arm of government, while State laws provide the procedure for the impeachment of Local Government Chairmen and Vice Chairmen. Under the Constitution, these elected officials [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":3642,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[11],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3633","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3633","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3633"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3633\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3638,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3633\/revisions\/3638"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3642"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3633"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3633"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/placng.org\/Legist\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3633"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}