The national debate over the allegations of budget padding in the 2016 Appropriation Act has raised several issues over the role and ambit of the legislature in the Appropriation process. It will be recalled that Hon. Jibrin Abdulmumin, former Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations levelled accusations of budget padding against the Speaker and some principal officers of the House of Representatives in the 2016 Appropriation Act. Hon, Abdulmumin alleged that the budget was padded with billions of Naira spread across over 2,000 fictitious constituency projects.
He also accused some of the principal officers for padding the budget outside the legitimate plenary sessions and allocating N40 billion out of the N150 billion allocated to the National Assembly to so-called constituency projects.
In part, the public’s confusion appears to emanate over what the concept “budget padding” encompasses. Largely unknown in Nigeria’s appropriation lexicon, the term is often used in accounting practice when the estimates of a budget are artificially inflated to give a project room to expand or to cover unexpected costs. In this sense, some of its incentives are defended on practical factors that may affect the proper implementation of a budget like inflation, foreign exchange rate and red tape that for instance the supplementary budget process envisages when the amount appropriated under the Appropriation Act is insufficient. However, objectors of the practice generally base their claims on ethical or moral considerations such as that it is harmful or may pre-empt budget inflation. Nevertheless, from its definition, it is clear that its intention is to increase the estimate of actual anticipated projects.
Related to this is the question of the power of the Legislature to alter an Appropriation Bill after its presentation by the President (first reading). It has been argued that although the 1999 Constitution (as amended) gives the National’s Assembly powers to prescribe how funds can be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, it is completely silent on its role to amend the budget and that “budget padding” is also not recognised as an offence under Nigerian law. Section 81 of the 1999 Constitution has been reproduced below:
81(1) The President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly at any time in each financial year, estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the Federation for the next following financial year”
81(2) The heads of expenditure contained in the estimates other than the expenditure charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation by this Constitution shall be included in a bill, to be known as Appropriation Bill providing for the issue of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the sums necessary to meet the expenditure and the appropriation of the sums for the purposes specified therein”
Inherent in this argument is the question of ownership of the Appropriation Bill. The American Congress for instance, frequently characterise an independent capacity to mold and transform proposals from whatever source into laws. In this sense, Budget padding could be interpreted as legislative foresight by providing a means of preventing the Executive from going through the rigours of a Supplementary Appropriation Act. The approved N6.06 trillion 2016 budget which is a N17bn reduction of the initial 6.077trn budget presented by President Buhari may be indicative of the 8th Assembly’s asserting its independence.
Lastly, there have also been debates as to the impropriety of whether an implicated lawmaker can claim statutory protection from civil or criminal proceedings under the Legislative Houses (Power and Privileges) Act 1953. This may because section 3 of the Act grants civil and criminal immunity to a legislator in respect of any words spoken before that House or Committee or in respect of words in a report to that House or Committee in any petition, bill, resolution, motion or question brought or introduced by him, there. Section 3 has been reproduced:
3. Immunity from proceedings
No civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against any member of a Legislative House-
(a) in respect of words spoken before that House or a committee thereof; or
(b) in respect of words written in a report to that House or to any committee thereof or in any petition, bill, resolution, motion or question brought or introduced by him therein.
Therefore, can a lawmaker accused of padding the budget be legitimately covered under section 3 of the Act? This makes it pertinent for the case to be tested before the Supreme Court to define the parameters of the Legislature in the Appropriation Process and elucidate on the legality or otherwise of the term “budget padding” in the Nigerian Appropriation process
However, some influential commentators have emphasised that the principal issue in the matter not necessarily the budget padding per se but the place and timing of the alleged alterations. The extension of this argument would seem to infer that if the alterations were effected after passage and outside its legitimate plenary session, then the matter is a clear case of conspiracy, fraud or corruption.
Constituency Development Fund
Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) are funding arrangements that channel money from central government directly to electoral constituencies for local infrastructure projects. The fund is designed to support constituency-level, grass-root development projects to achieve equitable distribution of development resources across regions and promote even development. The origin of CDF’s can be traced to President Olusegun Obasanjo’s budget in 1999 and has been contained in the yearly budget of all his successors. However, since its inception, there have been some concerns that the concept has been abused as a tool for embezzling funds rather than being the intended vehicle for development.
Nigeria is not alone in her use of constituency development funds and projects. For instance, countries such as Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, India, Jamaica and Pakistan are known to allocate sums for the execution of infrastructural projects at the grassroots. In Jamaica for instance, constituency development projects empower Members of Parliament to respond to needs articulated by constituents. Also, in India, a Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme was instituted in 1993 for development based on locally felt needs.
However, some of these countries have gone a step further to address some challenges in the implementation of CDF’s by instituting a legal framework for the administration of constituency development funds. In Kenya for example, CDF’s are regulated by the National Government Constituencies Development Fund Act 2015 which limits the role of legislators to the oversight of the projects rather than deciding how the funds can be utilised. Currently, Nigeria has no legal framework for the implementation of CDF’s. This has led to an array of challenges, as there are no specific measures in place to determine the efficacy in the delivery of projects to constituents. There are also arguments that a legal framework will provide a mechanism of monitoring and evaluation and guarantee accountability and transparency by ensuring that projects are implemented and will curb the misappropriation of public funds. In June 2016, A Bill seeking to establish CDF’s for the purpose of even development passed second reading in House of Representatives. Specifically, the Bill provides for a benchmark of 2.5% of the total sum in the budget to be set aside for constituency development.
Nevertheless, public perceptions of CDF’s have been increasingly in the negative necessitating calls for its stoppage. Some critics who advocate that constituency projects should be expunged from the projects have also done so on economic grounds citing that 2,399 of such projects were abandoned in 2013 alone. Recently, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Babachir David Lawal raised questions on its sustenance stating that the implementation of constituency projects itemised in the 2016 budget cannot be guaranteed due to the decline of estimated oil production from 2.2 million barrels per day to about 800,000 barrels per day. The use of CDF’s has also come under attack in other countries. In Tanzania for instance, it has come under strong opposition by some civil society activists who argue that the CDF is unconstitutional because it violates the principle of separation of powers. In the Philippines, the opposition party has also argued that the funds are a mechanism by the executive to buy votes of Congress and an opportunity for lawmakers to collect bribes and kickbacks from contractors.
However, these views digress from the major aim of the CDF, which is to redistribute national resources to the community, improve rural economy, alleviate poverty, create employment and improve the standard of living of constituents. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the 8th Assembly to pass a Bill that will address the aforementioned concerns in addition to institutionalising the concept of CDF’s. The ability of the Legislature in addressing these anxieties will undoubtedly increase citizens’ participation when executing its mandates, plans and processes as well as strengthen its role of representation and oversight.