The National Assembly has passed fresh amendments to the Electoral Act 2026, this time targeting pre-election litigation. The stated focus of the amendments, passed in the House of Representatives on Wednesday, 29 April 2026 and in the Senate on Thursday, 7 May 2026, is to clarify jurisdiction in pre-election disputes and reduce prolonged litigation of election petition processes. But the problem is not simply what the amendments seek to do. It is how and when the National Assembly is doing it.
Reform on the Eve of Primaries
The Electoral Act 2026 was itself passed after a contentious process. Its birth was marked by public criticism, civil society pushback on certain provisions, emergency sittings and concerns that major electoral rules were being settled with limited openness. Now, with party primaries approaching, the National Assembly is again changing the rules that will shape access to the ballot. That is not careful reform. It is political convenience dressed up as legal correction.
Fewer Appeals, Bigger Questions
The major proposal is the creation of a new Section 29A to define how pre-election matters will be heard. The aim appears to be to shorten pre-election litigation by reducing the process to two levels: one court of first instance and one appeal. For National Assembly, State House of Assembly and governorship disputes, the case would begin at the Federal High Court, with appeal ending at the Court of Appeal. For presidential and vice-presidential pre-election disputes, the case would begin at the Court of Appeal, with final appeal to the Supreme Court.
There is a real problem here that the proposal seeks to cure. Pre-election litigation has often dragged too close to elections and, in some cases, beyond them. A faster and clearer process would help. But a serious reform should not be adopted through a rushed amendment process on the eve of primaries, some of which are now being conducted. If the rules for who can sue, where they can sue, and how far they can appeal are being changed, the process should be deliberate, public and constitutionally sound.
A Constitutional Shortcut?
The constitutional question is even more serious. Section 251 of the Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, including matters conferred on it by an Act of the National Assembly. This gives NASS some room to legislate on electoral matters and assign trial jurisdiction. Section 240 also allows for appeals to the Court of Appeal from courts and tribunals as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.
But that power has limits. Conferring jurisdiction is not the same as cutting off constitutional appeal rights or expanding the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal beyond what the Constitution provides.
The key issue is whether an ordinary Act can be used to cut off further appeals or make the Court of Appeal final in some pre-election disputes. Section 233(2)(f) allows NASS to prescribe additional cases that may reach the Supreme Court, but it does not clearly allow NASS to shut the Supreme Court out where the Constitution already opens the door.
Furthermore, section 239 gives the Court of Appeal original jurisdiction mainly over presidential post-election petitions, not presidential “pre-election disputes” such as nomination or sponsorship.
If the goal is to shorten litigation in pre-election matters, the cleaner and more durable route is constitutional amendment. Otherwise, NASS may be using the Electoral Act to circumvent a constitutional process in a way that leaves the amendment vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
Are False-Affidavit Claims on a Separate Track?
A closer reading of the bill suggests that the National Assembly may be creating two procedural tracks for pre-election disputes: one for false-affidavit claims, and another for nomination, sponsorship and primary-related disputes.
The amendment to section 29(5) provides that an aspirant challenging false information in a candidate’s affidavit may file the suit “at a court in the Federal Capital Territory or in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose.” In his lead debate, the sponsor of the bill in the Senate, Senator Simon Lalong (Plateau; APC), described this as a practical and equitable reform aimed at reducing hardship and improving access to justice.
But the drafting raises an immediate question: what court does section 29(5) refer to when it says an aspirant may sue in “a court” in the FCT or where the cause of action arose? Is it the Federal High Court, the FCT High Court, a State High Court, or any court within that territory?
Proposed section 29A appears to move in a more restrictive direction. It provides that “all pre-election matters arising from the nomination of candidates and other pre-election activities” under section 285 of the Constitution and the Electoral Act “shall be commenced, heard and determined” in accordance with that section. Read literally, this provision appears to channel such disputes through specified courts (Federal High Court and Court of Appeal), exclude the jurisdiction of other courts, and limit appeals to two levels.
This raises a further question: does the bill intend to preserve a separate procedural route for false-affidavit claims under section 29(5), or are such claims also meant to fall within the new section 29A framework?
One possible reading is that false-information and qualification disputes under section 29(5), being connected to the nomination process, are also pre-election matters within the meaning of section 29A. On this interpretation, section 29A has already identified the courts with jurisdiction over all pre-election disputes, including false-affidavit claims, while section 29(5) merely expands the territorial venue for filing such claims. In practical terms, the suit would still lie before the Federal High Court, but could be filed either in the FCT or in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose.
This interpretation would avoid the conclusion that the bill creates two parallel tracks for pre-election litigation. The courts may ultimately have to decide how they should operate in practice.
Even so, the coexistence of both provisions exposes a deeper drafting problem. The bill does not clearly state whether false-affidavit claims are to operate within the general pre-election framework or under a distinct procedural route. This kind of ambiguity has been a recurring criticism of the National Assembly’s approach to electoral lawmaking. For a bill intended to streamline pre-election disputes, that uncertainty is a serious weakness.
The Process is a Problem: Pass First, Explain Later
The larger concern is the legislative process adopted. Electoral laws are not ordinary housekeeping rules. They determine who gets on the ballot, how disputes are resolved, and how public power is contested. For that reason, amendments to electoral laws should not be passed with the speed and opacity now becoming familiar. They require proper notice, stakeholder consultation, public hearings, careful committee work and clear publication of the final text being voted on. That did not appear to happen here in any meaningful way. The House passed the bill in one day and the Senate has now followed.
This is exactly the kind of legislative behaviour that weakens public confidence. It creates the impression that electoral rules are being adjusted not through principled reform, but through hurried political calculation. It also repeats a troubling pattern: pass first, explain later; amend first, consult later; create legal uncertainty, then leave courts and citizens to clean up the consequences.
Nigeria does need a faster and clearer system for resolving pre-election disputes. It also needs a modern approach to service of election petition processes. But those goals cannot justify shortcuts.
A law meant to reduce electoral confusion should not be born in confusion. And a National Assembly that claims to be strengthening electoral justice must first show respect for the legislative process itself.